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In this dissertation, I present three essays which examine questions in
the ﬁeld of public economics using a game theoretic approach, and I derive
hopeful results and helpful rules for international negotiation.
In my ﬁrst chapter, I examine minimum participation constraints. In
the presence of heterogeneity, a minimum participation (MP) clause in a public
goods arrangement can serve as a device to create a more homogeneous group.
When coalitions are restricted in what they can bargain over, exclusion of
some agents from the bargaining process can be Pareto improving. This paper
gives a general set of suﬃcient conditions for such an exclusion result to hold,
and presents examples of when exclusion does, and does not, improve upon
unanimity.
In the second chapter, I discuss the problem of determining which exter-
nality situations merit international cooperation. I create a general framework
vi
of linearized parameters to examine a general externality problem, and then
I provide the suﬃcient conditions for a parameter to move non-cooperative
and cooperative solutions in opposite directions under certain circumstances.
I argue that situations which behave in this manner and which have a higher
parameter value have more beneﬁt to cooperation through the increased range
in actions to bargain over.
The third chapter extends upon the second chapter and applies the
framework developed to an externality problem. I present a particular story
of correlation in ﬁsh growth and a corresponding model which gives an example
of an increasing action gap. I describe the method of use of the framework, and
using the linearized parameters developed in the second chapter, I attempt to
show the divergence of non-cooperative and cooperative actions in this setting,
demonstrating the need for negotiation among sovereign entities.
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Chapter 1
Minimum Participation Clauses and Exclusion
in Public Good Agreements
1.1 Introduction
An agreement for the abatement of a public bad or the supply of a
public good requires determination of the exact action to be taken and the set
of agents to be involved. Internationally, a typical multilateral environmental
agreement (MEA) may be negotiated to reduce transboundary pollution, in-
crease ﬁshing stocks, or control regional radioactive waste. A Home Owners'
Association, on the other hand, has a goal to reduce annoying actions amongst
the community and may involve a single apartment complex or a whole block
of houses. Though the agreements operate on diﬀerent levels of agents, the
goal to reduce a negative externality is the same.1 Other examples of coali-
tions reducing a negative externality are the European Union, which originally
had the aim of ending frequent and bloody wars between neighbors, and the
1It is true that agents most often encounter previously established Home Owners' Associ-
ations, while just-forming Associations usually have a very clear set of agents to draw from
when a new development is built. Agents joining MEAs, on the other hand, are usually
directly involved in determining the provisions during negotiation. However, the parallel
stands, because there are Home Owners' Associations which encompass residential homes,
as opposed to buildings, and the lines of membership must be drawn, and there is accession
to existing treaties.
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euro currency zone, which was partly intended to limit the impact of currency
exchange on trade deals and tourist experiences [4, 5].
Sovereignty implies that agents cannot be forced to do something by
another party's will alone. In an environment with sovereign agents, lack
of external enforcement means that only mutually beneﬁcial agreements can
correct an externality. Countries are fully sovereign, since a country cannot
force its will on another without making war and since there is no ruling
third party. Citizens do not have quite the same degree of sovereignty, since
they need to follow a government's laws, but laws rarely extend to cosmetic
issues, such as curtain lining color, or establish less stringent guidelines than a
community would impose, as in the case of noise controls.2 For either country
or citizen, there must be a signiﬁcant beneﬁt to joining a coalition and binding
oneself to the group's chosen action. The formation of government operates
along similar lines: the government provides a positive externality, and the
founding agents must determine how to establish and provide for it [37].
If sovereign agents take a hand in designing their own agreement, then
agents would endogenously determine the actions taken, as well as the self-
enforcement mechanisms implemented. First, agents must choose the method
and amount of contribution to the public good, and they must do so in a way
that is in every participant's best interests. Diﬀerent situations may specify for
2Another diﬀerence to note is that in a Home Owner's Association, individuals fully
commit, while in a multilateral environmental agreement, citizens and ﬁrms may violate an
alloted share of some sort. This paper will therefore treat countries as the individual, and
assume perfect enforcement for them upon their commitment.
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agents varying ability to commit to certain types of group action. In the Home
Owners' Association, agents can commit to a monthly dues system easily, but
keeping communal areas clean may be more diﬃcult. In the MEA, agents
may agree on the necessity of cooperation and sharing of research, but may be
hard-pressed to give speciﬁc details of policy.
Second, the mechanisms which will make the agreement stick and in-
crease its value must be determined. Some possible provisions that enhance
participation in agreements are minimum participation clauses, direct trans-
fers, and issue linkages. Of particular interest are minimum participation
(MP) clauses, mechanisms with low transaction costs and powerful beneﬁts.
MP clauses raise the value of an agreement by guaranteeing at least a certain
number of compliers or a certain level of provision if the treaty is implemented.
In a historical example, an MP clause of nine applied to the Constitution of the
United States: nine of the original thirteen colonies had to ratify the Consti-
tution before it would take eﬀect. Though widespread in modern agreements,
MPs are especially prevalent in MEAs, such as the Montreal Protocol, the
Rotterdam Convention, and the Kyoto Protocol.
In a public-good contribution game, the optimal binding treaty would
specify an action for each agent, even if the agents diﬀer in their contribution
costs. If the set of possible contracts is limited, though  principally, if con-
tracts must specify the same increase in contributions for all agents  then the
optimal contract may exclude agents with a high cost of contributing. This
is signiﬁcant because important examples of such asymmetry are present in
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overﬁshing and nuclear armament: in the former, countries are limited in types
of ﬁshing by geography, while costs may vary widely because of technology;
in the latter, countries have diﬀerent historical starting positions, needs for
nuclear power, and perceived intentions. Therefore, though all agents may
have interest in the overarching topic and beneﬁt from the public good, re-
strictions in what the agents bargain over aﬀects the optimal MP constraint
in the presence of heterogeneous players.
This paper examines how restricted action sets aﬀect the MP constraint
that should be chosen for a treaty in the presence of heterogeneous players.
In particular, it evaluates how agreement actions which are restricted to egal-
itarianism, either in the form of equal changes or proportional changes from
the pre-treaty state, lead to the desirability of using the MP constraint as an
exclusion device. I ﬁnd that under restricted actions, when a MP constraint
can reduce the heterogeneity of the potential signatories, the mechanism can
deliver treaties with higher total welfare.
In Section 1.2, I present a brief development of this topic in others'
work, as well as a summary of how this paper ﬁts into the existing literature.
In Section 1.3, I present a motivating example, while in Section 1.4, I set up
my general model, deﬁne two types of restricted action set, present results, and
describe the intuition behind them. In Section 1.5, I compare the two types
of restricted action sets and place them in a real-world context. In Section
1.6, I present conclusions and possible extensions. Finally, I have included
an Appendix that contains the major and minor proofs, as well as one with
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alternative proof approaches.
1.2 Literature
Barrett [10] presents two approaches to modeling self-enforcing agree-
ments, one which is a one-shot game, while the other is inﬁnitely repeated.
Through numerical analysis, Barrett shows that in the one-shot game, the
self-enforcement strategy of punishment and reward may not sustain a larger
group, even when the beneﬁt of the agreement would be high. In the repeated
game, credible tit-for-tat and trigger strategies can increase the number of
participants, but a treaty relying on these strategies may not be renegotiation-
proof. While a repeated game may be more eﬀective in capturing the long-
standing interactions of nations, businesses, or home owners, the one-shot
game can accurately represent the incentives present in the process of writing
and signing a treaty, while preserving the endogeneity of decisions.
Black, Levi, and de Meza [15] examine the introduction of an exogenous
MP constraint into a one-shot game. They ﬁnd that inclusion of any constraint
larger than the resulting number of members under open participation outper-
forms a standard agreement. In their model, the new constraint increases the
number of participants and lowers the total stock of the negative action. The
constraint can be constructed so as to maximize aggregate surplus, resulting
in an optimal participation level. Black et al. also discuss the issue of model
timing, observing that in a single round of negotiation, agents will choose to
implement the optimal participation level, but multiple rounds of negotiation
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lead to a decreased incentive to quickly ratify, since pivotal signers wish to
gain further beneﬁts.
Carraro, Marchiori, and Oreﬃce [20] endogenize the MP constraint in a
three-stage game of public good provision in which all agents are identical. The
ﬁrst stage is the minimum participation stage, in which all agents unanimously
vote on the fraction required to sign the treaty in order for it to go into
force. The second stage is the coalition stage, when each agent weighs the
utility of being a member versus that of being a free-rider in deciding whether
or not to join. The ﬁnal stage is the policy stage, in which the coalition
chooses its allocations cooperatively while non-members choose their actions
non-cooperatively. Carraro et al. show that it is possible for agents to agree
to an endogenously chosen MP clause which increases the overall number of
signatories from the coalition formed under open membership. Here, already,
there is some notion of exclusion; an MP constraint requiring the coalition of
the whole may not be chosen due to the incentive to be a free-rider. Because
each agent wants a chance to free-ride, he supports an MP constraint which
gives him some chance of joining the agreement and some chance to strictly
beneﬁt. However, the analysis is sensitive to the assumption of homogeneity
of agents: the MP stage can be solved with unanimous voting since what is
optimal in the eyes of one agent is optimal for all of them.
While arguments using models with identical agents capture the impor-
tant aspects of many situations, in others, heterogeneity of costs and beneﬁts
is of central importance in the analysis of the actions to which signatories will
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bind themselves. Agents can vary in terms of the beneﬁt they receive from
their individual action and eﬀects caused by others' actions, while treaties can
vary in type of committed action. For environmental considerations, any num-
ber of factors such as population, area, topology, GDP, and political relations
have been shown to aﬀect a country's decision to sign an MEA [13, 28, 43].
A source of heterogeneity among countries for the issue of pollution is that of
technology, since a country on the cutting edge of technology likely has lower
costs of reduction compared to a country with little research and development.
Meanwhile, in the case of nuclear disarmament, the largest source of hetero-
geneity is preference for security and perceived threat level. On a smaller level,
when establishing an Home Owners' Association, families may value diﬀerent
restrictions, such as noise control or cleanliness of public areas, than do single
households. A Home Owners' Association formed among similar family-size
homes may ﬁnd it easier to enact certain restrictions than a community of
apartments of varied occupancy.3
Weikard, Wangler, and Freytag [59] extend Carraro et al.'s model to
heterogeneous agents. They use the same coalition formation timing as Car-
raro et al., but change the minimum participation constraint from number of
signatories to minimum abatement, which has some precedence. Weikard et
al. designate a sharing rule proportional to outside options to determine the
actions of any coalition. A random agent is chosen to propose which agents
3This, of course, is a moot point if the Association's rules are established by a developer
prior to construction as part of a marketing plan to select for a homogeneous group of
homeowners.
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should enter a coalition under this sharing rule, capturing the idea that some-
one's proposal will win, but it is hard to predict whose. In this set-up, they
ﬁnd that free-riding always occurs, at least by one agent  the agenda setter.
In addition, they ﬁnd that a larger number of countries leads to a smaller
abatement outcome which is ineﬃcient.
Using a coalition formation model to represent a treaty negotiation
process separates the MP and allocation decisions. The MP is chosen in a ﬁrst
stage through the statement of a minimal coalition, ahead of the allocation
decision, which is set in a following stage by the formed coalition. This may be
the proper timing for certain applications such as the home owners' association
or even the euro zone, when membership is established before rules. However,
in most multilateral international negotiations, countries write agreements over
a period of time and then vote on all ﬁnal provisions in one shot. Initially, one
might suppose that using incorrect timing may limit the theoretical predictions
and outside relevance of the model. Despite that, the coalition formation
model can be regarded as robust to both timing scenarios because of backwards
induction: forward-looking agents will only suggest or sign agreements which
beneﬁt them in some way and which will gain acceptance from other agents.
In this context of coalition formation, I study the equilibria of a one-
shot negative externality game and the set of agreements that improve upon
the no-coalition Nash equilibrium. This can be understood as an equilibrium
in a repeated game with Nash reversion, though I do not develop that idea
or pursue the enforcement of agreements. In the MEA context, the one-shot
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game would be a single treaty negotiation, which must be adhered to or no
other one-shot games can be played in the nebulous future. Thus, it is as if
agents were embedded in a larger game of international politics and respect
for negotiations, where cheating on the outcome of a one-shot treaty coalition
game leads to collapse of the system.
Like Weikard et al. [59], I consider a speciﬁc type of treaty action. Un-
like their sharing rule, I develop a solution concept under the limited commit-
ment power of an equal treatment assumption, where coalition members can
only commit to one-dimensional decreases from the ex ante no-coalition Nash
equilibrium. Under this exogenous constraint of egalitarianism, I examine the
MP choices that give the most improvement over no-coalition equilibrium.
When the possible agreement sets for a coalition are unrestricted, par-
ticipants can always beneﬁt from the reduction of the amount of free-riders,
since each can contribute a bit more of the public good and improve the util-
ity of all participants. Even though it adds a restriction, egalitarianism can
be a desirable treaty trait. Requiring all coalition members to take the same
action allows for simplicity in negotiation, since the choice variable can be
one-dimensional instead of multi-dimensional.
Furthermore, egalitarianism may result from environments with uncer-
tainty. In a dynamic externality reduction game with private cost shocks,
Harrison and Lagunoﬀ [44] ﬁnd that truth-telling and coalition participation
require fully compressed quotas, i.e. amount allowances which cannot depend
on private information, but must the same for all players. Agents are ini-
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tially identical, even if later they develop heterogeneously. Regardless of later
shocks, all agents in the agreement have the same per-period production quota
as other agents. Bagwell [9] develops a bilateral tariﬀ negotiation game with
uncertainty in types, solving both a one-shot static and dynamic version. He
ﬁnds pooling equilibria in which countries with one type of public opinion will
imitate the other type, both negotiating the same levels of tariﬀs. The results
of both of these papers add to the motivation of understanding the use of
egalitarian treaties.
The equal treatment assumption changes the structure and participa-
tion of an enacted treaty in comparison to unrestricted actions. The main
result of this paper is that under egalitarianism and given suﬃcient hetero-
geneity, the optimal MP constraint is strictly smaller than the whole. The
constraint  which may declare the number of players, the exact set of players,
or the total action required  removes agents who are limited by lack of ability
to greatly aﬀect the public good by rendering them non-pivotal. The remain-
ing agents, whose actions have the largest eﬀects on public goods, create a
more eﬀective agreement.
Ludema and Mayda [48] ﬁnd a similar exclusion result in their paper on
tariﬀ negotiations within the World Trade Organization. The WTO's most-
favored nation status must apply to all members. If a large exporter with
most-favored nation status negotiates a lower tariﬀ with an importer, then
the lower tariﬀ applies to all members and results in a positive externality for
other exporters. Exporters may band together to oﬀer equal transfers to the
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importer to incentivize negotiation. Ludema and Mayda ﬁnd that only large
exporters will participate in negotiations and oﬀer equal-sized transfers to an
importer in return for a lower tariﬀ on a good. Small exporters of the good
who are unable to pay the transfer will free-ride on the eventual negotiation.
In another environmental setting, Ricke, Moreno-Cruz, and Caldeira [55] also
found exclusion to be optimal for coalitions deploying climate geoengineering.
In their global thermostat setting game," regional preferences lead to an in-
centive for more homogeneous groups to band together to enact an optimal
action for the region. I conﬁrm both of these exclusion results in a broader
setting of negative externality reduction by coalitions with restricted actions.
1.3 Motivational Examples
In this section, I motivate the research question anecdotally and nu-
merically. First, I portray a few real-world situations and discuss their appli-
cability to this model. I describe this paper's notion of what a large actor is
and what a small actor is. Second, I examine a simple, three-person game
which previews the general result of the paper, developed more fully in the
section following.
1.3.1 Anecdotal Motivation
Here, I present a few examples of negative externalities in an interna-
tional context. I break down the actors of each example into large players
and small players. In the context of this paper, a large player is one who
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takes a large action. By taking a large action, this player is the source of a
large portion of the total externality. A small player, on the other hand, is
one who takes a small action, possibly zero, but is still aﬀected by the exter-
nality. This is a bit of a simpliﬁed notion of heterogeneity, which lends itself
to the introductory examples I present. I expand upon this idea in favor of
more nuanced heterogeneity in Section 1.5. I review the following real-world
situations and label which players are large and which are small. For each, I
discuss my model's applicability to the situation.
1. Carbon Dioxide Emissions : Consider the emission of carbon dioxide
(CO2) into the atmosphere.4 The industry and energy provisions which
release CO2 are the action within the model, and the emissions are the
negative externality.
According to data from the European Commission Joint Research Cen-
tre, the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, and the World
Bank [3, 51, 61], from 2008 to 2010 China and the United States were the
largest kiloton (kt) producers of CO2 emissions, while Kiribati, Lesotho,
Tuvalu, Nauru, and the U.S. Virgin Islands were the smallest produc-
ers.5 Therefore, in terms of kiloton CO2 emissions, China and the U.S.
4From the World Bank [61]: Carbon dioxide emissions are those stemming from the
burning of fossil fuels and the manufacture of cement. They include carbon dioxide produced
during consumption of solid, liquid, and gas fuels and gas ﬂaring.
5Both datasets indicate China and the U.S. as the largest producers but diﬀer on the
matter of the smallest. The World Bank's Development Indicators have missing values
for a number of small countries, including Tuvalu and the U.S. Virgin Islands, while some
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are large players, while Kiribati, Lesotho, Tuvalu, Nauru, and the U.S.
Virgin Islands are small players.
In this case, China and the U.S. have large industrial sectors which
manufacture goods necessary to the economy, as well as large energy
demands which consume tremendous amounts of fossil fuels. The small
players listed have little industry compared to the large players and in
some cases no industry at all. However, since emissions aﬀect the global
stock of CO2, the externality is felt by all players. In fact, the small island
nations may be in greater danger of calamities like ﬂooding, thereby
experiencing higher expected damages from the externality [2, 40]. This
example ﬁts the model well: there is a clear distinction between large
and small players, and all players beneﬁt from reduction of the negative
externality. This situation will particularly ﬁt the type of egalitarian
reduction discussed in Section 1.4.1, which prescribes the same decrease
for each player.
A modiﬁcation to this example is to measure the negative externality in
terms of metric tons per capita, instead of kilotons of CO2. Under this
new deﬁnition of the action and according to the same data in the same
time period, Qatar, Trinidad and Tobago, and the Netherlands are now
the large players, since they are the top metric ton per capita producers
countries are missing entirely, like Nauru. The EDGAR database lists estimates of 1 kiloton
of CO2 for Tuvalu, Nauru, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, while the World bank estimates 18.3
kt for Lesotho and 62.3 kt for Kiribati.
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of CO2. The small players are then Burundi, Lesotho, Afghanistan, and
Chad, since they have the lowest emissions of CO2 in metric ton per
capita. By this metric, China drops down to about 70th place because
of its large population, despite its rank in kiloton production.
This method of measurement, however, creates a situation more diﬃcult
to describe. In a sense, the externality would result from industry and
energy provision per capita, though these are odd metrics on a global
scale, especially since energy use is disproportionate even within a coun-
try. Therefore, it is better to imagine the ﬁrst metric (kt of CO2) in
the context of this model. If a weighted measure of CO2 emissions is
desired, then perhaps it would be more intuitive to consider emissions
per industrial worker or divided by industrialized area or stock of fossil
fuels, instead of emissions per capita.
2. Albacore Tuna: The albacore tuna (Thunnus alalunga) is a highly migra-
tory species found in most of the world's oceans. The species has value
as the preferred canned white meat tuna [7]. According to data from
the United Nations' Food and Agriculture Organization [6], the highest
albacore producers in 2012 were Japan, Taiwan, and China.6 The small-
est non-zero producers in 2012 were Saint Helena, Niue, Bermuda and
Morocco.
With some exception, the large albacore producers generally have large
6All ﬁshing regions for a country aggregated.
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ﬂeets and advanced technology, long coasts and access to multiple ﬁshing
regions, or cooperation with other large producers. These characteristics
allow for ﬁshing multiple species, so the albacore catch is just a fraction
of the total ﬁshing business. Furthermore, the ﬁshing industry is just a
fraction of the overall economy, since these characteristics overlap with
those of a rich country. The small producers generally have smaller ﬂeets,
less advanced technology for catching and processing, and small coasts.
For many of the small producers, food production  and particularly for
island nations, ﬁshing  makes up a large part of the economy, and the
albacore tuna is a large percentage of the industry.
The four species of tuna that underpin oceanic ﬁsheries in
the tropical Paciﬁc (skipjack, yellowﬁn, bigeye and albacore
tuna) deliver great economic and social beneﬁts to Paciﬁc Is-
land countries and territories (PICTs). Domestic tuna ﬂeets
and local ﬁsh processing operations contribute 3-20% to gross
domestic product in four PICTs and licence fees from foreign
ﬂeets provide an average of 3-40% of government revenue for
seven PICTs. More than 12,000 people are employed in tuna
processing facilities and on tuna ﬁshing vessels. Fish is a cor-
nerstone of food security for many PICTs and provides 50-90%
of dietary animal protein in rural areas. [11]
Any voluntary reduction by the small producers greatly impacts the
economy, since the ﬁsh has high marginal beneﬁt. Any involuntary re-
duction, in the form of a lower catch caused by overﬁshing or climate
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change, could be ruinous. All the countries beneﬁt from reducing over-
ﬁshing caring for the health and size of the stock of albacore tuna, but
perhaps the small producers perhaps beneﬁt even more. Therefore, the
global production of albacore ﬁts the model described in this paper, be-
cause despite the heterogeneity of players, the eﬀects of overﬁshing are
felt by all who partake in catching this species.7 In particular, this sit-
uation ﬁts the type of egalitarian reduction discussed in Section 1.4.3,
which respects the quickly diminishing marginal beneﬁt of reduction by
the small producers.
3. Downstream and Downwind Pollution: Consider two types of trans-
boundary pollution, downstream and downwind. In each of these cir-
cumstances, there is a discrepancy in the impact of the externality on
neighboring countries. Both water and air pollution can occur as by-
products of electricity production from coal, though other industrial ac-
tions can create the situation as well. An example of this case would
be two countries that share access to the same river, where one coun-
try is upstream, while the other is downstream. The upstream country
has waste that is released into the river to a certain extent, while the
downstream country experiences the eﬀects of this waste. In an empiri-
cal estimation testing for the presence of free-riding on water quality of
international rivers, Sigman [57] ﬁnds signiﬁcance for pollution by coun-
7There are countries who produce nil.
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tries upstream of borders outside the European Union. Similarly, for an
airborne pollutant, one country which is downwind of others experiences
more of the externality.8 Such conditions describe the Black Triangle
in the Izera Mountains of the Western Sudetes [16]. In the 1980s, the
forests of the Izera Mountains were decimated through the damaging
combination of logging and pollutants contained in wind sediment and
precipitation.
In this case, the emphasis is not on the identities of the large and small
producers. Though it is likely that the upstream/upwind country is the
larger producer, any heterogeneity of production could be due to diﬀerent
resource distributions, industrialization levels, or energy demands. What
matters more in this situation is that only one agent bears the brunt of
the externality, since the pollutant is quickly washed or blown away from
the other. The downstream/downwind country has more to gain from
reduction of the externality, and may need to compensate its neighbor.
The model in this paper allows for heterogeneity in the beneﬁts of the
action with the externality and the costs of the externality. However,
this example does not ﬁt the model as well as the previous two. The
main diﬀerence is not that the externality is experienced more keenly
by one party than by the others. The model allows for this, as does
the ﬁrst example. The real issue is that the downstream/downwind
8In fact, this latter situation can cause the former situation, as clouds absorb the airborne
pollutant and deposit it through precipitation.
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country has less of an eﬀect on itself than the upstream country has on
it. By cutting its own production, the downstream country may not
meaningfully decrease the externality, nor does it aﬀect the stock of the
pollutant in the upstream country. The situation violates some of the
model assumptions listed in Section 1.4.9
As demonstrated in these examples, the type of public-good problem
described in this paper is one where all agents are aﬀected by a negative
externality, the reduction of any agent constitutes a public good for the others,
and certain agents produce less of the negative externality than others. In this
context, the descriptors large and small pertain to the size of an agent's
action.
1.3.2 Numerical Example
In this section, I provide a numerical example with three agents. I
hold one agent's utility function ﬁxed, and then I calculate the Nash equilib-
rium actions as the values of the parameters of the other two agents vary. I
then calculate the utility of lump-sum reduction treaties and determine which
improve upon the no-coalition equilibrium. I present this example as a moti-
vation for the exclusion of the odd man out, showing that a treaty may be
more successful when participants are more homogeneous.
9Most notably, submodularity, since the upstream country is not hurt by the actions of
the downstream country.
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A treaty's purpose is to bring the equilibrium closer to the Pareto
optimal solution through players' joint reductions. As in any public good
agreement, there is concern that agents will prefer to free-ride, lowering the
value of cooperation and collapsing the agreement. A minimum participation
constraint can add initial value to a treaty and gain commitment from players.
An MP constraint could specify the exact minimum set players who
must join the treaty in order for it to go into eﬀect. The constraint could
also be the required cardinality of the ﬁnal set of participants, which is more
akin to real treaty MP constraints, or the total sum of participants' actions, so
that the treaty is not in force until the required level of action is committed.
By agreeing on the set of agents J (or the number of agents or amount of
reduction) as a measure of minimum participation, players can then infer the
vector of commitments, which follow from the type of action restriction and J
itself.
This constraint can also serve as a way of selecting a homogeneous
group out of a set of heterogeneous agents. To examine this idea, I consider a
speciﬁc parameterized example in a simple world of three agents, I = {1, 2, 3},
to better understand the selection of J . For this toy model, the chosen utility
function is:
ui(a) = θiai − ai
3∑
j=1
wjaj, (1.1)
where ai is in Ai = [0, 1], θi ∈ [0, 1], and the weights sum to one, i.e.
∑
j∈I wj =
1. This utility function is twice-continuously diﬀerentiable, concave in ai, and
exhibits a negative externality from aj, j 6= i. The function has areas in which
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it is increasing in ai and areas in which it is decreasing in ai. It has a unique
equilibrium on A for each parameter set {θ1, θ2, θ3}.
I solve ﬁrst for the no-coalition Nash equilibrium, compare this to a
social planner's prescriptions, and then determine how actions would change
under each possible minimum participation constraint. Afterward, I consider
which MP constraint deﬁnes the optimal coalition for a range of parameters.
In the absence of a treaty, each agent solves the following problem:
max
ai
θiai − ai
3∑
j=1
wjaj,
s.t. ai ∈ [0, 1].
(1.2)
The best response function for agent i is:
BRi(θi, aj, ak
) ≡

1 if θi ≥ 2wi + wjaj + wkak
θi−wjaj−wkak
2wi
if wjaj + wkak < θi < 2wi + wjaj + wkak
0 if θi ≤ wjaj + wkak.
The Nash equilibrium, a∗(θ), consists of the simultaneous best re-
sponses, i.e. for each i, a∗i (θ) = BRi(θi, a
∗
j(θ), a
∗
k(θ). Counting corner solu-
tions, there are nine types of equilibria.10 The interior Nash equilibrium has
each agent i playing according to the function:
a∗i (θ) = −
wi
(−4θi + θiw2jw2k + 2θjw2j − θjw2jw2k + 2θkw2k − θkw2jw2k)
2
(
4− w2iw2j − w2iw2k − w2jw2k + w2iw2jw2k
) .
10All play zero; two play zero, one plays interior; two play zero, one plays one; one plays
zero, two play interior; one plays zero, one plays interior, one plays one; one plays zero, two
play one; all play interior; two play interior, one plays one; all play one.
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The other equilibria involving corner solutions can be calculated. For
any θ, there is only one possible equilibrium. In general, for agents with
relatively large values of θ, the solution is greater than zero; I call these agents
positive producers. Meanwhile, agents with rather small values of θ take
action of zero; I call these agents non-producers. These labels are related to
the concept of large and small actors, as discussed earlier.
Unless all agents are non-producers, the no-coalition Nash equilibrium
is not optimal because of the negative externality. The social planner's problem
is:
max
a1,a2,a3
3∑
i=1
{
θiai − ai
3∑
j=1
wjaj
}
,
s.t. ai ∈ [0, 1] ∀i ∈ I.
(1.3)
The equal-weighted Pareto optimal solution for the economy results
in prescribing reduced actions for each positive producer, as expected. The
threshold of producing more is now higher, meaning that an agent's beneﬁt
parameter must be very large, giving a large individual beneﬁt, in order for
an agent to be allowed to inﬂict a high level of externality on the others.
Having examined the no-coalition problem, I now consider a lump-sum
reduction treaty for the motivating example, wherein each participant of the
treaty reduces from his no-coalition equilibrium action by the same amount.
Notationally, the lump-sum restricted treaty consists of (J, aLS(J)), where the
minimum participation constraint is J , the minimum set of agents that must
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participate in the treaty, and aLS(J) are the agreed-upon actions.
Consider a negotiation scenario as follows: agents ﬁrst determine J
through some voting process, or J is somehow provided exogenously, then
agents joining J choose aLS(u, J), while agents outside of J best respond to
the actions of the coalition.11 The outcome of the negotiation is either the sin-
gleton Nash equilibrium or a vector of commitments and singleton responses.
I examine incentives for agents to cooperate with a lump-sum reduction treaty
under each possible cardinality MP constraint size, #J ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}.
First, it is important to establish that, regardless of J , a non-producer
cannot commit to a lump-sum reduction because it is impossible for him to
reduce beyond zero. This distinct pattern of heterogeneity demonstrates how
a smaller group can improve upon the results of the whole coalition: with even
one non-producer, the coalition of the whole can do nothing under this form of
the equal treatment assumption. This pattern extends beyond the trivial case
of excluding agents with corner solutions of zero and holds even for strictly
interior equilibria.
In contrast, consider a diﬀerent type of treaty, one of proportional re-
duction, where each agent participating would reduce from no-coalition equi-
librium by the same percentage. It is possible for a non-producer to commit to
an egalitarian proportional reduction treaty, as any factor multiplying zero is
11The simultaneous timing could be altered to a Stackleberg model, where the coalition
moves ﬁrst in choosing their actions and the free-riders move second. The direction and
exclusion results are largely generalizable, though the exact actions may diﬀer.
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still zero, albeit such an action is largely symbolic. Two or three agents could
easily enter an ineﬀective proportional treaty, either by choosing a reduction
of zero percent or, if all are non-producers, choosing any reduction level at all.
Since such a treaty does not actually require positive reduction, there is no
improvement over the no-coalition equilibrium. Eﬀective treaties of this type
are possible, but are not examined in this section; the toy model's focus will
remain on lump-sum reduction treaties for now.
It is necessary to discuss the possible distribution of agents from the
two types, positive producers and non-producers. Clearly, in a world of solely
non-producers, there is no negative externality, no need for improvement, and
hence, no need for a treaty. Thus, in the following discussion, I assume there is
at least one agent who is a positive producer. Since there are only four mean-
ingful cardinality MP constraints in a world of three, each can be examined in
detail for optimal actions and implications.
Under the open membership rule, reductions can be negotiated, but
there is no minimum number of members for the treaty to go into eﬀect.
Without repeated interaction providing a chance for punishment or some sort
of side transfers that provide reward, open membership removes the initial
value that the MP constraint could provide. Thus, no positive producer will
join such a treaty in this game, unable to count on the participation of others,
and the solutions are the same as under no treaty.
Under a singleton MP constraint, if one agent considers committing to
reduction on his own, he does not have to negotiate the amount  he would
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simply choose it. A non-producer could individually commit to an ineﬀective
proportional reduction treaty of any level; even though this is an equilibrium
in which an agreement arises, the total externality is not reduced from the
no-coalition equilibrium level in any sense. Such an agent could not commit to
a unilateral lump-sum reduction. A positive producer could reduce his action
for the beneﬁt of the whole, but such an action would run counter to the
no-coalition equilibrium. Unilateral deviation gives no outside beneﬁt to the
agent in question and allows all the other players to free-ride on the reduced
action. Therefore a Pareto-improving treaty will not occur for the singleton
MP clause.
For an MP constraint greater than one, there are Pareto-improving
lump-sum reduction treaties possible. The question which sparks the most
interest is when a treaty with an MP clause of two producers is preferred to
one with a clause specifying all three must participate.
Without loss of generality, look at the situation where agents i = 1, 2
are positive producers who consider the treaty:(
J, aLS(J)
)
=
(
{1, 2} ,{a∗1 − r∗ ({1, 2}) , a∗2 − r∗ ({1, 2})}),
while agent three best responds with BR3 (θ3, a∗1 − r∗({1, 2}), a∗2 − r∗({1, 2})),
for now suppressed as abr3 . The reduction r
∗({1, 2}) solves the following coali-
tion problem:
max
r∈R
2∑
i=1
{
θi(a
∗
i − r)− (a∗i − r)
[
2∑
j=1
(
wj(a
∗
j − r)
)
+ w3a
br
3
]}
,
s.t. 0 ≤ r ≤ min{a∗1, a∗2}.
(1.4)
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With the MP commitment device, the coalition only goes into eﬀect
if the two required agents sign. Thus, agents one and two know that each
of them must sign in order for the other to uphold the agreement. Such an
agreement would only be signed if the agents' individual utilities are improved.
The comparative statics of the individual utility from this treaty can
demonstrate when signing is beneﬁcial. Deﬁne uLSi for i = 1, 2 as the utility of
entering into the treaty described, where 1 and 2 reduce and 3 best responds.
Moving from zero, the marginal utility of increasing the reduction is:
∂uLSi
∂r
∣∣∣
r=0
= −θi + (2wi + wj)a∗i + wja∗j + w3a∗3. (1.5)
This statement is positive when the beneﬁts of reduction outweigh the foregone
beneﬁts of action, i.e. when (2wi + wj)a∗i + wja
∗
j + w3a
∗
3 > θi. If no-coalition
actions are large or θi is small, then this statement likely holds.
So when would the marginal utility of increasing the reduction be pos-
itive moving from zero?
1. Looking at the corner solution where all agents play an action of one,
the statement clearly holds. We can rearrange it to be:
(wi + wj + wk) + (wi + wj) > θi
The weights add up to one, so we have:
1 + (wi + wj) > θi
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The parameter θi ≤ 1, and the weights are strictly positive, so this
statement holds. Thus when all the agents are such that they play the
maximum action, reduction by two members has positive beneﬁt. This is
because the third agent, being at the maximum already, cannot free-ride
upon the reduction. A treaty would be more beneﬁcial to include him as
well, but if need be, a two-person treaty is enough. This case is alluded
to in Section 1.5.
2. In the case of the interior no-coalition Nash equilibrium, this condition
would be:
(wi(2wi + wj)− 2) ·
(
4− w2jw2k − w2i
(
w2j (1− w2k) + w2k
)) ·(
2w2kθk − (4− w2jw2k)θi − w2j
(
w2kθk − (2− w2k)θj
))
< 0
With weights of one-third for all the players, this statement becomes
17θj + 17θk > 323θi. We see that this is unlikely to hold for both players
i = 1, 2 when weights on all players are equal and θ is large enough for
an interior equilibrium.
Intuitively, this makes sense, because if the equilibrium is interior, then
agent three is a positive producer and has an incentive to increase his ac-
tion when he is a free-rider, negating the possible beneﬁt from reduction
by the other two agents.
3. Consider the case where the third agent's no-coalition action is zero while
the other two agents have interior actions a∗i =
3
323
(18θi− θj). Then, the
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condition becomes:
wj(323 + 54θi − 3θj)− 2(163− 54wi)θi + 6(9− wi)θj > 0
With weights of one-third for all the players, this statement becomes
19 + 9θj > 48θi. It holds for many combinations of low values of θj and
θi.
Furthermore, the second derivative of uLSi is negative always, so the
utility of reduction is concave. Thus, if the marginal beneﬁt of reduction is
positive at zero, then the agent desires a reduction that is strictly positive.
Expanding the treaty to include full participation requires that all three
agents agree on the action vector. A Pareto-improving lump-sum reduction
treaty for the coalition of the whole could only occur if all agents are positive
producers. Similarly as with two, three positive producers have an incentive
to join a lump-sum reduction treaty.
To summarize, in a world of three agents, there are two possibilities for
lump-sum reductions:
1. Agents could sign an ineﬀective treaty, one where the chosen reduction
is zero. Any MP constraint is possible for this.
2. Agents can sign a Pareto-improving lump-sum reduction treaties with
with r > 0. The MP constraint must be greater than two for this case.
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The category of Pareto-improving agreements deserves further exami-
nation, particularly with regard to which MP constraint and vector of actions
will result.
Equilibrium selection is an issue which may be resolved through game
timing or bargaining protocol. A timing common to most models of the liter-
ature, such as that of Carraro et al. [20], is one where the treaty participants
determine their action as a coalition in a separate stage from all agents' deci-
sion of the MP constraint. This timing reﬂects the idea that it would be unfair
or perhaps even infeasible to bind participants to the decisions of the whole
group. In this timing, equilibrium selection proceeds according to the coali-
tion's maximization function  the coalition that results from a ﬁrst stage will
choose its actions. The reduction can be chosen by maximizing the summed
utility of the coalition members or some other function of member utility.
On the other hand, in many real-world agreements, all persons in at-
tendance at the start of the negotiation have a say in the provisions of the
agreement; only once these are agreed upon do agents declare their partic-
ipation. However, the results of this timing are not so diﬀerent: there are
more possible equilibria without the coalition utility function to act as an
equilibrium selector, but the equilibria are bound by the preferences of the
expected participants. An agent who will not participate cannot suggest an
unreasonable reduction and expect the other agents to join the treaty.
For instance, without a negotiation process more detailed than a unan-
imous vote, the possible equilibria lie on a continuum. Any of the valid values
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could be chosen in equilibrium through unanimous vote and adhered to in
the policy stage of either timing, so the question of equilibrium selection for
non-coalition timing persists. Most real-world agreements undergo rounds of
discussion, as is the case in many bargaining protocols. A bargaining pro-
cess which is strictly increasing and always eﬃcient, such as Nash or Kalai-
Smorodinsky, would result in an eﬃcient selection. Furthermore, in some pro-
cesses, as the bargaining set gets larger, everyone is better oﬀ. Thus, agents
with a larger initial action give more room for the bargaining process, are able
to reduce more, and can improve social welfare more.
Apart from heterogeneity in utility, agents may also have heterogeneity
of bargaining power. A measure of bargaining power in multi-state agreements
could be calibrated to various instruments of power, such as overall pollution
rank, number of trade agreements, GDP, or United Nations Security Council
membership, to name a few. Coalition negotiation captures the weakened
position of an agent who has little to bring to the table, while other decision
protocols such as unanimous voting may allow a small player to derail an
agreement. These ideas present areas for further research and tie-ins to other
strands of bargaining literature, such as delay in negotiation and capture of
bargaining position.
Using the utility function speciﬁed by Equation 1.1, if selection proceeds
according to highest total utility, then the ﬁgure below gives a graph of which
outcome will occur under which realization of parameters. In this ﬁgure, agent
one's parameter θ1 is normalized to one. The externality weights wi are equal
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to one third for each agent. For each pair of parameters θ2 and θ3, I examine
which coalitions, if any, improve the most upon the no-coalition equilibrium.
Figure 1.1: Exclusion in a linear utility function.
(a) The parameter θ1 is normalized to one, while parameters θ2 and θ3 take values
from zero to one. Each area depicts which coalition meets individual rationality
constraint and most improves upon the no-coalition equilibrium.
For small values of the parameter, there is an area in the upper right-
hand corner where the coalition of the whole is restriction Pareto optimal.
However, when the parameter value decreases below some threshold, that agent
drops production to zero, rendering the coalition of the whole no longer optimal
under the equal treatment assumption. There is an intermediate value for the
parameter where the no-coalition Nash equilibrium persists, since a coalition
by the two remaining producers would be sabotaged by an increase in action
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from the excluded player. However, once the parameter of one agent is small
enough, the remaining two form the exclusive treaty. Along the x-axis, when
player two's value of θ2 is small, there is a region where the optimal lump-
sum restricted coalition is between players one and three, represented in the
upper left corner. Symmetrically, along the y-axis, there is a region where
the optimal coalition is between players one and two, represented in the lower
right corner. The remaining region, where player one takes much larger action
than player two or three, has no lump-sum treaties which improve upon the
no-coalition outcome for all players.
This example gives a clear view of how more homogeneous agents can
band together to improve total utility. When all three players are similar, they
form the coalition of the whole; when one agent is less similar, he is excluded
from treaty negotiation. In Section 1.5, I present another optimality map for a
diﬀerent utility function, which exhibits its own distinct pattern of exclusion.
While this toy model presented a simpliﬁed view of things, it does serve
as motivation for a more generalized understanding of exclusion. In particular,
it prompts the next section's result on existence of exclusion.
1.4 Model and Analysis
This section describes a set of negative externality games played by
coalitions with diﬀerent restrictions on their actions. I ﬁrst specify the con-
stituent elements, then the classes of games.
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I study equilibria of games in which coalitions have commitment power
of diﬀerent sorts. In all of the games, there is a set of agents I, with cardinality
n at least equal to three. Each agent's action set is Ai = [0, 1], with A ≡
×i∈IAi, and the utility functions belong to the class U satisfying the following
conditions:
a. twice continuous diﬀerentiability, each ui is in C2(A),
b. negative externalities, (∀i ∈ I)(∀j 6= i)(∀a ∈ A)
[
∂ui(a)
∂aj
< 0
]
,
c. submodularity, (∀i ∈ I)(∀j 6= i)(∀a ∈ A)
[
∂2ui(a)
∂ai∂aj
< 0
]
,
d. strict own concavity, (∀i ∈ I)
[
∂2ui(a)
∂a2i
< 0
]
, and
e. unique Nash equilibrium, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for equilibrium of
u have a unique solution on A.
These elements describe a fairly general class of negative externality
games. The main limiting assumption is that of strict submodularity. While
many externality situations such as natural resource extraction ﬁt this assump-
tion, there are a few situations in which submodularity may be questionable,
such as a ﬁrm-level analysis of emissions. A reasonable model may have that
the cross-partial for a ﬁrm does not depend on the production of another ﬁrm,
or that it is even enhanced by production of a complementary product. How-
ever, a strict inequality is required for the technical reason of openness and
ease of proving existence; if the assumption is relaxed to no submodularity or
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even reversed to supermodularity, there are likely games in which the exclusion
result of this holds, but this is an extension to be tackled at another point.
In this environment, I examine the possible coalitions. In a game with-
out any cooperation, the Nash equilibria involve only the singleton coalitions.
Deﬁnition. [Nash Equilibrium.] For utility function u ∈ U, the vector a∗
is a Nash equilibrium at u, denoted a∗(u) ∈ Eq(u), if for all players the
individual vector entry a∗i (u) maximizes agent i's utility given that each other
player j chose a∗j(u). Formally:
∀ i ∈ I, a∗i (u) = arg max
bi∈Ai
ui(bi, a
∗
−i).
The negative externalities condition guarantees that any no-coalition
Nash equilibrium is ineﬃcient and reductions strictly improve everyone's wel-
fare.
Lemma 1.1. For any utility function u ∈ U, if a∗(u) ∈ Eq(u), then any small
vector decrease in a∗(u) is Pareto improving.
This result relies on demonstrating that each agent's small decrease
in action has a ﬁrst order eﬀect on others' utility, but only a second order
eﬀect on own utility. Anderson and Zame [8] use a method similar in ﬂavor in
Section 4 of their paper on shyness in the proof that non-vertex pure-strategy
equilibria are ineﬃcient.
Lemma 1.1 establishes that a group of agents may form to act together.
As alluded to earlier, group formation is typically modeled via coalition games.
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Multilateral treaties are agreements to cooperate in the interests of group
welfare, so I will examine games played by coalitions to gain insights on treaty
formation. Though I discussed a few possibilities for bargaining and timing
in Section 1.3.2, for the general analysis I ignore the details of the bargaining
process in favor of ﬁnding agreements that make everyone party to them better
oﬀ.
Prior to taking action, agents are invited to negotiate a single agree-
ment; there are no side agreements or alternate provisions possible. Coalitions
can vary in commitment power, and I study two types of commitment: ﬁrst,
agents in a coalition can agree to a speciﬁc vector of commitments which lists
the action taken by each member of the ﬁnal agreement; second, agents in a
coalition can agree to a one-dimensional reduction from the no-coalition Nash
equilibrium. However, the externality in this class of games gives rise to a
free-rider problem. If a coalition J forms and commits to reductions, the play-
ers not in the coalition will increase their outputs in response, because of the
higher marginal utility resulting from the strict submodularity of the utility
function and the decreased actions of the coalition members.
Joining a coalition must give some beneﬁt to the participants. There-
fore, a coalition's actions are certainly not even conceivable if the members
do not perform as well utility-wise as in the no-coalition equilibrium; such a
coalition simply would not form.
Deﬁnition. [Conceivability.] A vector of actions a(u, J) is conceivable for
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coalition J if each agent within J experiences a weak improvement in utility
over the no-coalition Nash equilibrium and at least one agent experiences a
strict improvement. Formally,
(∀j ∈ J) [uj (a(u, J)) ≥ uj (a∗(u))] (1.6)
and
(∃k ∈ J) [uk (a(u, J)) > uk (a∗(u))] . (1.7)
The notion of conceivability is akin to individual rationality constraints
in mechanism design. Without an improvement upon her no-coalition out-
come, an agent will simply not join a proposed coalition. This is also related
to the unpursued issue of coalition stability: if a coalition is conceivable, then
it is internally stable, since no agent within the coalition wishes to abandon it.
However, I do not address external stability; I am examining coalition candi-
dates and evaluating them in comparison to the no-coalition Nash equilibrium
under diﬀerent types of restricted action.
At issue is how much reduction will be achieved by various coalitions
when they have diﬀerent kinds of commitment power. I begin by studying
unlimited commitment power, then turn to the ability to commit to a one-
dimensional reduction from the no-coalition Nash equilibrium.
Unrestricted commitment power games for a coalition J , where J is
non-empty, non-singleton, and a subset of I, are the games in which the agents
in J act as a single player with the summed group utility function
∑
j∈J uj
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while every player i not in J acts as a single player with his original utility
function ui.
Deﬁnition. [Unrestricted Coalition Power.] For J ⊆ I, the J-coalition
game with unrestricted coalition commitment power, denoted ΓUnJ (u),
has [#(I \ J) + 1] agents, with the coalition labeled as agent J and having the
action set ×j∈JAj and utility function uJ(a) =
∑
j∈J uj(a), and agents i 6∈ J
having action sets Ai with utility functions ui(a). The simultaneous-move
Nash equilibrium of this game is denoted aUn(u, J) =
(
aUnJ (u), a
Un
−J(u)
)
.
As earlier discussed, Lemma 1.1 establishes that a reduction from no-
coalition Nash equilibrium by all players will improve utility for each player.
A coalition of the whole could most easily achieve such an outcome in a game
with unrestricted commitment power. By maximizing group utility, such a
coalition is not only conceivable but eﬃcient as well. No other coalition in
unrestricted commitment power can improve upon it.
Lemma 1.2. For u ∈ U, when coalitional commitment power is unrestricted,
the unrestricted equilibrium of the coalition of the whole, aUn(u, I), is conceiv-
able for all u ∈ U, and no other coalition J strictly smaller than I can improve
upon the actions in summed utility.
The best possible coalition under unrestricted actions is the coalition
of the whole. This is because the coalition can always request that a member
plays his no-coalition action, while leaving that player out may give him leave
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to free-ride. If there are players with a no-coalition Nash action of zero, then
coalitions excluding these players may tie the outcome of the coalition of the
whole if the excluded players still have a best response of zero to the decreased
actions of the coalition.
Apart from the unrestricted ability of assigning an individual target
to each agent, the vector of coalition commitments can be constructed in a
few manners. The equal treatment assumption is a broad concept, reﬂected
in the structure of many multilateral agreements and motivated earlier in
the paper. As described in the toy model, one possibility is to establish a
one-dimensional decrease from no-coalition actions, for instance each by some
equal lump-sum reduction or by some equal percentage reduction. Requiring
all members to follow the same reduction rule has a sense of egalitarianism
and is often observed in real world agreements, like the proportional reduction
in the Montreal Protocol [13]. This type of reduction could be particularly
useful in a repeated game, where the historical equilibrium is observed and
can be improved upon or reverted to.
Lemma 1.2 illustrated that the coalition of the whole is the best possible
option in terms of group utility in the case of unrestricted commitment power.
However, the grand coalition may be thwarted if the gains to free-riding are
especially high, in the presence of uncertainty, or in a dynamic game with-
out suﬃcient patience. Furthermore, under the restriction of lump-sum or
proportional commitment power, the coalition of the whole may not be ideal.
Suﬃcient heterogeneity in the costs and beneﬁts of agents guarantees that,
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with restricted commitment power, coalitions strictly smaller than I are con-
ceivable and and also improve upon a coalition of the whole, giving a sort of
exclusion result. One can go even further, for some vectors of payoﬀ functions
(ui)i∈I , and ﬁnd the set (or sets) J that are Pareto superior to the coalition
of the whole amongst all subsets of I. In this section, I deﬁne two types of
one-dimensional decrease from no-coalition Nash equilibrium: lump-sum com-
mitment power and proportional commitment power.12 I show the existence
of exclusion for both.
1.4.1 Lump-sum Restricted Commitment Power
Consider the game where a coalition can commit to lump-sum reduc-
tions. By this I mean that each agent in J reduces from their no-coalition
Nash action, a∗i , by an amount r.
Deﬁnition. [Lump-sum Commitment Power.] For J ⊆ I, the J-coalition
game with lump-sum commitment power, denoted ΓLSJ (u), has #(I \
J) + 1 agents, with the coalition named agent J and having the action set
{aJ ∈ ×j∈JAj : (∀j ∈ J)[aj = a∗j(u) − r], r ∈ [0,minj a∗j(u)]} and utility
function uJ(a) =
∑
j∈J uj(a), and agents i 6∈ J having action sets Ai with
12Another possible restriction is an upper limit X¯ on the stock of negative actions which
is then split according to some sharing rule. A carbon cap program contains stock limits,
though such a program is not so much a treaty as an implemented policy. In a smaller
example, home owners' association members must restrict all noise to a lower decibel level
at nighttime. This type of restriction is used in Weikard, Wangler, and Freytag [59], as well
as Ludema and Mayda [48].
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utility functions ui(a). The simultaneous-move Nash equilibrium of this game
is denoted aLS(u, J) =
(
aLSJ (u), a
LS
−J(u)
)
.
This solution concept is subtle because the equilibrium deﬁnitions have
Nash equilibria within them. This is why uniqueness of the no-coalition Nash
equilibrium is so important. The solution concept could be weakened to non-
unique Nash games, perhaps by choosing the largest equilibrium, or by ig-
noring relabeled equilibria. Despite this being a static game, the negotiations
could be thought of as if the players are agreeing to a per-period action, with
the no-coalition equilibrium as a fall-back.
The following result demonstrates that there are coalitions J , strictly
smaller than the full set of agents, with lump-sum commitment power which
improve upon the no-coalition equilibrium and upon the result of the whole
coalition. Together, these give the result that coalitions strictly smaller than I
are conceivable and Pareto-improving under the equal treatment assumption
when there is enough heterogeneity.
Theorem 1.1. For any J ( I, #J ≥ 2, there is a set of u ∈ U having
non-empty interior, for which the vector of actions aLS(u, J) is conceivable,
formally denoted as:
(∀j ∈ J)[uj(aLS(u, J)) > uj(a∗(u))]. (1.8)
Further, there is a subset of u ∈ U having non-empty interior which fulﬁll the
above and for which, under the lump-sum restriction, the coalition J improves
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upon the outcome of the coalition of the whole, formally written as:
(∀i ∈ I)[ui(aLS(u, J)) > ui(aLS(u, I))]. (1.9)
The proof relies on demonstration of a particular utility function u ∈ U
for which their is exclusion, as well as openness of the conditions describing
U. The proof can be found in Appendix A. The next section elaborates on
the intuition of this result using a class of models with parameterized utility
functions.
1.4.2 Intuition for Exclusion under Lump-sum Restricted Commit-
ment Power
To clarify the exclusion result given in Theorem 1.1, I discuss a utility
function similar to those common in the literature on coalitions as environmen-
tal agreements. The functional form can be separated into a beneﬁt function
and a damage function.
As initially presented in Section 1.4, the agents I = {1, 2, ..., n} take
action ai ∈ Ai = [0, 1]. These players are heterogeneous in the following
fashion: each player i ∈ I has a positive beneﬁts coeﬃcient, θi ∈ Θi = [0, 1],
which multiplies the beneﬁt gained from the action taken. Thus, the class
of utility functions examined here consists of those which have the following
form:
ui(ai, a−i) = θiB(ai)− ai c
(∑
j∈I aj
)
Here, B(ai) represents the beneﬁts of the individual action, with mul-
tiplicative coeﬃcient θi. The function is increasing and weakly concave, i.e.
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B′ > 0, B′′ ≤ 0. The cost of individual action is aj c (
∑
k ak), where the
marginal cost depends on the weighted summed total action.13 The marginal
cost function is increasing and convex, i.e. c′ > 0, c′′ > 0. Observe that since B
is increasing, we have that B′(0) > 0, and that the cost function at zero action
is zero, because 0 · c(·), so no marginal cost is incurred. These assumptions
guarantee that the whole utility function is concave in all actions.
The beneﬁt and damage functions are shared among players, and to-
gether they must fulﬁll the characteristics deﬁned earlier on U, which were
negative externalities, strict submodularity, strict own concavity, and unique
Nash equilibrium. The [resented structure of separable beneﬁt and cost func-
tions can easily fulﬁll all of these requirements, and each of the characteristics
can be checked when functional forms and number of agents are assigned.
To further describe the heterogeneity and make use of the distinction
between large and small actors, I establish two groups of players:
1. The ﬁrst is group J with cardinality m.14 The agents in group J all have
θi = 1. Hence, the utility function for players i ∈ J is:
ui(ai, a−i) = B(ai)− aic
(∑
j∈I aj
)
(1.10)
13For simplicity's sake, the damages depend on the sum of the players' actions. The
components of the action vector could be enter as individual arguments of the function,
instead of as a sum. In a setting of incomplete information, the sum could be a discounted
expectation [29].
14Naming this group J is an abuse of notation. It is used to suggest that this will be the
group eventually forming an exclusive treaty.
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2. The second group of players I \ J consists of the remaining (n − m)
players. These agents all have θi = θ. The utility function for a player
i ∈ I \ J is:
ui(ai, a−i) = θB(ai)− aic
(∑
j∈I aj
)
(1.11)
In this examination, the parameter θ increases the marginal beneﬁt of
the action as it increases from zero to one. As θ increases, the two groups
grow less disparate. In equilibrium, the players in J should be taking the
same action, as should all the players not in J .
Suppressing the u from the notation in the previous sections, the no-
coalition Nash equilibrium of this game a∗(θ) consists of the equilibrium actions
of the players not in J , denoted a∗I\J(θ), and the equilibrium actions of the
players in J , denoted a∗J(θ):
a∗I\J(θ) ≡ arg max
ai∈Ai
θB(ai)− aic
(
ai + (n−m− 1) a∗I\J(θ) +ma∗J(θ)
)
, (1.12)
a∗J(θ) ≡ arg max
aj∈Aj
B(aj)− ajc
(
aj + (n−m)a∗I\J(θ) + (m− 1)a∗J(θ)
)
(1.13)
At the highest value of the group parameter, θ = 1, both groups of
players have the same maximization problem. Since the players are identical
in this case, they would play the same action: a∗I\J(1) = a
∗
J(1). At lower
values of the group parameter, θ < 1, the two groups of agents have diﬀerent
maximization problems and diﬀerent actions.
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Lemma 1.3. When the group parameter is strictly smaller than one, θ < 1,
then the equilibrium action of the players not in J , a∗I\J(θ), is smaller than the
equilibrium action taken by players in J , a∗J(θ).
The proof shows that a smaller θ decreases the marginal beneﬁt of
action of the players not in J compared to that of the players in J .
According to Lemma 1.1 from Section 1.4, this no-coalition Nash equi-
librium is ineﬃcient. Therefore, the agents may form a coalition in which they
agree to reduce the action and total negative externality. Under a coalition
with unrestricted power, the agents could easily achieve a ﬁrst-best solution,
assigning a speciﬁed action to each agent. Under a coalition with lump-sum re-
stricted power, each agent participating must subtract the same amount from
his no-coalition action. Examining restricted power coalitions in this class of
utility functions will help illustrate the exclusion result in Theorem 1.1.
The agents consider two possible lump-sum reduction treaties: one
which forms a coalition of the whole (all I players), and one which contains
only the players in J (excluding those not in J).
First, consider the coalition of all I players. The coalition maximization
problem under lump-sum commitment power is:
max
r∈
[
0,a∗
I\J (θ)
]
{∑
j∈J
[
B
(
a∗J(θ)− r
)− (a∗J(θ)− r)c((n−m)(a∗I\J(θ)− r)+m(a∗J(θ)− r))]
+
∑
i∈I\J
[
θB
(
a∗I\J(θ)− r
)− (a∗I\J(θ)− r)c((n−m)(a∗I\J(θ)− r)+m(a∗J(θ)− r))]}
(1.14)
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For every θ and equilibrium a∗(θ), there is some utility-maximizing
lump-sum reduction for the coalition of the whole denoted r∗I (θ). This reduc-
tion solves the ﬁrst order condition listed in Appendix A. The choice of r∗I (θ)
is limited by the smaller action, a∗I\J(θ). The action space is bounded from
below by 0, so the coalition's reduction can only be as large as the smallest
action of a participant, meaning that r∗I (θ) ≤ a∗I\J(θ).
For large values of θ, this condition does not pose a problem. If the
optimal reduction for the coalition of the whole is strictly smaller than the
no-coalition action chosen by the players not in J , then the optimal reduction
is implemented and all players participate. However, consider what happens
as θ approaches zero. Then, the equilibrium action of the players not in J
approaches zero as well, which limits the reduction that a coalition of the
whole could implement.
The agents in J still take a strictly positive action. Though the agents
not in J have negligible actions, the players in J continue to exert a negative
externality on each other and could agree to reduce by themselves. In the
limiting circumstances of θ close to zero, a separate treaty for the players in J
would beneﬁt all players.
Thus, consider the coalition of only the players in J . For any value of
θ, the coalition maximization problem under lump-sum commitment power is:
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max
r∈[0,a∗J (θ)]
∑
j∈J B
(
a∗J(θ)− r
)
−(a∗J(θ)− r)c((n−m)aJI\J(θ) +m(a∗J(θ)− r)) (1.15)
while agents not in J best respond as singletons with:
aJI\J(θ) ≡ arg max
ai∈Ai
(1− θ)B(ai)
− ai c
(
ai + (n−m− 1)aJI\J(θ) +m
(
a∗J(θ)− r∗J(θ)
)) (1.16)
For every θ and equilibrium a∗(θ), there is some utility-maximizing
lump-sum reduction for the coalition of the whole denoted r∗J(θ). This reduc-
tion solves the ﬁrst order condition listed in the Appendix.
At any θ, the J-coalition's marginal utility to increasing reduction from
zero is strictly positive, i.e. ∂uJ
∂r
|r=0 > 0 (shown in Appendix A.1), given that
the players not in J were initially best responding. Even if the free-riding
players increase actions from no-coalition equilibrium by a tiny amount, the
J-coalition will still be Pareto improving for the agents in J . This hints at the
fact that, when the agents not in J have minimal response, the J coalition has
r∗J(θ) strictly greater than zero and that the exclusion result holds for small
values of θ.
In the coalition of the whole, total utility is increasing in the reduction
r for some time, and then begins to decrease. The ﬁrst order condition for
the I-coalition gives weight to the marginal beneﬁt to action of each group
according to the size of that group, choosing a reduction between what would
be optimal for those not in J and those in J . When the marginal beneﬁt of
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action is zero for agents not in J , attempting to include them restricts the
possibilities of reduction, particularly since the marginal utility of those not
in J turns negative more quickly than the marginal utility of those in J .
Lemma 1.4. There exists a threshold value θ¯ > 0 for the group parameter
such that for all values of the parameter higher than the threshold, θ ∈ (0, θ¯),
the equilibrium action of players not in J , a∗I\J(θ), is a binding constraint on
problem (1.14).
Lemma 1.4 demonstrates that the exclusion result from Theorem 1.1
holds for this class of parameterized utility functions. Furthermore, it elu-
cidates the mechanics of the exclusion result: for zero actions, players are
excluded because they simply cannot take smaller actions; for non-zero but
small actions, players are excluded because they will not take smaller actions,
since their marginal utility would run negative. Either way, the smallest ac-
tions bind the egalitarian action space of any coalition which would include
them.
The ﬁrst rationale, in particular, spurs the desire for equal treatment
which still allows for small-action takers and zero-action takers to participate.
This leads to the development of proportional commitment power: because
a fraction of zero is still zero, even the smallest players can participate. In
the next section, I examine the exclusion result under proportional restricted
commitment power. General existence is once again shown, this time with the
driving rationale is the disparity between the marginal beneﬁt of reduction of
heterogeneous players.
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1.4.3 Proportional Restricted Commitment Power
Consider the game where a coalition can only commit to proportional
reductions. A coalition J commits to a proportional reduction of s: each agent
in J plays s times his no-coalition action, a proportion of what would have
been played.
Deﬁnition. [Proportional Commitment Power.] For J ⊆ I, the J-
coalition game with lump-sum commitment power, denoted ΓLSJ (u),
has #(I \ J) + 1 agents, with the coalition named as agent J and having the
action set {aJ ∈ ×j∈JAj : (∀j ∈ J)[aj = sa∗j(u)], s ∈ [0, 1]} and utility function
uJ(a) =
∑
j∈J uj(a), and agents i 6∈ J having action sets Ai with utility func-
tions ui(a). The simultaneous-move Nash equilibrium of this game is denoted
aPr(u, J) =
(
aPrJ (u), a
Pr
−J(u)
)
.
The following theorem extends the exclusion result from earlier to lump-
sum commitment power. Under proportional commitment power, there are
coalitions J strictly smaller than I which are conceivable and Pareto-improving
in the presence of heterogeneity.
Theorem 1.2. For any J ( I, #J ≥ 2, there is a set of u ∈ U having
non-empty interior, for which the vector of actions aPr(u, J) is conceivable,
formally denoted as:
(∀j ∈ J)[uj(aPr(u, J)) > uj(a∗(u))]. (1.17)
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Further, there is a subset of u ∈ U having non-empty interior which fulﬁll
the above and for which, under the proportional restriction, the coalition J
improves upon the outcome of the coalition of the whole, formally written as:
(∀i ∈ I)[ui(aPr(u, J)) > ui(aPr(u, I))]. (1.18)
The proof can be found in the Appendix. The next section gives some
intuition for this result using the same class of models as in Section 1.4.2.
1.4.4 Intuition for Exclusion under Proportional Restricted Com-
mitment Power
Recall the earlier set-up with two types of agents and separated beneﬁt
and cost functions:
1. Agents in J , or large agents: These agents have utility deﬁned by
Equation (1.10) and take action a∗J(θ) in equilibrium.
2. Agents not in J , or small agents: These agents have utility deﬁned by
Equation (1.11), with an extra beneﬁts parameter θ ∈ (0, 1), and take
action a∗I\J(θ) in equilibrium. From Lemma 1.3, this action is smaller
than the action of members in the group J .
As with the lump-sum reduction, the agents consider two possible pro-
portional reduction treaties: one which forms a coalition of the whole, and one
which contains only players in J .
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For the proportional reduction coalition of all I players, the maximiza-
tion problem is:
max
s∈[0,1]
∑
i∈J
B(sa∗J(θ))− sa∗J(θ)c
(∑
j∈J sa
∗
J(θ) +
∑
k/∈J sa
∗
I\J(θ)
)
+
∑
i/∈J
θB(sa∗I\J(θ))− sa∗I\J(θ)c
(∑
j∈J sa
∗
J(θ) +
∑
k/∈J sa
∗
I\J(θ)
) (1.19)
For every θ and equilibrium a∗(θ), this will have some solution, s∗I(θ),
which lies in [0, 1]. This fraction solves the Kuhn-Tucker conditions in the
Appendix. A choice of s∗I(θ) = 1 means that no reduction is implemented and
that, in essence, the coalition agrees to play the no-coalition Nash equilibrium.
On the other hand, a choice of s∗I(θ) = 0 means that the coalition implements
full reduction and eliminates the negative externality and the action. Any
fraction in between indicates some reduction, with lower numbers indicating
more reduction than higher numbers.
As with the lump-sum reduction, the coalition of the whole works well
for small values of θ. If the reduced vector, s∗I(θ) · a∗(θ), weakly improves
upon the no-coalition equilibrium, a∗(θ), for all players, then all players will
participate and the coalition will implement the reduction. With this type of
egalitarian treaty, there is no physical limit on the one-dimensional reduction
choice, as with the lump-sum reduction. The lump-sum reduction was clearly
limited by the smallest players' actions; if it were larger, those players could
not participate, since they could not play a negative action outside of the space
Ai = [0, 1]. All players can physically participate, since the reduction is by a
multiplied factor.
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However, in revealed Section 1.4.2, there is a secondary reason why the
exclusion eﬀect holds for lump-sum restricted power. The marginal beneﬁt
of coalition reduction for a player is positive and increasing at ﬁrst, then
decreasing, and then negative. At some point, the reduction is too high to
be optimal for that player. In fact, the reduction could go so far as to cause
the players to drop out of the coalition, preferring to play the no-coalition
equilibrium and then free-riding.
Furthermore, the next result shows that the grand coalition will never
choose full reduction:15
Lemma 1.5. For any θ, the proportional reduction taken by the grand coalition
is never full-reduction, i.e. s∗I(θ) > 0.
At ﬁrst, this may seem a strong result from the problem. However,
proportional reductions approaching full reduction may still occur, so the result
does not limit the application in any realistic sense. In many agreements some
small amount of the action is still permitted. For instance, nuclear weapons
treaties allowed much of the armory already in existence to remain so, which
is not a reduction to zero. For other agreements, banned behaviors may have
some substitute, if imperfect: whaling provides meat and oil, which can be
obtained from other animals and energy sources. The question addressed in
this paper is not whether coalitions can or will reduce to zero; the question is
15So long as there are players with positive action  this is discussed in the Appendix.
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whether a smaller coalition can improve upon the outcome of the coalition of
the whole.
Consider what happens as θ approaches zero. The action of the smaller
players approaches zero. At these small actions, players not in J could still
participate in a coalition of the whole: whatever positive percentage is chosen,
they can play s ·a∗I\J without issue. The problem lies with whether they would
want to reduce any further. If θ is very small, then the marginal beneﬁt at
that action increases quickly upon reduction due to concavity. Thus, agents
playing a small positive action would appreciate reduction by other players,
but would cling to their own last production. At some level of θ, the coalition
of the whole cannot reduce at all.
Lemma 1.6. There exists a threshold value θ¯ > 0 for the group parameter
such that for all values of the parameter lower than the threshold, θ ∈ (0, θ¯),
the reduction chosen by the coalition of the whole, s∗I(θ), is equal to one.
The players not in J have such small actions that any further reduction
causes them great pain. Thus, consider a proportional reduction coalition just
for the players in J . The maximization problem of the J-coalition is:
max
sˆ∈[0,1]
m
[
B(sˆa∗J(θ))− sˆa∗J(θ)c
(
msˆa∗J(θ) + (n−m)aJI\J(θ)
)]
The best response of those not in J is deﬁned as:
aJI\J(θ) ≡ arg max
ai∈Ai
θB(ai)− aic
(
ai +
∑
j∈J sˆa
∗
J(θ) +
∑
k/∈J∪{i} a
J
I\J(θ)
)
51
This will have some solution, deﬁned sJ(θ), which solves the Kuhn-
Tucker condition listed in the Appendix. At any θ, the J-coalition's marginal
utility of reduction from the no-coalition equilibrium is strictly positive. What
this means is that, given that the players not in J were best responding by
playing the no-coalition action, the beneﬁt to decreasing from s = 1 is positive,
i.e. − (∂uJ
∂s
|s=1
)
> 0 (shown in Appendix A.3.2). Therefore, if the coalition
of the whole is unable to reduce because the agents not in J have very small
actions, agents in J will prefer the J-coalition to form, provided that the
remaining players have limited free-riding increases.
Thus, Lemma 1.6 establishes the rationale behind Theorem 1.2. Since
the members of J would like to establish their own coalition, they will do so 
and since the other players' actions are minuscule, their free-riding will also be
negligible. Thus, the exclusion result holds for another type of one-dimensional
decrease from no-coalition equilibrium.
1.5 Robustness to Policy
I have already described some reasons why restricted action sets caused
by the equal treatment assumption are interesting and relevant. Here, I discuss
the two chosen types in particular, placing them in context of each other and
applications. I also address two alternative treaty structures related to the
egalitarian restriction, the possibilities of multi-level coalitions and central
commissions. Before those topics, however, I present a second optimal treaty
map. While it indicates a similar pattern to the example in Section 1.3.2, it
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has a completely new optimal area to describe and explain.
1.5.1 Exclusion of Large Agents
So far, I have placed exclusion in the context of large actors forming
coalitions without small actors. In the toy model, the only coalitions that
formed included agent one, the player who always had θ1 = 1. In the proof, I
present a parameterized case that splits two groups. However, Theorems 1.1
and 1.2 are more general than this. The result is general existence of exclusion,
not existence hinged on this particular bifurcated heterogeneity.
Using a utility function from the set U, I perform the same three-
agent analysis as in Section 1.3.2. The utility function for agents I = {1, 2, 3},
presented below, is the one used in the Appendix in the proofs of the Theorems:
ui(a) = θi (10 + ai)− a2i
(
3 +
n∑
j=1
aj
)
.
Every set of parameters for this function has a unique interior no-
coalition Nash equilibrium. For each set of parameters, I calculate the lump-
sum reduction for each possible coalition and then examine which has the
highest total welfare. The following image presents which coalition is optimal
under the equal treatment of lump-sum reduction in this game.
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Figure 1.2: Exclusion in a parabolic utility function.
(a) As in Figure 1, the parameter θ1 is normalized to one, while parameters θ2 and
θ3 take values from zero to one.
The ﬁgure has a similar pattern to that of Figure 1, in that the corners
match up between the two images. However, there is a whole new area where
the coalition of agents two and three is optimal. This is despite the fact that
agent one is normalized to be the largest agent (the agent with the highest
marginal beneﬁt and action). However, with this utility function, there is a
low elasticity of response, and even though agent one is excluded, his action
does not shift very much when he is permitted to free-ride. This creates an
area where the smaller agents have the optimal coalition.
This example demonstrates the need for further examination of exclu-
sion in treaties. While the general result has been established, there is room
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for more characterization regarding how and when exclusion appears. Apart
from the economic models, the way exclusion applies in the context of policy
must also understood, which leads to the discussion in the next section.
1.5.2 Egalitarian Restrictions as Policy
An egalitarian restriction upon actions might be an attractive idea to
policymakers. First, the framing eﬀect of Everyone is contributing the same
amount could have a psychological impact and ease negative responses. Sim-
ilarly, equal treatment serves as an easy anchoring point in negations. The
restriction could result from a transaction cost to the dimension of the bar-
gaining space. If there is some sort of cost or diﬃculty to bargaining over
the J-dimensional action vector, then it might be easier to bargain over a
one-dimensional number. Finally, the restriction guarantees a high rate of
reward from the minimum participation constraint. Under the lump-sum re-
striction, a participant's contribution is multiplied many times over, while the
proportional restriction ensures that the participants' total stock is decreased
by some percentage.
The lump-sum reduction may seem too simplistic when ﬁrst described,
particularly for an international context of pollution or ﬁshing reduction.16
However, it is not so outlandish for similar entities to immediately agree to
contribute the same amount, perhaps by splitting some desired total, instead
16A Total Allowable Catch (TAC) seems to be a reverse of the lump-sum reduction  it's
a lump-sum limit. The reduction would be the diﬀerence between the original ﬁshing level
and the TAC.
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of spending time haggling over exact contributions. Therein lies the exclusion:
since everyone needs to contribute the same amount, the whole operation is
limited by the smallest ability.
The proportional reduction, in contrast, has more real-world traction.
For instance, it is easy to imagine its presence in pollution reduction treaties,
where each participant has to cut emissions to, say, 80 percent of previous
levels. Though the actual number which is negotiated does not depend on
heterogeneity, the ﬁnal contribution does. Participants who have larger actions
then have a larger prescribed reduction, while participants with smaller actions
still contribute some. A proportional reduction agreement has the potential
to include more players, but even here, the contributions of the small actors
are negligible. These players have small actions because they have a lower
marginal utility of action; thus, when permitted to free-ride, they will hardly
increase actions in a noticeable way.
1.5.3 Alternative Treaty Structures
What if the coalition of the whole optimized among multiple levels of
one-dimensional action? Agents may be open to the possibility of multi-level
coalitions, meaning that all participants belong to the same coalition but that
diﬀerent actions are prescribed for segmented levels of actors. For instance,
large actors may be given one lump-sum reduction, while small actors are given
another. In the case of the parameterized class examined in the toy model,
where much of the heterogeneity stems from a group parameter, a multi-level
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coalition could be a way to include the players not in J in a coalition of the
whole even when θ is close to zero.
However, with only two types of players, specifying two levels of re-
duction is akin to having unrestricted commitment power. One can see how
multi-level coalitions converge to unrestricted commitment power. As more
and more levels are introduced, the coalition can tailor action to each mem-
ber, in the same way that unrestricted actions would be constructed. This
eliminates the very object of interest, which is the response of players to a sin-
gle, egalitarian action. Furthermore, in a game with uncertainty, a multi-level
coalition may still end up having only one level, if agents wish to obscure type.
Another possible structure for a treaty is to establish a central body,
a commission, a third party which investigates the situation and provides
recommendations. For instance, one such commission is the Inter-American
Tropical Tuna Commission, which includes largest and smallest tuna produc-
ers described in Section 1.3.1 on the same committee. Such a provision can
allow for some type of treaty, even if the original negotiation game is played
under incomplete information and ensure longevity of an agreement. Each
coalition participant then agrees to an equal treatment of sorts  supporting
the establishment of such a commission  and then agrees to further action
recommendations in the future. The agreement can then allow for more in-
clusion, perhaps overriding the beneﬁt of treaty exclusion presented in this
paper. This treaty structure merits further investigation, particularly under
heterogeneity.
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1.6 Conclusions
Under the restriction of egalitarian action sets, heterogeneity plays a
great role in the MP constraint chosen. If agents are more homogeneous, then
an increase in the size of the MP constraint will unambiguously beneﬁt the
treaty. With more heterogeneous agents in the world, agents on the interior
follow the intuition of excluding the odd man out and creating a Pareto-
improving treaty, as opposed to signing an inclusive but less eﬀective treaty.
In a fairly general class of negative externality games, there are groups of agents
strictly smaller than the coalition of the whole which perform strictly better
under a lump-sum reduction constraint. This translates to a MP constraint
strictly smaller than n, rendering the most disparate agents non-pivotal. In an
application to environmental treaties, large polluters could use MP constraints
to exclude smaller polluters and form a better performing MEA. This result is
also evidenced by the use of smaller negotiation spaces: a negotiation at an ex-
clusive summit, as opposed to the United Nations' headquarters, immediately
excludes uninvited countries.
The equal treatment assumption leaves open an interesting paradox
where agents most damaged by the externality or with least beneﬁt from taking
the action are most eager to limit the total stock but cannot join an eﬀective
egalitarian treaty. Furthermore, there is some residual ineﬃciency to this
egalitarian approach, as can be seen throughout the examples of this paper.
In the numerical example of Section 1.3.2, the agents are unable to form a
three-person coalition when the third agent produces zero, but the remaining
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agents cannot form a two-person coalition either and must play no-coalition
Nash equilibrium in order to keep the third agent from free-riding on the
public good. A coalition with unrestricted commitment power could prescribe
an action of zero for the third agent, and an eﬀective treaty would be adopted.
This example illustrates the very tension between Lemma 1.2 and Theorems
1.1 and 1.2  the lemma speciﬁes that a coalition strictly smaller than the
coalition of the whole cannot improve upon everyone, while the theorems give
exactly the opposite. The restricted actions and diﬀering marginal beneﬁts of
reduction drive the exclusion result. For the extreme two type set-up, exclusion
gives a coalition arbitrarily close to eﬃciency, though this may not extend to
less drastic heterogeneity.
In this model, agents are indiﬀerent between ineﬀective treaties and no
treaty at all, allowing symbolic agreements as equilibrium behavior. Agents
could choose a lump-sum reduction of zero or a proportional reduction of one
and enact an agreement to play Nash equilibrium. To avoid symbolic equilib-
ria, these could be discouraged with a minor tie-breaking rule or minimal cost
to entering negotiations, or encouraged with some sort of utility boost from
the appearance of concern. However, it is rather intriguing that those with the
most to gain from eﬀective treaties are the ones that can join only symbolic
treaties when actions are restricted, since they have the least to contribute.
The fact remains that greater treaty membership does not automat-
ically mean greater treaty beneﬁt. This is clearly illustrated in overﬁshing
control: the promise of landlocked countries to limit their ﬁshing has little
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meaning when their access to the ﬁshing stock is already limited by geogra-
phy.
The exclusion result is hopeful, not stark; after all, the large and small
producers alike prefer eﬀective, exclusive treaties to symbolic, inclusive ones.
The MP mechanism is somewhat successful in internalizing the common dam-
ages faced by agents and attracts participants by increasing the beneﬁt of the
treaty itself, even in a one-shot game. Moreover, the increase in initial value
oﬀered by the MP constraint can be combined with other self-enforcement
mechanisms to enhance not just treaty participation, but treaty eﬀectiveness
as well.
60
Chapter 2
When is Bad Bad Enough? A Framework for
Analyzing Beneﬁts of Coordination under
Externalities
2.1 Introduction
As with other resources studied in economics, international cooperation
may be limited. There is only so much national eﬀort to expend in the pursuit
of negotiation with other countries, whether measured in diplomats' man-
hours, dollars spent on transfers, or implementation costs. Scarcity limits the
situations for which coordination can occur.
In an analogue to this idea, a person's time to haggle prices is limited.
As a society, well-established super-markets do not allow for negotiation, but in
the markets for cars and houses,1 negotiation is generally expected. Produce is
generally a low-stakes purchase  at least in the short term, it hardly matters
if a red pepper costs $0.99 or $1.29  while cars and houses are long-term
ﬁnanced purchases for which each dollar of price may yield much more interest
over time.
1And even then, some people do not wish to haggle over those either, as seen in the rising
popularity of car dealerships with no-haggle policies, like CarMax.
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This, however, is not a paper on attrition in haggling or optimal bar-
gaining over multiple sets. Rather, in considering international cooperation as
a limited resource, a framework is desired for determining which situations are
best, most important, or most beneﬁcial to entertain for negotiation. There is
an abundance of global externality situations that could beneﬁt from an inter-
national treaty, but if there is a cost to cooperation  perhaps the opportunity
cost of other things that cannot be negotiated over  then it is vital to know
when a situation is more valuable cooperatively. The greatest international
beneﬁt would come from ﬁxing the worst externality problems.
What does it mean to say an externality is worse in one situation
than in another? This may be an easy question if social cost is measurable:
producing chemical A has a social marginal cost of 5, while chemical B has
one of 10. On the other hand, the question may be more diﬃcult to answer
if the externality is aﬀected by some other parameter or construction of the
situation. What happens when part of the story cannot be classiﬁed so easily?
When the reason behind the severity of the externality is characterized best as
something not aﬀecting utility directly, but only through the actions chosen?
For instance, if the only externality lies in a decreased chance of returning to
a good state, how can that be quantiﬁed?
This paper presents a framework for the analysis of these questions, as
well as suﬃcient conditions for a situation in which externalities are worse,
based on an increasing disparity in actions between coordination and lack
thereof. As a preview, this paper ﬁnds that an acceleration in the externality
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caused by an opponent's action, or having a large positive opposite derivative,
will increase the likelihood of coordination.
Section 2.2 describes the literature surrounding this problem. In Sec-
tion 2.3, I examine how to simplify a severity parameter in a one-stage game.
I ﬁrst discuss a symmetric game in Section 2.3.1 and then an non-symmetric
game in Section 2.3.2. Chapter 3 extends the result from the previous sections
to a dynamic setting by applying the framework to ﬁshery growth models and
presents conclusions.
2.2 Literature
The environmental literature has long examined international coordi-
nation on reducing negative externalities. Many externality problems, includ-
ing most environmental situations, have a dynamic component to the story,
beyond a one-stage ﬁxed or marginal cost, or a tragedy of the commons. Anal-
ysis often predicates upon modeling particular situations wit some detail, such
as location and travel hindering resource extraction [32], the development of
technology with complementarities driving economics growth [19], or positive
spillover eﬀects increasing eﬃciency after increases in environmental regulation
[35].
There is great interest in understanding environmental policy. Bernard
and Vielle [12] use a general equilibrium model to examine dynamic climate
change policy. They use the General Equilibrium Model of International Na-
tional Interaction for Economy/Energy/Environment (GEMINI-E3). They
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attempt to calculate the closeness of a carbon tax to marginal abatement cost.
They describe how with a representative consumer, this is relatively easy, but
with multiple types of consumers, some suﬀer a welfare loss as opposed to gain.
Overall, they try to examine the claim that cost of implementation of carbon
tax or such may be negative and therefore there would be a double-dividend.
They ﬁnd that long-term estimation works well, but that short-term analysis
may be oﬀ.
Beyond these examples, there are general rules to be characterized in
that the mismanagement of a shared resource with dynamic growth causes
an externality to others partaking in the stock. Thus, understanding man-
agement of resource stocks aids not only the choice of an optimal time path,
but also international relations. Clemhout and Wan [24] analyze two-player
equilibria of harvesting continuous-time dynamic resource stocks. Under the
assumptions of an exact dynamic guiding function, particular formation of per-
formance indices, strategy spaces that are nonnegative, bounded, and locally
Lipschitz, and assumed structure of coeﬃcients, the authors prove existence
of equilibrium strategy harvest plans. They then examine comparative statics
for two examples: single species with stochastic evolution and two species with
deterministic evolution. In particular, they examine the eﬀects of crowding,
impatience, and predator-prey relationships, looking for cases in which more
is harvested. They ﬁnd extra harvesting when crowding is more inhibitive to
growth, when players are more impatient, and when players prefer a higher
ratio of harvest to resource. In these three situations, communication and
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management are potentially more important for the agents.
A number of authors examine the optimal development of ﬁsh stocks,
using both traditional methods of stock assessment [52, 56] and more inno-
vative approaches [14]. A few develop structural models of dynamics caused
by ﬁsh characteristics, ecological variables, and market behavior made worse
by repetition, like Fischer and Mirman [32] who examine the sources of ex-
ternalities in ﬁsheries. They model and discuss the tragedy of the commons,
a biological externality, a dynamic externality, and a market externality. To
do so, they establish a game with two agents and two species of ﬁsh with
possibly interdependent biological growth rates. Both players consume both
types of ﬁsh, but only catch one species. The authors calculate the closed
non-cooperative and cooperative equilibria, look at the comparative statics
for both, and then compare the two to capture the market externality. In the
non-cooperative equilibrium, they ﬁnd that an increase in the reproductive
capacity of a country's own ﬁsh species leads to a lower catch ratio due to
investment value. Meanwhile, the eﬀect of an increase in reproductive capac-
ity of the other country's species depends on the species cross-eﬀects. If the
species have a symbiotic or negative interaction (i.e. both prey upon each
other), then this causes a lower catch ratio as well, but if the species have a
predator-prey relationship, then the increase in reproductive capacity of the
other country's ﬁsh results in a higher catch ratio. Furthermore, making the
species more symbiotic by increasing a positive cross-eﬀect leads to a lower
catch ratio; decreasing a negative cross-eﬀect leads to a higher catch ratio;
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and if there is a predator-prey relationship, it results in a lower catch ratio for
the predator, a higher ratio for the prey. Clearly, understanding the relation-
ship of the two species of ﬁsh gives insight into how the negative externality
works and how to coordinate to reduce it. Compared to the market equilib-
rium, the cooperative catch ratio is lower under positive interactions, higher
under negative interactions, and higher for a predator while lower for prey.
Thus, depending on the biological parameters of the story, the beneﬁt to co-
ordination can change. They also ﬁnd that the noncooperative equilibrium is
eﬃcient under no common access when there are no biological externalities or
when the preferences are the same across countries, caused by the countries
managing their own stocks separately and then selling at the fair market price.
Following along the lines of ﬁsh stocks under markets, Datta and Mir-
man [27] examine the interdependence between market clearing prices and
harvesting decisions. They look at the entire dynamic equilibrium trajectory
of each market approach and compare sources of the externality from a com-
mons eﬀect versus a market power eﬀect. They ﬁnd that ineﬃciency from
overexhaustion caused by common access dominates the general restriction of
market power. Their model echoes that of Fischer and Mirman in the set-up
of two types of players and two types of ﬁsh. In a Cournot-Nash equilibrium,
the planner in each country decides the amount of ﬁsh to be caught, tak-
ing the other countries' catch functions as given. The trading decisions and
market clearing prices depend on the catches of all the countries. If there is
only one country of each type, the result on eﬃciency of markets from Fischer
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and Mirman is conﬁrmed. With more than one country for at least one type,
there is dynamic overexhaustion. The authors then compare Cournot-Nash
equilibrium to cooperation and to a price-taking equilibrium. They ﬁnd that
price-taking still causes overharvest, but performs better than Cournot-Nash
under certain conditions.
In addition to the question of resource-stock management, Farzin [31]
examines environmental stock externalities with threshold eﬀects. He deﬁnes
two main categories of externalities: ﬂow externalities and two types of stock
externalities. Flow externalities refer to direct damage from resource use.
Resource stock externalities push up extraction cost at future dates, while
environmental stock externalities cause damage from adding to accumulated
stock and passing a certain threshold. First, Farzin establishes that existence
of a steady-state policy requires separability of arguments in the environmental
damage function and the resource extraction cost function and linearity in one
of the arguments. Then using model simulation with calibration of parame-
ters, he calculates an optimal carbon dioxide control strategy as a benchmark,
ﬁnding that optimal policy postpones climate change for 122 years. The opti-
mal policy involves no delay in implementation, as even if for an initial period
there is going to be no pollution stock damage, the optimal policy still requires
that abatement begins immediately and at increasing rates; for instance, a
delay in implementation of 10 years results in over 1.2 percent loss of welfare.
Since the main application is fossil fuels, when Farzin examines alternative
policies, he ﬁnds that a carbon tax on its own is more eﬀective than a sole fuel
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tax.
With many of these situations, parameters that change the story cause
a drastic eﬀect on the externality. Apart from Farzin's discussion of the thresh-
old eﬀect, a common concern in the literature is catastrophe. A catastrophe
is often modeled as an uncertain, and unlikely, event which has an extremely
negative impact on utility. Weitzman [60] explores the use of fat-tailed dis-
tributions to analyze a climate-change model. He ﬁnds that, in contrast to
a thin-tailed model, the fat tails can dominate the social-discounting aspect,
the pure-risk aspect, and the consumption-smoothing aspect. The fat tail
distribution, however, renders problems more diﬃcult to solve.
Motoh [49] analyzes a standard resource management problem with un-
certainty with the added interest of catastrophic risk. His main application is
forest management with some probability of a forest ﬁre, though the model
could extend to health shocks in animal populations and pollution spillovers.
Catastrophe is modeled as a Poisson value shock. Motoh ﬁnds that an increase
in the risk of catastrophe, through an increase in the intensity of the Poisson
process, increases a manager's optimal use rate. Because the manager is risk-
averse, he prefers to use the resource more quickly than to wait for disaster to
strike. Motoh's conclusions give a bit of a grim view of unpreventable catas-
trophe, in that the strengthening of one issue  the possibility of catastrophe
 increases the problem of overharvesting in a rational way.
With regard to management of catastrophes across disparate areas,
Charpentier and Le Maux [21] examine a model of the insurance market which
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allows for more generality applicable to a world with natural catastrophes.
Breaking traditional insurance market rules, they allow for an insurer to be-
come insolvent, as well as for correlated claims possibilities, more accurately
reﬂecting the nature of catastrophes. They also examine whether government
intervention is optimal in a single region model and in a multiple region model,
each with representative consumers. In the single region, they ﬁnd that the
government can oﬀer an unlimited guarantee of payment, even if the insurer
falls insolvent, which increases customers' willingness to pay over the limited
liability scheme oﬀered by an insurer. With multiple regions, the authors ﬁnd
again that the unlimited guarantee of payment is preferred, but that there
could be an issue in getting the safer region to participate in pooling of risk.
The authors note that perhaps a lower premium for the safer area would help.
Allowing for sovereignty of regions parallels countries in a treaty and empha-
sizes the need for examining such accommodations.
Accounting for quirks in the externalities proves quite important. Lange,
McDade, and Oliva [45] use a catastrophe model to model technology adoption
under network externalities and ﬁnd that the catastrophe structure accounts
much better for the adoption of PCs and PC software from 1988 to 1994.
In their model, when a certain parameter is low, then small changes in an
independent variable lead to small changes in the dependent variable; when
the parameter value is high, then small changes in the independent variable
can lead to large jump discontinuities in the dependent variable. One could
model a stock externality for an environmental problem in a similar manner
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and search for general lessons in accounting for such parameters.
Another way of thinking of catastrophe is that prevention severely in-
creases the beneﬁt of coordination. In this paper, I discuss a related notion,
which is the speed of increase of marginal beneﬁt of coordination. I discuss
the importance of the second derivative of an agent's utility function with re-
spect to the opponent's action, and how it aﬀects room for coordination. In a
way, this has the feeling of Farzin's threshold eﬀect and the catastrophe mod-
els. However, this notion diﬀers from the literature in that it is a curvature
assumption, not a probabilistic event.
The next section presents a one-stage model with an externality. I allow
for worsening of an externality through a parameter, θ, and then discuss how
changes in this parameter aﬀect the diﬀerence between non-coordination and
coordination.
2.3 Model
The ﬁrst setting to examine is the simplest, and it will give basic in-
tuition for further sections of this paper. Here is a one-shot, two player game
in which players take an action which exerts an externality. For now, this
is a negative externality, though Chapter 3 gives an example with a positive
externality. Future work includes full extension to positive externalities. I
leave the exact story, timing, and utility outcomes vague at the moment, since
the goal is to describe the most general setting ﬁrst and investigate individual
examples afterward. I formally deﬁne the game Γ = {I, {Ai}i∈I , {wi}i∈I} with
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the following:
1. agents I = {1, 2};
2. actions ai ∈ Ai;
3. utility functions wi(ai, aj; θ) ∈ W , which have the properties of
(a) twice-diﬀerentiable continuity, wi ∈ C2,
(b) concavity with respect to own action, ∂
2wi
∂a2i
< 0,
(c) negative externality, ∂wi
∂aj
< 0,
(d) submodularity, ∂
2wi
∂ai∂aj
< 0, and
(e) unique Nash equilibrium; and
4. a worsening parameter θ ∈ Θ.
Submodularity is for convenience of the analysis at the moment, though
this can be relaxed in the future. Unique Nash equilibrium allows for ease of
examination. Finally, some example of functions and worsening parameters
are:
1. Fishing Boat 1. Consider a model of a ﬁshing boat, where ai is eﬀort
that yields a marginal beneﬁt depending on total actions exerted and
which has a constant marginal cost:
wi = ai(1 + θ)v(ai + aj)− c · ai.
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In this example, θ multiplies the value of the action. In particular, v(a)
is decreasing, while ai and aj are perfect substitutes, so they enter cer-
tain functions as a sum; increasing either action decreases the marginal
beneﬁt of all action. A larger θ means that action is more valuable,
and so intuitively, both players would increase actions and thus further
diminish v(·).
2. Fishing Boat 2. Another possibility is:
wi = aiv(ai, (1 + θ)aj)− c · ai.
This is example is similar to the one above in set up, other than the fact
that θ now directly magniﬁes the eﬀect of the opponent's action, decreas-
ing v(·, ·). However, unlike the example above, there is no compensating
beneﬁt from θ, and it appears that both players will lower their actions,
which then gives room for compensation.
3. Variance Spread 1. Now consider a dynamic utility function where θ
determines the entrance and eﬀect of shocks:
wi = (1− β)ai[v(ai + aj)− c] + βV ((s− ai − aj)((1− θ)r + θht)).
In this example, there is a dynamic stock which aﬀects value next period,
as well as a parameter ht carried around which aﬀects the variability of
next period's input. As θ gets larger, there is less weight on the static
growth rate r and more weight on the series of ht.
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4. Variance Spread 2. Another possibility is:
wi = (1−β)ai[v(ai+aj)−c]+βE [V ((s− ai − aj)((1− θ)r + θht+1))|ht] .
where ht+1 ∼ f(ht). This example is similar to the one above, except
that ht is not a known sequence. Agents can no longer perfectly prepare
for what will happen, and as θ gets larger, there is more uncertainty.
5. Time Correlation 1. A ﬁnal example is:
wi = (1− β)ui(ai, aj, s) + βE [V (ai, aj, s, ht+1)|ht, θ] .
where ht+1 ∼ f(ht, θ). In this ﬁnal example, which is a further extension
of the ones above, θ is not even in the utility function directly, but rather
governs the distribution of some shock. If this is a correlation parameter,
as in Chapter 3, then this could enhance a dynamic externality.
For now, the problem will remain general. An individual player's Nash
optimization problem, which has the unique solution aNi (θ), can be written as
follows:
max
ai∈Ai
wi
(
ai, a
N
j (θ); θ
)
(2.1)
Because of the negative externality, the Nash equilibrium is not optimal.
A social planner putting equal weight on each player would choose aP (θ) =(
aPi (θ), a
P
j (θ)
)
, which is the unique solution to the following problem:
max
ai∈Ai,aj∈Aj
wi(ai, aj; θ) + wj(aj, ai; θ) (2.2)
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For both of these problems,2 there needs to be a baseline of what occurs
when the parameter is zero. Only with an understanding of a baseline can a
change be measured.
Deﬁnition. The baseline utility function of a game Γ is evaluated at θ = 0,
and is formally written as:
wi(ai, aj; 0) = ui(ai, aj) (2.3)
The baseline optima are as follows:
1. The non-cooperative Nash equilibrium is denoted as aN(0), abbreviated
as aN, with components
(
aNi (0), a
N
j (0)
)
, which may also be abbreviated
to
(
aNi , a
N
j
)
. This is the unique solution to the simultaneous maximiza-
tion problems for all i in I:
max
ai∈Ai
ui
(
ai, a
N
j
)
2. The cooperative Nash equilibrium, or Social Planner's solution, is de-
noted as aP (0), or shortened to aP, with components
(
aPi (0), a
P
j (0)
)
,
2Observe that the ﬁrst order conditions to both of these problems could be summarized
as the following set of equations, where the Nash condition is at t = 0, while the social
planner's condition is at t = 1:
∂wi
∂ai
+ t
∂wj
∂aj
= 0, t
∂wi
∂ai
+
∂wj
∂aj
= 0.
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which may also be abbreviated to
(
aPi , a
P
j
)
. This is the unique solution
to the social planner's maximization problem:
max
ai∈Ai,aj∈Aj
ui(ai, aj) + uj(aj, ai)
The existence of negative externalities means that coordination, if pos-
sible, would be Pareto-improving. One of the main interests is when coordina-
tion will happen and its resulting value. It is possible that when value is higher,
coordination is more likely. However, what does it mean for value to be higher?
To answer this question, I examine the diﬀerence between non-coordination
and coordination, taking into account gaps in utility and in action. The pos-
sible objects of interest to pursue are:
1. Direct value to coordination: This seems to be the clear measure of
beneﬁt: how much extra total surplus can be created by moving from
non-coordination to coordination in situations with varying degrees of
externality? If θ characterizes the externality, then of interest is how
increases in θ, which make the externality worse, will aﬀect the gap
between coordinated and uncoordinated action:
d
dθ
[
wP (θ)− (wN1 (θ) + wN2 (θ))]
where the wP (θ) is the total utility evaluated at aP (θ), wN1 (θ) is the
utility to agent one evaluated at aN(θ), while wN2 (θ) is the utility to
agent two evaluated at aN(θ).
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The diﬀerence should always be weakly positive, because of the deﬁnition
of the two problems. However, the gap could stay the same as θ increases,
or could even shrink. Therefore, it is of non-trivial interest to characterize
when this gap is strictly increasing.
Unfortunately without careful attention to the structure of the problem,
this object could capture changes purely in levels. It appears this value
to coordination can be arbitrarily manipulated via magnitude of the
gap. This leads to another object of interest.
2. Increase in range of coordination: In the presence of a negative
externality, a social planner's actions are generally smaller than the Nash
actions. Rather than pursuing changes in utility, one way to think of an
externality getting worse would be if the social planner's recommended
actions are decreasing as the worsening parameter increases, while agents
acting on their own are inclined to do the opposite. An increasing gap
between actions taken under coordination and non-coordination can be
another sign that an externality is getting worse. Therefore, of interest is
how the diﬀerence between the Nash equilibrium and the Pareto optimal
actions change with respect to the parameter:
d
dθ
[
aNi (θ)− aPi (θ)
]
.
If the actions are moving further apart from one another, there may
be more beneﬁt to coordination. Furthermore, the scope of possible
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agreements is increased, and there are more reductions that can be made,
so this may be another notion of when a treaty is more likely.
The above can also be written as:
∆aNi (θ)−∆aPi (θ)
∆θ
Moving from an original utility function, the change in the parameter
is simply the value assigned, that is
∆θ = θ − 0 = θ.
The changes in the Nash and Pareto optimal actions can be written as:
∆aNi (θ) = a
N
i (θ)− aNi (0)
∆aPi (θ) = a
P
i (θ)− aPi (0)
Observe that were one to multiply these by θ, these would look like
pieces of a ﬁrst order Taylor expansion around the Nash equilibrium and the
social optimum.
For certain problems, even if it is possible to determine how the pa-
rameter θ aﬀects actions, the relative changes between coordination and non-
coordination may be diﬃcult to characterize. Furthermore, if θ is a diﬃcult
nature to derive, simpliﬁcation through linearization may assist in answering
the questions of interest.
In the following section, I describe a symmetric game within the basic
assumptions described earlier in order to gain some intuition in a simple case.
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I modify the original utility functions with three diﬀerent linearized worsening
parameters  an own eﬀect, an opponent eﬀect, and a submodular eﬀect 
in order to represent more complicated utility functions. I then derive general
conclusions for such parameters in a one-stage symmetric game.
2.3.1 Symmetric Game
There are many ways to model the severity of an externality, depending
on the type of inﬂuence the action has upon it. For instance, the simplest
notion of worsening could consist of pure hurt, a multiplying factor on the
opponent's action which does not aﬀect marginal utility of own action but
which lowers utility unambiguously. A more complicated version of worsening
could involve a story of correlation in time shocks of a resource stock, and as
more information is available, the resource stock is exploited even more and
the tragedy of the commons worsens.
As mentioned earlier, this section models the worsening of externalities
using three paths: changing how the opponent's action aﬀects utility, changing
how the agent's own action aﬀects utility, and changing how the cross-eﬀect
of actions aﬀects utility. These three paths oﬀer representation of more com-
plicated stories on their own or through combinations.
With regard to the earlier discussion of utility gaps versus action gaps,
there are a few ways to go about adding a linearized term to the utility func-
tion. One possibility is to simply add a linear term multiplied by θ. This
will change the derivative with respect to that variable in a linear manner.
78
The pure hurt term would be represented as subtracting oﬀ θ · aj from the
baseline utility function. This approach will give the correct intuition for the
action gaps, but will necessarily aﬀect utility as well. There is some worry that
an increase in the utility gaps between non-coordination and coordination is
somehow built in through this term.
Another approach is to model the parameter eﬀects as if they were
Taylor expansions around the Nash equilibrium or the Pareto optimal solution,
so these changes in externalities can be thought of as aﬀecting the derivatives
of a symmetric utility function. These would not aﬀect utility through the
additive term unless actions changed. However, while taking a derivative at
two diﬀerent points is a mathematically sound idea, the economic intuition is
somewhat murkier. This exercise also captures the correct directional changes
in actions, but may cause concern that the utility function under coordination
is diﬀerent than that under non-coordination.
Because of these concerns, I use the simple linearization to study only
the action gaps. I ignore the direct value to coordination, because of the
limitations mentioned earlier. I do present the alternative Taylor expansion
structures in the Appendix, and initial analysis for them appears to be similar.
The opponent eﬀect is the most intuitive of the three linearizations.
This is where the worsening of the externality rotates the ﬁrst derivative with
respect to the opponent's action. The linearization for the individual problem
is:
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wNi (θJ) = ui(ai, aj)− θJaj,
wNj (θJ) = uj(aj, ai)− θJai.
(2.4)
The own eﬀect linearization for the Social Planner's problem is:
wP (θJ) = ui(ai, aj) + uj(aj, ai)− θJ (ai + aj) . (2.5)
As θ increases there is more room for an increase in the opponent's
action to harm the player. Thus, as θ increases, the externality is worsening,
particularly compared to level of θ = 0.
The own eﬀect improves the value of one's own action, incentivizing
agents to take larger actions. With a submodular utility function, this en-
hanced activity decreases the marginal beneﬁt of the opponent, thereby in-
creasing the negative externality. Here, the worsening of the externality is the
rotation of the ﬁrst derivative with respect to own action. The linearization
for the individual problem is:
wNi (θI) = ui(ai, aj) + θIai,
wNj (θI) = uj(aj, ai) + θIaj.
(2.6)
The own eﬀect linearization for the Social Planner's problem is:
wP (θI) = ui(ai, aj) + uj(aj, ai) + θI (ai + aj) . (2.7)
This equation is very similar to Equation (2.5); the main diﬀerence is
that the sign on the worsening parameter is opposite. When linearizing the
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parameter, the determination of own or opponent eﬀect in the social planner's
problem is reduced to the sign on the coeﬃcient. The increase of the parameter
θI increases the value of acting, which may in fact override the externality at
some point, when individual beneﬁt outweighs social cost. Thus it can be
expected that changes of this kind eliminate the need for coordination at high
levels, though at low parameter values there might still be beneﬁt.
The submodular eﬀect changes the cross-partial of both actions, making
the utility function more submodular than before and enhancing the negative
externality in this manner. The linearization for the individual problem is:
wNi (θIJ) = ui(ai, aj)− θIJaiaj,
wNj (θIJ) = uj(aj, ai)− θIJaiaj.
(2.8)
The submodular eﬀect linearization for the Social Planner's problem is:
wPi (θIJ) = ui(ai, aj) + uj(aj, ai)− 2θIJaiaj. (2.9)
The eﬀect of each separate modiﬁcation can be found by comparing
the ﬁrst order conditions of the altered coordination and non-coordination
problems. The following theorem gives the direction of the action gap for each
eﬀect in a symmetric game.
Theorem 2.1. For a symmetric game Γ, an increase in the parameter multi-
plying the added linearizations has the following eﬀect for each:
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1. Increasing the opponent eﬀect increases the distance in the actions under
non-coordination and coordination, that is, for all i:
d
dθJ
[aNi (θJ)− aPi (θJ)] > 0;
2. Increasing the own eﬀect has ambiguous results on the distance in actions
under non-coordination and coordination; and
3. Increasing the submodular eﬀect also has ambiguous results on the dis-
tance in actions under non-coordination and coordination.
The proof of Theorem 2.1 is the Appendix, though its intuition is dis-
cussed brieﬂy here. As mentioned earlier, the opponent eﬀect is perhaps the
most intuitive, and it is easy to see why its eﬀect is unambiguous. Adding
the linearized term to the problem of non-coordination does not change the
player's own incentives, so the Nash actions are unchanged. However, this
term changes the incentives facing a social planner, and coordinated actions
decrease. The opponent eﬀect could model a story where there is simply a
larger harm from the opponent's action, or a more complicated story where
harm from the opponent's action prevails.
The own eﬀect is ambiguous, at least in attempting to describe it for
the whole range. At small increases, it can result in a positive gap, due to
the submodularity in the problem. However, the enhanced beneﬁt from an
increase in one's action at some point outweighs the increased negative ex-
ternality caused by the other player doing the same. A social planner would
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also increase actions, but more slowly because of the negative externality and
submodularity. An example of this would be an improved technology that
increases the marginal beneﬁt of own action.
The submodular linearization is also ambiguous unless curvature is ex-
amined, but for another reason. While the own eﬀect caused increases in
actions under both coordination and non-coordination, the submodular eﬀect
causes decreases in both. The direction of change in the distance of action
gaps depends on the comparative speeds of reduction.
For this symmetric analysis, the three eﬀects were examined separately,
in order to distinctly characterize each. In translating an externality situation
into this linearized parameter, the three eﬀects may need to be combined to
correctly capture the circumstances. This idea is further explored in the next
chapter of this dissertation.
2.3.2 Non-symmetric Game
The symmetric game places assumptions on the direction that the re-
sponses to θ can take. For instance, cases where the same change in θ aﬀects
the players diﬀerently are not permitted. Thus, in examining the many ways an
externality could be worse, non-symmetric games are important as well. Mov-
ing to a non-symmetric game opens up more possible outcomes with regard to
direction of the players' reactions, and the directions derived in Theorem 2.1
may no longer hold.
Because there are fewer restrictions, this section will ignore the sub-
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modular eﬀect in order to keep the analysis tractable. Using both the own
eﬀect and the opponent eﬀect allows for the agents to aﬀect each other asym-
metrically. The parameter θxy represents a deepening of player x's eﬀect on
player y. With this adjusted linearization, the agent's utility functions are
now:
wNi (θ) = ui(ai, aj) + θiiai − θjiaj,
wNj (θ) = uj(aj, ai)− θijai + θjjaj.
(2.10)
The non-symmetric linearization for the social planner is:
wP (θ) = ui(ai, aj) + uj(aj, ai) + (θii − θij)ai + (θjj − θji)aj. (2.11)
As brieﬂy alluded to earlier, the expansions of interest have a linear
combination of coeﬃcients in front of them. However, while the symmetric
game assured that both coeﬃcients collapsed into only one, here there are two
distinct coeﬃcient. Therefore, two composite coeﬃcients can be deﬁned as
allows:
γi = θii − θij
γj = θjj − θji
(2.12)
With these coeﬃcients, the social planner's problem can be rewritten
as:
max
ai,aj
ui(ai, aj) + uj(aj, ai) + γiai + γjaj (2.13)
Because the two eﬀects linearly combine, whether there is an own eﬀect
or an opponent eﬀect for each agent is given by the signs of γi and γj. There
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are ﬁve main regions of interest: both γi and γj are positive, both are negative,
they are of opposite signs, one is zero while the other is positive, and one is
zero while the other is negative.
If both coeﬃcients are negative, then there is an opponent eﬀect only.
From the previous section, it is safe to say that coordination will reduce actions,
while the non-coordination actions are constant or increasing. If they are of
opposite signs, or one is negative while the other is zero, then it is likely that
the agent causing an opponent eﬀect will have his action reduced, while the
other agent's action may be increased. Also from the previous section came
the result that the own eﬀect is ambiguous and depending on curvature. This
is of great interest and will now be somewhat resolved for the non-symmetric
case. The following analysis will characterize suﬃcient conditions for diverging
actions under own eﬀect, or in areas where θii > θij and θjj > θji.
The Nash equilibrium, aN , uniquely solves the following simultaneous
best response problems:
max
ai
ui(ai, aj) + θiiai − θjiaj
max
aj
uj(aj, ai)− θijai + θjjaj
The Nash ﬁrst order conditions are:
∂ui(ai, aj)
∂ai
+ θii ≡ 0,
∂uj(aj, ai)
∂aj
+ θjj ≡ 0.
In the symmetric case, the direction of movement of actions could be
determined because of the extra assumptions symmetricity imposed. Now,
85
however, the actions could be moving in separate directions, as the parameters
θii and θjj can also move around separately. One similarity to the symmetric
case is that the opponent eﬀect coeﬃcients wash out, no longer appearing in
the ﬁrst order conditions. Any eﬀect from the opponent will come from their
own adjustment of action. The directions of changes can be analyzed with
a second order expansion. This process can be found in the Appendix. The
comparative statics that result can be summarized as follows:
UN =
 ∂2ui(ai,aj)∂a2i ∂2ui(ai,aj)∂ai∂aj
∂2uj(ai,aj)
∂ai∂aj
∂2uj(ai,aj)
∂a2j

Dθiia
N =
[
∂aNi
∂θii
∂aNj
∂θii
]
, Dθjja
N =
∂aNi∂θjj
∂aNj
∂θjj
 , DaN = [DθiiaN DθjjaN]
U ·DaN =
[−1 0
0 −1
]
All of the entries in U are negative due to concavity and submodular-
ity. This means that the entries in Dθiia
N need to be opposite signs, as do
the entries in Dθjja
N , in order to obtain the negative identity matrix when
multiplied with UN .
Since θii is not in player j's ﬁrst order conditions, the eﬀect of θii on
j's action can be described as follows:
∂aNj
∂θii
=
∂aNj
∂ai
· ∂a
N
i
∂θii
Because of the submodularity,
∂aNj
∂ai
< 0, and because of the own eﬀect,
∂aNi
∂θii
> 0. Hence,
∂aNj
∂θii
< 0, so the two are of opposite signs and the story
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can hold under proper curvature assumptions. This idea is similar to Huang
and Smith's discussion of congestion versus agglomeration and determining
the direction of externalities in shrimp ﬁshing [38].
For the cooperative problem a social planner chooses unique aP (θ) to
solve:
max
a
ui(ai, aj) + uj(aj, ai) + γiai + γjaj
The ﬁrst order conditions are:
∂ui(ai, aj)
∂ai
+
∂uj(aj, ai)
∂ai
+ γi ≡ 0,
∂ui(ai, aj)
∂aj
+
∂uj(aj, ai)
∂aj
+ γj ≡ 0.
Once again, the second order expansions are in the Appendix. The
summary of the comparative statics is:
UP =
∂2ui(ai,aj)∂a2i + ∂2uj(ai,aj)∂a2i ∂2ui(ai,aj)∂ai∂aj + ∂2uj(ai,aj)∂ai∂aj
∂2uj(ai,aj)
∂ai∂aj
+
∂2ui(ai,aj)
∂ai∂aj
∂2uj(ai,aj)
∂a2j
+
∂2ui(ai,aj)
∂a2j

UP = UN + V, V ≡
∂2uj(ai,aj)∂a2i ∂2uj(ai,aj)∂ai∂aj
∂2ui(ai,aj)
∂ai∂aj
∂2ui(ai,aj)
∂a2j

Dγia
P =
[
∂aPi
∂γi
∂aPj
∂γi
]
, Dγja
P =
∂aPi∂γj
∂aPj
∂γj
 , DaP = [DγiaP DγjaP ]
UP ·DaP = (UN + V ) ·DaP =
[−1 0
0 −1
]
Because of submodularity and concavity, all the entries in UN are nega-
tive, and the oﬀ-diagonal entries in V are negative as well. As of yet, however,
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this paper has placed no assumptions on the diagonal entries in V . The diag-
onals are second derivative with respect to opponent's action, an aspect which
is not commonly modeled.
In many common utility functions, the opponent-directed second deriva-
tive is zero. Once the opponent's initial eﬀect is known, externality or not,
rarely is the speed of that eﬀect explicitly described as being central to the
problem. If the second derivative is zero, ∂
2ui
∂a2j
= 0, this means that the op-
ponent's eﬀect is constant, and that regardless of the opponent's action, their
marginal externality will be the same. For a negative externality, if the sec-
ond derivative is negative, ∂
2ui
∂a2j
< 0, then the opponent's eﬀect on utility is
`accelerating'  as the opponent's action is increasing, the marginal external-
ity is becoming more negative. If the second derivative is positive, ∂
2ui
∂a2j
> 0,
this means a negative externality is `decelerating.' As the opponent's action
is increasing, the marginal negative eﬀect on the player is becoming less nega-
tive.3 Borrowing the term from physics, the second derivative of distance with
respect to time is acceleration; this concept gives an idea to the incentives
of reduction of a negative externality or promotion of a positive externality.
When the beneﬁts to coordination are not only increasing but accelerating,
negotiation is warranted.
In order to determine the worsening parameter eﬀect on the gap be-
tween actions, the D matrices need to be understood. It can be shown that
3For a positive externality, a negative second derivative is decelerating the eﬀect of the
externality, while a positive second derivative is accelerating.
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DaN = −U−1 and DaP = −(U + V )−1. The main questions are how these
behave and where DaN −DaP has a deﬁnite positive sign.
First, some standardization is called for. The derivatives in DaN are
in fact with respect to θii and θjj, while those in DaP are with respect to
γi and γj, which are the composite coeﬃcients deﬁned earlier. In order to
compare the two, it needs to be shown that the hypothetical derivative of aN
with respect to γi and γj is the same as already taken for θii and θjj.
Lemma 2.1. The derivative of aN with respect to θii and θjj is equal to the
derivative of aN with respect to γi and γj, i.e.∂aNi∂θii ∂aNi∂θjj
∂aNj
∂θii
∂aNj
∂θjj
 = [∂aNi∂γi ∂aNi∂γi∂aNj
∂γj
∂aNj
∂γj
]
Proof. Recall the deﬁnition of the composite coeﬃcients:
γi = θii − θij
γj = θjj − θji
When taking the total derivative of ai with respect to γi, the following
is obtained:
∂aNi
∂γi
=
∂aNi
∂θii
− ∂a
N
i
∂θij
It has already been obtained that ∂a
N
i
∂θij
= 0, hence we have ∂a
N
i
∂γi
=
∂aNi
∂θii
.
This can be repeated for γj, and then for aNj . Thus, the two matrices are
equivalent.
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In such a general setting, it is diﬃcult to say where the derivatives are
positive or negative. Therefore, instead of looking for necessity, one possible
approach is to look for suﬃcient cases of possible direction. The action gap is
certainly increasing if aPi decreases while a
N
i grows or remains constant, or if
aPi remains constant while a
N
i grows. More diﬃcult situations would involve
relative speeds of the two and will remain unaddressed in this paper. Thus,
this means it is of interest to ﬁgure out when DaN is positive in both entries
while DaP is negative in both entries when both parameters are changed in
the same direction, if not by the same magnitude.
First, I examine the Nash actions to ﬁnd when DaN is positive. Then, I
examine the social planner's actions to ﬁnd when DaP is negative. The matrix
UP is a bit more complicated than UN , so I will use two diﬀerent approaches.
To ﬁnd the responses of the Nash actions when the non-symmetric own
eﬀects are both increasing, I look for suﬃcient conditions for the following to
be positive in both entries:
U ·DaN =
[−1 0
0 −1
]
DaN = U−1
[−1 0
0 −1
]
= −U−1 · I = −U−1
= −
 ∂2ui(ai,aj)∂a2i ∂2ui(ai,aj)∂ai∂aj
∂2uj(ai,aj)
∂ai∂aj
∂2uj(ai,aj)
∂a2j
−1
When DaN is written as
[
Dθiia
N Dθjja
N
]
, if both entries are posi-
tive, then DaN is positive as well. This method of writing DaN will be a
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linearization and can be found by the following procedure:
[
Dθiia
N Dθjja
N
]
= − [1 1] ·
 ∂2ui(ai,aj)∂a2i ∂2ui(ai,aj)∂ai∂aj
∂2uj(ai,aj)
∂ai∂aj
∂2uj(ai,aj)
∂a2j
−1
If the linearized inverse is negative, then the whole expression will be
positive. Recall that the inverse of a 2× 2 matrix is:[
a b
c d
]−1
=
1
ad− bc
[
d −b
−c a
]
.
Using the deﬁnition of an inverse and applying the linearization, observe
that:
− [1 1] · [a b
c d
]−1
> 0 iff
1
ad− bc
[
d− c a− b] < 0
Lemma 2.2. For DaN to be positive and for the Nash actions to be increasing
in response to an increase in θ, it is suﬃcient for the own second derivatives
to be the same direction in comparison to the cross-partials for both agents.
That is, the own second derivative can be more negative than the cross partial
for both agents:
∂2ui(ai, aj)
∂a2i
<
∂2ui(ai, aj)
∂ai∂aj
and
∂2uj(ai, aj)
∂a2j
<
∂2uj(ai, aj)
∂ai∂aj
or, the own second derivative can be less negative than the cross partial for
both agents:
∂2ui(ai, aj)
∂a2i
>
∂2ui(ai, aj)
∂ai∂aj
and
∂2uj(ai, aj)
∂a2j
>
∂2uj(ai, aj)
∂ai∂aj
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The proof of Lemma 2.2 is in the Appendix. Having found suﬃcient
conditions for DaN to be increasing, I now examine the movement of DaP ,
the actions under coordination. As before, observe that:
DaP = −(U + V )−1
= −
 ∂2ui∂a2i + ∂2uj∂a2i ∂2ui∂ai∂aj + ∂2uj∂ai∂aj
∂2ui
∂ai∂aj
+
∂2uj
∂ai∂aj
∂2ui
∂a2j
+
∂2uj
∂a2j
−1
Since (U+V ) is symmetric, its inverse is also symmetric. Furthermore,
a symmetric matrix is diagonalizable, so the eigenvalues of the inverse matrix
can be used to ﬁgure out the sign of its determinant. Since the matrix is
diagonalizable, there is some Q such that:
(U + V )−1 = QTΛQ
Since Q is repeated, the sign of the expression is determined by Λ,
the matrix of eigenvalues. If the eigenvalues of (U + V ) are positive, then
the eigenvalues of its inverse will be as well. When multiplied by the outside
negative, DaP will be negative, providing the decreasing eﬀect desired.
Lemma 2.3. For UP to have only positive eigenvalues, it is suﬃcient that:
∂2ui
∂a2j
> 0 (2.14)
∂2uj
∂a2j
> 0 (2.15)
(
∂2ui
∂a2i
+
∂2uj
∂a2i
)(
∂2ui
∂a2j
+
∂2uj
∂a2j
)
>
(
∂2ui
∂ai∂aj
+
∂2uj
∂ai∂aj
)2
(2.16)
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Lemma 2.3 is proven in the Appendix. Combining it with Lemma 2.2,
the following theorem is obtained.
Theorem 2.2. For a symmetric or non-symmetric game Γ, it is suﬃcient for
a utility function to satisfy Lemmas 2.2 and 2.3 in order for an increase in
the parameters multiplying the added linearizations to increase the distance in
actions under non-coordination and coordination.
Proof. If Γ satisﬁes Lemma 2.2, then DaN is positive, so aN is increasing in θii
and θjj and unresponsive to θij and θji. If Γ satisﬁes 2.3, then DaP is negative,
so aP is decreasing in γi and γj, while γi is increasing in θii and decreasing in
θij and γj is increasing in θjj and decreasing in θji.
With Theorems 2.1 and 2.2, this chapter has established two interesting
cases of suﬃciency of increasing action gap: the opponent eﬀect only in a
symmetric game, and the own eﬀect in a possibly non-symmetric game under
certain curvature assumptions. The next chapter describes how the framework
can be applied and attempts to do so in the context of a ﬁshery.
93
Chapter 3
Applying the Framework to Fishery Models
3.1 Introduction
As the previous chapter demonstrated, an indirect externality param-
eter can drive whether a situation merits international cooperation. A frame-
work was developed for approximating complicated externalities with a lin-
earized parameter or combination of parameters. The current chapter now
applies the framework to ﬁsheries and a dynamic externality caused by growth
correlation.
There is much concern regarding the state of the world's ﬁsheries today.
Current harvesting strategies have caused great depletion in ocean stocks. Un-
like land animals, the actual stock of a species of ﬁsh can be extremely diﬃcult
to assess. Estimating the population of a ﬁsh stock requires understanding of
three dynamic rates: recruitment, or the rate at which a juvenile ﬁsh is consider
mature enough to be caught; individual growth, the rate at which members of
the species grow in length; and mortality, the rate at which ﬁsh die from both
ﬁshing and natural causes. Hence, [u]nless the rate of harvesting can be con-
trolled somehow, the ﬁsh population may eventually be reduced (at a proﬁt)
to a low level. This in turn may aﬀect the productivity of the resource and
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greatly reduce future catches [23]. There is evidence that humans are ﬁshing
down the food web, seen in a declining average trophic level of worldwide
catches [53], which indicates unsustainable ﬁshing strategies.
By their very nature, ocean ﬁsh are an international commodity, and
so any meaningful coordination among producers must come through an in-
ternational agreement. There are 112 accords, agreements, conventions, pro-
tocols, and amendments under the keyword ﬁsheries in the Environmental
Treaties and Resource Indicators database, part of the Socioeconomic Data
and Applications Center hosted by the Center for International Earth Science
Information Network at Columbia University [33]. About 10 of these have
tuna in the title. There are number of species of tuna which are among
the most valuable commercial species, valued for their taste and sportiveness
[41]. None of the 112 agreements, however, have shrimp in the title. Yet both
species are especially valuable; [i]n the United States, the annual landings of
tuna are usually surpassed in monetary value only by the shrimp catch [41].
Tuna and shrimp have very diﬀerent reproductive patterns. Tuna are
classiﬁed as highly migratory species, with some like the albacore tuna mak-
ing trips from California to Japan. Spawning females release 100,000 eggs
per kilogram of their body weight, and some mega-spawners can weigh 65
kilograms. Larva and juvenile mortality rates are high, but [t]o keep the tuna
population constant, only two oﬀspring from the millions of eggs produced
by each female would have to survive to maturity [41]. This pattern sug-
gests high time dependence, where the amount of tuna greatly depends on the
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number of ﬁsh of recruitment age.
Shrimp, on the other hand, hug the coastline. Juvenile shrimp migrate
inshore in the spring, grow in estuaries during the summer and fall, and then
swim back to the open ocean to spawn in the winter and spring. This behavior
results in a major harvest season from early summer to early winter that
concentrates in the estuaries and nearshore in the open ocean [38]. Compared
to tuna, this pattern suggests a model where recruitment is less vital year-to-
year.
While externalities in ﬁshing will arise from multiple sources, including
crowding and commons problems, this chapter applies the framework devel-
oped in the previous to the dynamic externality resulting from changes to the
good growth periods of ﬁsh. Section 3.2 presents some of the biological and
economic literature of ﬁsh growth. Section 3.3 presents a simpliﬁed model of a
dynamic ﬁshery and describes a parameter which causes an increasing action
gap, while Section 3.4 develops a more realistic ﬁshing model and demonstrates
how the framework would be applied. Section 3.5 gives conclusions for these
two related chapters.
3.2 Literature
Individual ﬁsheries and governments rely on stock assessment tech-
niques, particularly those using biomass approximation, to estimate the num-
96
ber of ﬁsh in the oceans.1 By monitoring data on catches, abundances, and bio-
logical relationships, it is possible to estimate the size of a ﬁsh stock [1], as well
as important variables including recruitment growth [56], individual growth,
seasonal growth [25], and additional environmental interactions [17, 36, 50].
Biologists and economists also analyze human impact of harvesting
strategies and market behavior on ﬁsh populations [46]. Cabral, Geronimo,
Lim, and Aliño [18] examine how a two-species community responds to dif-
ferent ﬁshing exploitation strategies, particularly: boats following high-yield
boats (Cartesian); boats ﬁshing at random sites (stochast-random); and boats
ﬁshing at least exploited sites (stochast-pressure). They ﬁnd that the stochast-
random strategy is optimal at low ﬁshing pressure, while the Cartesian strategy
is more eﬀective at high ﬁshing pressure, in both yield per catch and future
biomass growth. Huang and Smith [38] solve a dynamic structural model with
strategic interactions for ﬁshing shrimp with two types of externalities. They
model a cost due to a stock externality, which has an overall negative impact
on utility, as well as a cost due to congestion externality, which turns out to
have a positive eﬀect on utility.
Management of international ﬁshing stocks can be challenging because
of the diﬃculty of deﬁning and assigning ﬁshing rights [39, 47]. There are nu-
merous controversies, including disagreements over the meaning and intent of
1A biological ﬁsh stock is a group of ﬁsh of the same species that live in the same
geographic area and mix enough to breed with each other when mature. A management
stock may refer to a biological stock, or a multispecies complex that is managed as a single
unit [1].
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ﬁshing rights, disputes over the distribution of rights and associated economic
gain, and concern for disruptions imposed [39] on those operating under the
previous system. Many countries use quota systems to manage national ﬁsh-
eries [30, 54], and economists have described methods for envy-free allocation
of such quotas [42]. Froese [34] notes that ﬁshing quotas are decided on the
basis of political considerations, largely ignoring the scientiﬁc advice, and typ-
ically legalizing catches beyond safe levels. Echoing the reasoning for simple
treaty forms in Chapter 1, he proposes three simple indicators of ﬁsh stock
health and justiﬁes each of them as a measure for whether there is overﬁshing
happening. The ﬁrst indicator is percentage of mature ﬁsh in catch, with
100% as target. Attaining this target allows all ﬁsh to spawn at least once
and maintain healthy stocks. The second indicator is percent of specimens
with optimum length in catch, with 100% as target. Following this rule pre-
vents growth overﬁshing, and over time increases the size and value of the ﬁsh.
The third and ﬁnal indicator is percentage of `mega-spawners' in catch, with
0% as the target, which allows large females to lay more eggs and prevents
subsequent recruitment failure.
The link missing in the literature is between which ﬁsh are most in
danger of extinction and which ﬁsh are under current protection, a connection
of biology and economics. Using the idea of increasing action gaps developed in
the previous chapter, I attempt to provide an explanation for why international
coordination occurs for certain species of ﬁsh and not others.
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3.3 A Simple Fishery
Many of the most diﬃcult-to-analyze externalities are dynamic in na-
ture. If a dynamic game is Markovian in nature, then inheritability in value
functions [58] applies to many of the curvature requirements derived in Chap-
ter 2. Therefore, if an externality only enters in the stage game, and does
not aﬀect the dynamics in an opposing manner, the earlier results are clearly
extendable. The question remains: what of a purely dynamic externality?
Consider a simple stochastic ﬁshing zone model with two agents. The
ﬁshing zone can be in one of two states: damaged, with s = 0, or productive,
with s = 1. When the ﬁshing zone is productive, agents take no strategic
action and receive a deterministic payoﬀ of u1. With probability (1 − r), the
zone remains productive, while with probability r, the ﬁshing zone becomes
damaged.
When the ﬁshing zone is damaged, each agent i has a choice variable
pi ∈
[
¯
p, p¯
]
. This pi is part of the transition probability back to the productive
state, so a higher choice gives a higher chance of getting out of the damaged
state. However, this action is costly in terms of yield. The reward in the bad
state is u0(pi), a function that is decreasing in pi and dominated by the good
state's utility, i.e. u1 > u0(
¯
p) > u0(p¯) > 0 and u′0(pi) < 0. The agent's utility
is only a function of his own choice, pi, so there are no static externalities. The
transition probability, on the other hand is a function of both agents' choices:
P0,1 = pi + pj
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To keep P0,1 in the range of probability, it must be that 2p¯ ≤ 1. Because it is
a function of both agents actions, the transition probability displays a positive
externality.
The transition matrix is:
st
st+1
0 1
0 1− pi − pj pi + pj
1 r 1− r
Consider a stationary strategy as a candidate for a Markov perfect
equilibrium. The strategy would be to play pMi whenever the state is damaged,
or bad, satisfying the following value functions:
Πig(pi, p
M
j ) = u1 + β
[
(1− r)Πig(pi, pMj ) + rΠib(pi, pMj )
]
Πib(pi, p
M
j ) = u0(pi) + β
[
(pi + p
M
j )Π
i
g(pi, p
M
j )
+ (1− pi − pMj )Πib(pi, pMj )
] (3.1)
Since this is stationary, the good-state value function, Πig(pi, p
M
j ), can
be solved for directly as a function of the other variables. The derivation is in
the Appendix, and it is equal to:
Πig(pi, p
M
j ) =
u1 + βrΠ
i
b(pi, p
M
j )
(1− β(1− r))
This can be substituted back into the bad-state value function, solving
for Πib(pi, p
M
j ). This is completed in the Appendix, and the resulting function
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is:
Πib(pi, p
M
j ) =
(1− β(1− r))u0(pi) + β(pi + pMj )u1
(1− β) [1− β + βr + β (pi + pMj )]
Therefore, agent i's maximization problem is as follows, given player
j's Markov perfect stationary action:
max
pi
(1− β(1− r))u0(pi) + β(pi + pMj )u1
(1− β) [1− β + βr + β (pi + pMj )]
s.t. pi ≥
¯
p
pi ≤ p¯
Lemma 3.1. There exists a unique interior Markov perfect equilibrium de-
scribed by:
βu0(p
M
i )−
[
1− β + βr + β (pMi + pMj )]u′0(pMi )− βu1 = 0
βu0(p
M
j )−
[
1− β + βr + β (pMi + pMj )]u′0(pMj )− βu1 = 0
The proof is in the Appendix. If the agents are symmetric, then this
becomes:
βu0(p
M)− [1− β + βr + 2βpM]u′0(pM)− βu1 = 0,
which can be rearranged to form:
β
(
u0(p
M)− u1
)
=
[
1− β + βr + 2βpM]u′0(pM),
a statement which has the usual interpretation of equating marginal cost and
marginal beneﬁt and where both sides are negative.
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Now consider a cooperative version of the stationary Markov equilib-
rium.2 The value functions are as follows:
ΠPg (pi, pj) = 2u1 + β
[
(1− r)ΠPg (pi, pj) + rΠPb (pi, pj)
]
ΠPb (pi, pj) = u0(pi) + u0(pj) + β
[
(pi + pj)Π
P
g (pi, pj)
+ (1− pi − pj)ΠPb (pi, pj)
] (3.2)
Similarly as for the non-cooperative case, the good-state value function,
ΠPg (pi, pj), can be solved for explicitly, then substituted into the bad-state
function, which is also obtained. The derivations are in the Appendix and
give the social planner's maximization problem:
max
pi,pj
(1− β(1− r)) (u0(pi) + u0(pj)) + 2β(pi + pj)u1
(1− β) [1− β + βr + β (pi + pj)]
s.t. pi ≥
¯
p
pi ≤ p¯
pj ≥
¯
p
pj ≤ p¯
Lemma 3.2. There exists a unique interior Markov perfect cooperative equi-
librium given by:
β [u0(pi) + u0(pj)]− [1− β + βr + β (pi + pj)]u′0(pi)− 2βu1 = 0
β [u0(pi) + u0(pj)]− [1− β + βr + β (pi + pj)]u′0(pj)− 2βu1 = 0
2There are two ways to deﬁne the social planner's corresponding restrictions on actions:
he could keep each pi within [
¯
p, p¯], or could keep the sum pi+pj within [2
¯
p, 2p¯]. The second
method gives the social planner some extra transferability the players themselves do not
have, so the ﬁrst method corresponds more naturally to the problem.
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This is proven in the Appendix. With symmetric agents, have one
condition for pP :
2βu0(p
P )− [1− β + βr + 2βpP ]u′0(pP )− 2βu1 = 0
which can be rearranged as:
2β
(
u0(p
P )− u1
)
=
[
1− β + βr + 2βpP ]u′0(pP )
The simpliﬁed symmetric case will be used. A comparison of the sym-
metric non-cooperative and cooperative ﬁrst order conditions is below:
β
(
u0(p
M)− u1
)
=
[
1− β + βr + 2βpM]u′0(pM)
2β
(
u0(p
P )− u1
)
=
[
1− β + βr + 2βpP ]u′0(pP )
For continuation purposes, the following assumptions are imposed:
1. Dominance of the good state, i.e.
u1 > 2u0(
¯
p) (3.3)
With this assumption, the utility in the good state is suﬃciently large,
larger than twice the maximum possible utility in the bad state. This is
to ensure that the good state is tempting enough.
2. Weak concavity, i.e.
0 ≥ u′′0(p) (3.4)
With this assumption, the utility in the bad state is weakly concave in
p.
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3. Suﬃciently high discount factor β, i.e.
[1− β + βr + 2βpP ] > 0 (3.5)
This assumption will guarantee a few non-zero denominators. What it
basically means is that the r given and pP chosen are suﬃciently large
together that their discounted sum is larger than 1−β. With exogenous
parameters only, the following is suﬃcient for the condition above:
[1− β + βr] > 0 (3.6)
The ﬁrst matter is to demonstrate that there is an externality situation,
in that the social planner recommends a higher probability and promotes the
positive externality.
Lemma 3.3. Under the assumptions listed, the social planner's symmetric
action pP is larger than the non-cooperative action pM .
The proof is in the Appendix. Having established the externality, the
next question is whether any of the parameters in the problem cause an increas-
ing action gap. Hence, the comparative statics of the problem are addressed
next.
Lemma 3.4. Under the assumptions listed, the following are the comparative
statics of the problem:
• With respect to the discount factor, β, the non-cooperative action is in-
creasing:
∂pM
∂β
> 0,
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as is the cooperative action:
∂pP
∂β
> 0.
• With respect to the static good-state reward, u1, the non-cooperative ac-
tion is increasing:
∂pM
∂u1
> 0,
as is the cooperative action:
∂pP
∂u1
> 0.
• With respect to the transition from the good state to the bad state, r, the
non-cooperative action is decreasing:
∂pM
∂r
< 0,
while the cooperative action is constant:
∂pP
∂r
= 0.
The proof deriving these comparative statics is in the Appendix. The
last two derivatives, those with respect to r, point the direction of investigation
of a parameter making the externality worse.
The variable r is the probability of transitioning to the bad state if in
the good state. This number is technically not part of the externality story at
all, since it is unaﬀected by the players' actions and is simply a fact of life.
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The social planner pays it no mind in determining the optimal action for the
players; as can be seen, if r increases, i.e. the likelihood of staying in the good
state decreases, the social planner does not change the action taken, ∂p
P
∂r
= 0.
If βu′0(p
M) >
(
1− β + βr + 2βpM)u′′0(pM), then the non-cooperative
action is shrinking because less of the costly action is taken to get back to
good state. With higher probability of leaving the good state for the bad, the
good state is less valuable than before, so sacriﬁcing utility to return to it is
not desirable. This reaction, however, creates a pattern which worsens the
dynamic externality and provides an example of an increasing action gap.
3.4 A Realistic Fishery
The previous ﬁshery model simpliﬁed reality, with a focus on under-
standing how a transition probability can cause a dynamic externality, even
when a one-stage game does not contain a commons problem. This section
presents a ﬁshery model which is slightly more realistic. The primitives of this
model are:
1. agents, I = {1, 2},
2. actions, Ai = [0, 1],
3. utility ui(xi), where xi is a function of a ∈ A ≡ ×i∈IAi, and
4. discount factor, δ.
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Agents come into period knowing residual stock, yt−1, and last period's
shock, zt−1. There is some growth shock, zt, which is applied to the residual
stock, but this shock is not revealed to the players. There is perhaps some
knowledge about the expectation of zt from zt−1, depending the distribution
of the growth shocks and any knowledge contained therein. When the growth
function is applied, yˆt is the new starting stock.
Agent i takes action ait, while agent j takes action ajt, each to maxi-
mize his own expected value. This action results in the individual catch, xit,
according to deterministic harvest function. The individual catches are ob-
served by both players, who can then calculate the total summed catch. From
this information, players can then back out the grown stock, as well as the
period's growth shock. Players then know the new residual stock, which is the
grown stock less the catches.
The particular functional forms are now described. First, the period
utility, u(xit), should be something relatively simple, given that the growth
process will be more complicated. The utility function should be increasing in
own catch and possibly weakly concave, depending on desired risk preferences.
Notably, the function does not take any other arguments, so the agent is not
harmed by the fact that the other agent may have caught something as well,
nor does the agent receive any direct beneﬁt from the stock's existence. The
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simplest possible function to use here is a linear one:3
u(xit) = xit. (3.7)
The catch xit is determined by the harvest function, h(ait, ajt, yˆt). This
is a deterministic function, though the grown stock, yˆt, is unknown to the play-
ers at the time of their decisions. The harvest function should be increasing
and concave in own action, ait, as more eﬀort increases catch but with dimin-
ishing marginal returns. On the other hand, the function should be decreasing
in the other player's action, ajt, as more eﬀort on an opponent's part decreases
a player's own catch. This aspect captures a direct negative externality in the
stage game, a characteristic which was not present in the example in Section
3.3. Furthermore, the harvest function should be submodular, so more eﬀort
on an opponent's part decreases the marginal catch as well. Finally, the har-
vest function should be increasing in stock. A possible function to use here
is:
h(ait, ajt, yˆt) = yˆt (1− exp (−ait (s− ajt))) . (3.8)
It is assumed that s is greater than one, to make sure that s− ajt is a positive
amount.
Working backwards, the next function to characterize is the growth
function. This function needs to correspond to the biological principles of ﬁsh
populations. The growth function should be increasing in the residual stock
3A logarithmic utility function would also be a good choice.
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and in the shock. There is also a natural growth rate, r, which is generally
somewhere between (0, 1), which enters the growth function in an increasing
manner. A possible function to serve as the growth function is:
g(yt−1, zt) = yt exp(r(1 + zt)). (3.9)
The growth shock, zt, is modeled in a manner that allows for possible
correlation over time. One possibility is an AR1 process with some idiosyn-
cratic shock. The growth shock can be written in the following manner:
zt = ρzt−1 + εt, (3.10)
where ρ is the coeﬃcient of correlation and εt is distributed according to a
standard normal. If ρ is zero, then there is no time correlation, and zt is
identical to the idiosyncratic shock. As ρ increases, the time correlation of
growth shocks increases.
Using these functions and the set-up, the maximization problem of
agent i, given ajt, can then be written as:
Vi(yt−1, zt−1) = max
ai∈[0,1]
E
[
yt−1 exp(r(1 + ρzt−1 + εt))
· (1− exp(−ait(s− ajt)))
+ δVi
(
yt−1 exp(r(1 + zt))(−1 + exp(−ait(s− ajt)
+ exp(−ajt(s− ait))), 1 + ρzt−1 + εt
)∣∣∣∣εt]
s.t. εt ∼ N(0, 1), f(εt) = 1√
2pi
exp
(−ε2t
2
)
(3.11)
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The exact bounds are not addressed here, though there must be some
knowledge of what occurs if the stock goes extinct. This is an extension to be
covered when estimation is attempted.
In order to apply the parameterization framework in a negative exter-
nality, the ﬁrst step is to characterize the nature of the externality and pa-
rameters that may aﬀect it. There were three possible linear eﬀects describe:
the opponent eﬀect, the own eﬀect, and the submodular eﬀect.
Recall that the opponent eﬀect involved directly increasing the nega-
tive externality caused by the opponent's action, the own eﬀect increases the
marginal beneﬁt of a player's own action, and the submodular eﬀect decreases
an already-negative cross-partial. Therefore, in order to determine which pa-
rameterization to use, the following derivatives should be taken:
1. If a parameter θ causes an own eﬀect, then it should increase the marginal
utility of own action. Therefore, the following derivative should be taken
and checked:
∂
∂θ
[
∂ui
∂ai
]
> 0
and/or
∂
∂θ
[
∂Vi
∂ai
]
> 0.
2. If a parameter θ causes an opponent eﬀect, then it should make the
negative externality stronger. Therefore, the following derivative should
be taken and checked:
∂
∂θ
[
∂ui
∂aj
]
< 0
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and/or
∂
∂θ
[
∂Vi
∂aj
]
< 0.
3. If a parameter θ causes a submodular eﬀect, then it should make a nega-
tive cross-partial even more negative. Therefore, the following derivative
should be taken and checked:
∂
∂θ
[
∂2ui
∂ai∂aj
]
< 0
and/or
∂
∂θ
[
∂2Vi
∂ai∂aj
]
< 0.
For a set-up with a positive externality or supermodularity, the signs of
interest would be opposite.
The second step is to determine if the necessary curvatures for The-
orems 2.1 and 2.2 to hold are met. For the derivatives that hold true, the
corresponding linearized parameters can be added to the baseline utility func-
tion, and with the proper curvature, they give the directions described in the
previous chapter. From the results derived, two suﬃcient situations are the
most clear: if the opponent eﬀect is the only eﬀect, then the action gap holds
by Theorem 2.1; if the own eﬀect is the only eﬀect, then the requirements for
Theorem 2.2 must be checked.
Checking the derivatives of a dynamic function can be a diﬃcult task,
particularly with a nuanced problem like Equation (3.11). Though the full
derivative should be checked, the following analysis will focus on just the ﬁrst
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stage. The linearization framework could be extended to two parameters, one
which describes the eﬀect of the parameter on the ﬁrst stage, and one which
describes the eﬀect on continuation value. This is an extension which may
prove interesting, but at this moment, only the stage parameter is investigated.
If just examining the ﬁrst stage, then the maximization problem be-
comes:
U ≡ max
ait
∫ ∞
−∞
yt−1 exp(r(1 + ρzt−1 + εt))[1− exp(−ait(s− ajt))]
· 1√
2pi
exp
(−ε2t
2
)
dεt
(3.12)
The parameter of interest is ρ, the coeﬃcient of correlation on the
growth shock. With zero correlation, there is no information gained from
knowing the previous period's shock. With positive correlation, the previous
period's growth shock gives some information, however, and may aﬀect the
strategies used and the negative externality.
To check if there is an own eﬀect, the ﬁrst step is to take the derivative
of U with respect to ai:
∂U
∂ai
=
∫ ∞
−∞
yt−1 exp(r(1 + ρzt−1 + εt))[− exp(−ait(s− ajt))(−1)(s− ajt)]
· 1√
2pi
exp
(−ε2t
2
)
dεt
=
∫ ∞
−∞
yt−1 exp(r(1 + ρzt−1 + εt)) exp(−ait(s− ajt))(s− ajt)
· 1√
2pi
exp
(−ε2t
2
)
dεt
(3.13)
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This derivative is positive, as the larger action increases one-stage util-
ity. However, since today's action lowers tomorrow's stock, this would enter
negatively into continuation value, making the derivative with respect to the
full value function have an ambiguous sign.
The next step is to look at the eﬀect of ρ on this derivative:
∂
∂ρ
[
∂U
∂ai
]
=
∫ ∞
−∞
yt−1 exp(r(1 + ρzt−1 + εt))rzt−1
· exp(−ait(s− ajt))(s− ajt) 1√
2pi
exp
(−ε2t
2
)
dεt
= yt−1zt−1 exp(−ait(s− ajt))(s− ajt)
·
∫ ∞
−∞
r exp(r(1 + ρzt−1 + εt))
1√
2pi
exp
(−ε2t
2
)
dεt
= yt−1zt−1 exp(−ait(s− ajt))(s− ajt)
·
∫ ∞
−∞
r exp(r(1 + ρzt−1)) exp(rεt)
1√
2pi
exp
(−ε2t
2
)
dεt
= yt−1zt−1 exp(r(1 + ρzt−1)) exp(−ait(s− ajt))(s− ajt)
·
∫ ∞
−∞
r√
2pi
exp(rεt) exp
(−ε2t
2
)
dεt
(3.14)
To determine the sign of this expression, each piece must be examined.
With proper bounds on extinction, then yt−1 is positive, as is s− ajt and each
of the exponential functions, including the integrated term. However, the sign
of zt−1 is unknown. Because this growth shock is hit by an idiosyncratic shock
distributed according to a standard normal, it is possible for the growth shock
to be positive or negative. The entirety of the expression is positive when
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previous period's growth shock, zt−1 is positive, but it is negative if that shock
is negative. Since this value could foreseeably switch every period, not much
information is gained here as to whether an own eﬀect is present.
To check if there is an opponent eﬀect, the ﬁrst step is to take the
derivative of U with respect to aj:
∂U
∂aj
=
∫ ∞
−∞
yt−1 exp(r(1 + ρzt−1 + εt))
· [− exp(−ait(s− ajt))(−ait)(−1)] 1√
2pi
exp
(−ε2t
2
)
dεt
= −
∫ ∞
−∞
yt−1 exp(r(1 + ρzt−1 + εt))
· exp(−ait(s− ajt))ait 1√
2pi
exp
(−ε2t
2
)
dεt
(3.15)
This derivative is negative, as a larger action taken by the opponent de-
creases one-stage utility. The opponent's action also lowers tomorrow's stock,
so this enters negatively into the continuation value. Unlike the own action,
the opponent action enters into both parts in the same manner, and so the
derivative with respect to the full value function should be negative.
The next step is to determine the eﬀect of ρ on this derivative:
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∂∂ρ
[
∂U
∂aj
]
=
∫ ∞
−∞
yt−1 exp(r(1 + ρzt−1 + εt))rzt−1
· exp(−ait(s− ajt))(−ait) 1√
2pi
exp
(−ε2t
2
)
dεt
= yt−1zt−1 exp(−ait(s− ajt))(−ait)
·
∫ ∞
−∞
r exp(r(1 + ρzt−1 + εt))
1√
2pi
exp
(−ε2t
2
)
dεt
= − yt−1zt−1 exp(r(1 + ρzt−1)) exp(−ait(s− ajt))ait
·
∫ ∞
−∞
r√
2pi
exp(rεt)) exp
(−ε2t
2
)
dεt
(3.16)
Again, most of the pieces of this function are positive, but there is a
negative sign out front. Like with the own eﬀect, the sign is determined by the
previous period's growth shock, zt−1. If that is positive, then the expression
is negative, while if that growth shock is negative, then the whole expression
is positive.
To check if there is a submodular eﬀect, the ﬁrst step is to take the
derivative of U with respect to ai and aj:
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∂2U
∂ai∂aj
=
∫ ∞
−∞
yt−1 exp(r(1 + ρzt−1 + εt))[exp(−ait(s− ajt))(−1)
+ exp(−ait(s− ajt))(−1)(s− ajt)(−ait)] 1√
2pi
exp
(−ε2t
2
)
dεt
=
∫ ∞
−∞
yt−1 exp(r(1 + ρzt−1 + εt))[− exp(−ait(s− ajt))
− exp(−ait(s− ajt))(−ait(s− ajt))] 1√
2pi
exp
(−ε2t
2
)
dεt
= −
∫ ∞
−∞
yt−1 exp(r(1 + ρzt−1 + εt)) exp(−ait(s− ajt))
· (1− ait(s− ajt)) 1√
2pi
exp
(−ε2t
2
)
dεt
(3.17)
This derivative is weakly negative, since s − ajt > 0, while ait ≤ 1 be-
cause of bounds on the domain. Hence there is weak submodularity displayed
in the problem.
The next step is to determine the eﬀect of ρ on this cross-partial:
∂
∂ρ
[
∂2U
∂ai∂aj
]
= −
∫ ∞
−∞
yt−1 exp(r(1 + ρzt−1 + εt))rzt−1 exp(−ait(s− ajt))
· (1− ait(s− ajt)) 1√
2pi
exp
(−ε2t
2
)
dεt
= − yt−1zt−1 exp(−ait(s− ajt))(1− ait(s− ajt))
·
∫ ∞
−∞
r exp(r(1 + ρzt−1)) exp(rεt))
1√
2pi
exp
(−ε2t
2
)
dεt
= − yt−1zt−1 exp(r(1 + ρzt−1)) exp(−ait(s− ajt))
· (1− ait(s− ajt))
∫ ∞
−∞
r√
2pi
exp(rεt)) exp
(−ε2t
2
)
dεt
(3.18)
As with the opponent eﬀect, most pieces of this expression are positive,
there is a negative sign out front, and the actual sign of the expression depends
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on the previous period's growth shock, zt−1. If that shock is positive, then the
whole expression is negative, while if that shock is negative, then the expression
is positive.
3.5 Conclusions
These two chapters work together to provide the very beginning of
insight into a complicated problem of externalities. With the number of possi-
bilities for coordination to reduce an externality problem, there must be some
method to determine which situations merit that coordination. I put forth the
framework examining externalities based on some parameter which causes in-
creasing action gaps between coordination and non-coordination. Since many
externality stories can be diﬃcult to analyze, I proposed a method of lin-
earization based on three possible eﬀects and analyzed two notable cases of
increasing action gaps. The ﬁrst was a sole opponent eﬀect in a symmetric
game, where the optimal action under coordination unambiguously diverges
from the non-coordination action. The second was an own eﬀect in a poten-
tially non-symmetric game, where suﬃcient conditions for divergence include
accelerating beneﬁts to reduction of the action that causes the negative exter-
nality.
The main extension to pursue is that of centered parameterizations.
Unlike the simple linear parameterization, a centered term can give better in-
sight into the utility gap as well. However, there must be careful understanding
of how the separate centerings aﬀect economic intuition. In early analysis, the
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centered Taylor expansion form suggests that the submodular eﬀect is null.
In comparison to the ambiguous decreases under the linear parameterization,
this departure suggests that the framework should be checked for robustness
to parameterization.
The diﬃculties in applying the framework in this chapter suggest an
even more complicated problem is at hand than originally thought. Further
work requires more conclusive examples than the ﬁshery models presented
here. For instance, a modiﬁcation of the full ﬁshery model which guarantees
that growth shocks are between zero and two would be less realistic, perhaps,
but would guarantee the necessary sign for each of the three eﬀects to be
included. However, the initial analysis presented here does suggest that per-
sistence in growth shocks of ﬁsh gives some sort of increase in action gap, and
thereby a motivation for coordination under high time correlation.
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Appendix A
Proofs and Derivations for Chapter 1
A.1 General Set-up and Unrestricted Commitment Power
Proof of Lemma 1.1.
Restatement of Lemma 1.1. For any u ∈ U, if a∗(u) ∈ Eq(u), then any
small vector decrease in a∗(u) is Pareto improving.
Proof. For each i, evaluated at a∗(u), an agent i's marginal utility of his own
action ∂ui(·)
∂ai
= 0, so an ε-decrease from a∗i will reduce i's utility by something
on the order of ε2. However, for all agents j 6= i, the marginal utility for j of
i's action is strictly negative ∂uj(·)
∂ai
< 0, so the ε-decrease from a∗i will increase
j's utility on the order of ε. For small positive ε, ε2 < ε.
Proof of Lemma 1.2.
Restatement of Lemma 1.2. For u ∈ U, when coalitional commitment
power is unrestricted, the unrestricted equilibrium of the coalition of the whole,
aUn(u, I), is conceivable for all u ∈ U, and no other coalition J strictly smaller
than I can improve upon the actions in summed utility.
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Proof. By Lemma 1.1, aUn(u, I) is conceivable. By deﬁnition, the unrestricted
coalitional commitment power solves the problem, maxa∈A
∑
i∈I ui(a), where
each member can be assigned any action in the space, so no other vector of
actions, equilibrium or not, gives a higher sum.
A.2 Lump-sum Commitment Power
A.2.1 Proofs for Section 1.4.1
Proof of Theorem 1.1.
Restatement of Theorem 1.1. For any J ( I, #J ≥ 2, there is a set of
u ∈ U having non-empty interior, for which the vector of actions aLS(u, J) is
conceivable, formally denoted as:
(∀j ∈ J)[uj(aLS(u, J)) > uj(a∗(u))].
Further, there is a subset of u ∈ U having non-empty interior which fulﬁll the
above and for which, under the lump-sum restriction, the coalition J improves
upon the outcome of the coalition of the whole, formally written as:
(∀i ∈ I)[ui(aLS(u, J)) > ui(aLS(u, I))].
Proof. For some I, pick some J with cardinality greater than one. Pick a
function u fulﬁlling all of the desired characteristics and where exclusion is
optimal under the lump-sum restriction. This proof will use a particular func-
tion for which exclusion is optimal and all the assumptions on U hold, and
then demonstrate that those assumptions are open conditions.
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The particular function considered is
ui(a) = θi (10 + ai)− a2i
(
n+
n∑
j=1
aj
)
. (A.1)
The parameter θ is as described in Section 1.4.2, where the group J consists
of agents who have θi = 1, while the remaining agents not in J have θi = θ ∈
Θ = (0, 1).
Exclusion Result
An example of the optimality of exclusion under suﬃcient heterogene-
ity for this chosen function comes from Lemma 1.4, which is itself proven in
Appendix A.2.2.
Fulﬁllment of Assumptions
• Twice continuous diﬀerentiability: This assumption clearly holds for this
utility function, as the ﬁrst and second total and partial derivatives can
be easily taken.
 First derivatives
dui(a)
da
= ∂ui(a)
∂ai
+
∑
j 6=i
∂ui(a)
∂aj
∂ui(a)
∂ai
= (1− θi)−
[
2ai
(
n+
∑n
j=1 aj
)
+ a2i
]
∀ j 6= i ∂ui(a)
∂aj
= −a2i
 Second derivatives
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d2ui(a)
da2
= ∂
2ui(a)
∂a2i
+ 2
∑
j 6=i
∂2ui(a)
∂ai∂aj
+
∑
j 6=i
{
∂2ui(a)
∂a2j
+
∑
k 6=i or j
∂ui(a)
∂aj∂ak
}
∂2ui(a)
∂a2i
= −
[
2
(
n+
∑n
j=1 aj
)
+ 4ai
]
∀ j 6= i ∂2ui(a)
∂ai∂aj
= −2ai
∀ j 6= i ∂ui(a)
∂a2j
= 0
∀ k 6= i or j ∂ui(a)
∂aj∂ak
= 0
• Negative externalities: Using the derivatives above, I can conﬁrm nega-
tive externalities on the domain. The ﬁrst derivative of i's utility function
with respect to any j's action is:
∀ j 6= i ∂ui(a)
∂aj
= −a2i
For every action in the set Ai = [0, 1], this derivative is less than or equal
to zero. It is strictly negative for actions in (0, 1] and only zero when no
action is taken, i.e. ai = 0.
• Submodularity: Again, using the derivatives above, I can conﬁrm sub-
modularity on the domain. The cross-partial of i's utility function with
respect to his own action and another agent j's action is:
∀ j 6= i ∂
2ui(a)
∂ai∂aj
= −2ai
For every action in the set Ai = [0, 1], this derivative is less than or equal
to zero. It is strictly negative for actions in (0, 1] and only zero when no
action is taken, i.e. ai = 0.
123
• Strict own concavity: Once again, using the derivatives above, I can
conﬁrm strict concavity on the domain. The second derivative of i's
utility function with respect to his own action is:
∂2ui(a)
∂a2i
= −
[
2
(
n+
n∑
j=1
aj
)
+ 4ai
]
For any a ∈ A, this derivative is strictly negative.
• Unique Nash equilibrium: The maximization problem for an agent, given
other's Nash actions a∗j , is the following:
max
ai∈[0,1]
(1− θi) (10 + ai)− a2i
(
n+
n∑
j=1
aj
)
s.t. ai ≥ 0
ai ≤ 1
The Lagrangian is:
L(ai, λ1i, λ2i) = (1− θi) (10 + ai)− a2i
(
n+
∑n
j=1 aj
)
+λ1iai + λ2i(1− ai)
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are:
∂L
∂ai
=(1− θi)−
[
2ai
(
n+
∑n
j=1 aj
)
+ a2i
]
+ λ1i − λ2i = 0
λ1iai = 0, λ1i ≥ 0, ai ≥ 0
λ2i(1− ai) = 0, λ2i ≥ 0, ai ≤ 1
There are three cases to examine: interior solution, corner solution of
zero, and corner solution of one.
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Case i. Interior action: ai ∈ (0, 1)⇒ λ1i = λ2i = 0
The ﬁrst derivative of the Lagrangian becomes:[
2ai
(
n+
∑n
j=1 aj
)
+ a2i
]
= (1− θi)[
2ai
(
n+
∑
j 6=i a
∗
j
)
+ 3a2i
]
= (1− θi)
3a2i + 2ai
(
n+
∑
j 6=i a
∗
j
)
− (1− θi) = 0
Using the quadratic formula to solve for the optimal action:
a∗i =
−2
(
n+
∑
j 6=i a
∗
j
)
±
√
4
(
n+
∑
j 6=i a
∗
j
)2
+ 12(1− θi)
6
=
−
(
n+
∑
j 6=i a
∗
j
)
±
√(
n+
∑
j 6=i a
∗
j
)2
+ 3(1− θi)
3
Check if these answers are interior. First, check a∗−i (which uses
the minus from ±):
a∗−i =
1
3
[
−
(
n+
∑
j 6=i a
∗
j
)
−
√(
n+
∑
j 6=i a
∗
j
)2
+ 3(1− θi)
]
Know
(
n+
∑
j 6=i a
∗
j
)2
+ 3(1− θi) > 0
⇒
√(
n+
∑
j 6=i a
∗
j
)2
+ 3(1− θi) > 0
⇒ 1
3
[
−
(
n+
∑
j 6=i a
∗
j
)
−
√(
n+
∑
j 6=i a
∗
j
)2
+ 3(1− θi)
]
< 0
This means that a∗−i is not within the domain, and so it cannot be
an equilibrium action. Now check a∗+i (which uses the plus from
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±):
a∗+i =
1
3
[
−
(
n+
∑
j 6=i a
∗
j
)
+
√(
n+
∑
j 6=i a
∗
j
)2
+ 3(1− θi)
]
Know
√(
n+
∑
j 6=i a
∗
j
)2
+ 3(1− θi) >
(
n+
∑
j 6=i a
∗
j
)
⇒ 1
3
[
−
(
n+
∑
j 6=i a
∗
j
)
+
√(
n+
∑
j 6=i a
∗
j
)2
+ 3(1− θi)
]
> 0
This means that a∗+i is greater than zero; now check if it is less than
one.
1
3
−
(
n+
∑
j 6=i a
∗
j
)
+
√(
n+
∑
j 6=i a
∗
j
)2
+ 3(1− θi)
?
< 1
−
(
n+
∑
j 6=i a
∗
j
)
+
√(
n+
∑
j 6=i a
∗
j
)2
+ 3(1− θi)
?
< 3
√(
n+
∑
j 6=i a
∗
j
)2
+ 3(1− θi)
?
<
(
n+
∑
j 6=i a
∗
j
)
+ 3(
n+
∑
j 6=i a
∗
j
)2
+ 3(1− θi)
?
<
((
n+
∑
j 6=i a
∗
j
)
+ 3
)2
(
n+
∑
j 6=i a
∗
j
)2
+ 3(1− θi)
?
<
(
n+
∑
j 6=i a
∗
j
)2
+ 6
(
n+
∑
j 6=i a
∗
j
)
+ 9
3(1− θi) < 6
(
n+
∑
j 6=i a
∗
j
)
+ 9
Since (1−θi) < 1, this certainly holds. Thus, we know that a∗+i < 1.
Case ii. Corner solution of zero: a∗i = 0⇒ λ2i = 0
The ﬁrst derivative of the Lagrangian becomes:
(1− θi) + λ1i = 0
⇒ (1− θi) ≤ 0
⇒ θi = 1
This is outside the range of Θi = (0, 1), so this case will not occur.
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Case iii. Corner solution of one: a∗i = 1⇒ λ1i = 0
The ﬁrst derivative of the Lagrangian becomes:
(1− θi)−
[
2
(
n+
∑
j 6=i aj
)
+ 3
]
− λ2i = 0
(1− θi) =
[
2
(
n+
∑
j 6=i aj
)
+ 3
]
+ λ2i
⇒ (1− θi) ≥ 2
(
n+
∑
j 6=i aj
)
+ 3
However, since 1− θi ≤ 1 and 2
(
1 +
∑
j 6=i a
∗
j
)
>> 1, this case can
never occur.
Thus the interior case is the only one which will be chosen. Now I show
that the equilibrium is unique through proof by contradiction. Suppose
there exists a∗ and a∗∗ s.t. that the interior Kuhn-Tucker conditions are
fulﬁlled, i.e. for all i both of the following hold:
2a∗i
(
n+
∑n
j=1 a
∗
j
)
+ a∗i
2 = (1− θi)
2a∗∗i
(
n+
∑n
j=1 a
∗∗
j
)
+ a∗∗i
2 = (1− θi)
Summing these conditions over i, the following two conditions must hold:
2 (n+
∑n
i=1 a
∗
i )
∑n
i=1 a
∗
i +
∑n
i=1 a
∗
i
2 =
∑n
i=1(1− θi)
2 (n+
∑n
i=1 a
∗∗
i )
∑n
i=1 a
∗∗
i +
∑n
i=1 a
∗∗
i
2 =
∑n
i=1(1− θi)
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Subtract the bottom condition from the top one:[
2 (n+
∑n
i=1 a
∗
i )
∑n
i=1 a
∗
i +
∑n
i=1 a
∗
i
2
]
− [2 (n+∑ni=1 a∗∗i )∑ni=1 a∗∗i −∑ni=1 a∗∗i 2] = 0
2 [(n+
∑n
i=1 a
∗
i )
∑n
i=1 a
∗
i − (n+
∑n
i=1 a
∗∗
i )
∑n
i=1 a
∗∗
i ]
+
[∑n
i=1 a
∗
i
2 −∑ni=1 a∗∗i 2] = 0
2n [
∑n
i=1 a
∗
i −
∑n
i=1 a
∗∗
i ] + 2
[
(
∑n
i=1 a
∗
i )
2 − (∑ni=1 a∗∗i )2]
+
[∑n
i=1 a
∗
i
2 −∑ni=1 a∗∗i 2] = 0
This can only be solved if
∑n
i=1 a
∗
i =
∑n
i=1 a
∗∗
i and
∑n
i=1 a
∗
i
2 =
∑n
i=1 a
∗∗
i
2.
However, this condition does not yet imply that the two equilibria are
equal, i.e. that a∗i = a
∗∗
i for all i.
In order for a∗ and a∗∗ to not be the same, there must be at least one
person for whom the actions are diﬀerent. Without loss of generality,
suppose a∗i 6= a∗∗i . Check the conditions for i to see whether this is
possible.
2a∗i
(
n+
∑n
j=1 a
∗
j
)
+ a∗i
2 = (1− θi)
2a∗∗i
(
n+
∑n
j=1 a
∗∗
j
)
+ a∗∗i
2 = (1− θi)
Recall that the total agent sums must be the same, i.e.
∑n
i=1 a
∗
i =∑n
i=1 a
∗∗
i . Subtract the bottom condition from the top one:
2(a∗i − a∗∗i )
(
n+
∑n
j=1 a
∗
j
)
+ (a∗i
2 − a∗∗i 2) = 0
Substitute the factorization for the diﬀerence of squares:
2(a∗i − a∗∗i )
(
n+
∑n
j=1 a
∗
j
)
+ (a∗i + a
∗∗
i )(a
∗
i − a∗∗i ) = 0
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If a∗i 6= a∗∗i , this means we can divide through by (a∗i − a∗∗i ), since it is
not equal to zero. This gives:
2
(
n+
∑n
j=1 a
∗
j
)
+ (a∗i + a
∗∗
i ) = 0
2
(
n+
∑n
j=1 a
∗
j
)
= −(a∗i + a∗∗i )
This leads to a contradiction: n > 0 and for all j, a∗j ≥ 0, meaning that
the left-hand side is strictly positive, while the right-hand side must be
weakly negative. Therefore it must be that a∗i = a
∗∗
i for all i, meaning
that a∗ and a∗∗ are the same and that the equilibrium is unique.
Openness of Conditions
The C2-norm on the utility functions for i ∈ I is:
||ui||i ≡ max
a∈A
|ui(a)|+
∑
j
max
a∈A
∣∣∣∣∂ui(a)∂aj
∣∣∣∣+ ∑
k,j∈I,k≥j
max
a∈A
∣∣∣∣∂2ui(a)∂ak∂aj
∣∣∣∣
The product space of the individual utility function is u ∈ C2(A;RI),
with the norm:
||u|| ≡ max
i∈I
||ui||i
The distance between two utility outcomes is d(u, v) ≡ ||u − v||. To show
openness, I will show that for a u ∈ U there exists ε > 0 such that ||u−v|| < ε
implies that v ∈ U also.
• Negative externality: The problem
max
i,j
max
a
∂ui(a)
∂aj
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has a solution {i∗, j∗, a∗}. Since u ∈ U, ∂ui∗ (a∗)
∂aj∗
< 0. Deﬁne
εa ≡ 1
2
∣∣∣∣∂ui∗(a∗)∂aj∗
∣∣∣∣ .
If ||u− v|| < εa, then ∀ i,∀ j,∀ a ∂vi(a)∂aj < −εa < 0. Thus, v has negative
externalities.
• Submodularity and concavity: Similarly as above, the problem maxi,j
maxa
∂2ui(a)
∂ai∂aj
has a solution {i∗, j∗, a∗}. Since u ∈ U, ∂2ui∗ (a∗)
∂ai∗∂aj∗
< 0. Deﬁne
εb ≡ 1
2
∣∣∣∣∂2ui∗(a∗)∂ai∗∂aj∗
∣∣∣∣ .
If ||u − v|| < εb, then ∀ i, ∀ j ∈ I (including i), ∀ a ∂2vi(a)∂ai∂aj < −εb < 0.
Thus, v is submodular and concave.
• Unique Nash equilibrium: For the purposes of Theorem 1.1, it is suﬃcient
for the property of unique Nash equilibrium to be open conditional upon
the previous properties.
Let Uconc denote the C2(A) utility functions which are strictly concave
in own actions. Observe that our functions of interest are within this
set, u ∈ U ⊂ Uconc. Let Eq(u) denote the set of equilibria for the game
Γ = (ui, Ai)i∈I . The vector of ﬁrst order conditions can then be denoted
F (u, a) ∈ RI and is written as:
F (u, a) =

∂u1(a)
∂a1
∂u2(a)
∂a2
...
∂un(a)
∂an

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Let Ao denote the interior of A. By strict own concavity, we know that
for an action proﬁle in the interior, a∗ ∈ Ao, we have that it is an
equilibrium, a∗ ∈ Eq(u), if and only if the FOC vector is equal to zero
at that proﬁle, F (u, a∗) = 0.
Thinking of openness of the condition of unique Nash equilibrium, we
need that for any small vector movement in others' actions, agent i
has one unique best action close to his previous action. Running into
boundaries and corner solutions might initially be of concern, so we will
carefully consider the implicit function theorem and the determinant of
the FOC.
For a non-empty J ⊂ I, let DFJ(u, a) denote the determinant of the
FOCs for J . Let the cardinality of J be equal to m, so DFJ(u, a) is an
m×m matrix which can be written as:
DJF (u, a) =

∂2u1(a)
∂u21
∂2u1(a)
∂a1∂a2
. . . ∂
2u1(a)
∂a1∂am
∂2u2(a)
∂a1∂a2
∂2u2(a)
∂a22
. . . ∂
2u2(a)
∂a2∂am
...
...
. . .
...
∂2um(a)
∂a1∂am
∂2um(a)
∂a2∂am
. . . ∂
2um(a)
∂a2m

The next result gives the invertibility of the FOC at the equilbrium,
DFI(u, a
∗), for these concave functions.
Lemma A.1. The set of u ∈ Uconc such that the J-determinant is in-
vertible at any equilibrium, i.e. DFJ(u, a
∗) 6= 0 for all a∗ ∈ Eq(u) and
all non-empty J ⊂ I, is a non-empty open subset of U.
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Proof. Non-emptiness can be shown by example.
Denote two sets of interest in Uconc. Let B1 be the set of utility func-
tions and their equilibria in the concave functions, denoted formally as
B1 = {(u, a) ∈ Uconc × A : a ∈ Eq(u)}. Let B2,J be the set of utility
function and actions for which the J-determinant is equal to zero, for-
mally denoted as B2,J = {(u, a) ∈ Uconc × A : DFJ(u, a) = 0}. Finally,
let B denote the projection of of B1 ∩ (∪J⊂IB2,J) onto Uconc.
Both B1 and ∪J⊂IB2,J are closed, so their intersection is as well. Because
A is compact, the projection of a closed subset of Uconc × A onto Uconc
is closed.The complement of the closed set B is the requisite set, with
invertible J-determinants at equilibrium, and it is open.
Let Uinv denote the set of invertible u from Lemma A.1. For u ∈ Uinv
and a∗ ∈ Eq(u), we say that (u, a∗) is not ﬂat at the boundary if
either the equilibrium is in the interior of A, i.e. a∗ ∈ Ao, or if for each
i ∈ I with equilibrium action a∗i in the boundary of Ai, the gradient of
ui points outwards. For instance, if a∗i = 0, then
∂ui(a
∗)
∂ai
< 0, so the agent
would want to decrease more if he could, or if a∗i = 1, then
∂ui(a
∗)
∂ai
> 0,
so the agent would want to increase more if they could. This notion sets
us up for the next lemma and the invertibility result.
Lemma A.2. There exists a non-empty, open set of u ∈ Uconc for which
there is a unique equilibrium, #Eq(u) = 1, and for which a∗(u) is a
smooth function of u.
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Proof. Let C denote the set of u ∈ Uinv for which there is an a∗ ∈ Eq(u)
that is ﬂat at the boundary, which means that every a∗ ∈ Eq(u) has the
property that for all i ∈ I, a∗i is in the boundary of Ai. The set C is
closed.
Let U′inv denote the complement of C in Uinv. Suppose that u ∈ U′inv has
one equilibrium and that J ⊂ I is the non-empty subset of I for which
a∗j is not in the boundary of Aj. Since u ∈ Uinv, then DFJ(u, a∗) 6= 0.
All of this means that a∗(·) is a locally unique, diﬀerentiable function
on a neighborhood of u when we hold a∗i ﬁxed, i 6∈ J . Since (u, a∗) is
not ﬂat on the boundary, for small enough changes in u, leaving a∗i ﬁxed
is still optimal for i 6∈ J . Since each u with one equilibrium has such a
neighborhood, the set of u with one equilibrium is open.
This shows that the property of unique Nash equilibrium is open.
Each of the conditions has been shown to be open individually, either
unconditionally or conditionally upon the remaining conditions. Take ε∗ ≡
min{εa, εb, εc, εd}. Pick v such that ||u− v|| < ε∗. Then all the conditions are
satisﬁed by v. Hence, the set of utility functions in U is open. This means the
exclusion result holds on an open set.
A.2.2 Proofs for Section 1.4.2
Proof of Lemma 1.3.
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Restatement of Lemma 1.3. When the group parameter is strictly smaller
than one, θ < 1, then the equilibrium action of the players not in J , a∗I\J(θ),
is smaller than the equilibrium action of the players in J , a∗J(θ).
Proof. Subtract FOC of J from FOC of I \ J .
[
θB′
(
a∗I\J(θ)
)−B′ (a∗J(θ))] = [a∗I\J(θ)− a∗θ(θ)] c′
∑
k∈I\J
a∗I\J(θ) +
∑
j∈J
a∗J(θ)

Suppose not.
Case i. Suppose that when θ < 1, a∗I\J(θ) = a
∗
J(θ). Then RHS = 0 ⇒ LHS
should be zero as well. However, LHS < 0. Contradiction shown.
Case ii. Suppose that when θ < 1, a∗I\J(θ) > a
∗
J(θ). Then RHS > 0 ⇒ LHS
should be greater than zero as well. However,
B′′(·) < 0⇒ [(a∗I\J(θ) > a∗J(θ))⇒ (B′ (a∗I\J(θ)) < B′ (a∗J(θ)))] .
Since 0 < θ < 1, then θB′
(
a∗I\J(θ)
)
< B′ (a∗J(θ)), which gives LHS < 0.
Contradiction shown.
Hence, it must be the case that a∗I\J(θ) < a
∗
J(θ) when θ < 1.
Kuhn-Tucker conditions for lump-sum reduction by coalition of the whole
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Using the cardinalities deﬁned earlier, the maximization problem can
be rewritten as:
max
r∈[0,a∗
I\J (θ)]
m
[
B(a∗J(θ)− r)− (a∗J(θ)− r)
· c
(
m(a∗J(θ)− r) + (n−m)(a∗I\J(θ)− r)
)]
+(n−m)
[
θB(a∗I\J(θ)− r)− (a∗I\J(θ)− r)
· c
(
m(a∗J(θ)− r) + (n−m)(a∗I\J(θ)− r)
)]
The Lagrangian is:
L(r, λ1, λ2) = m
[
B(a∗J(θ)− r)− (a∗J(θ)− r)
· c
(
m(a∗J(θ)− r) + (n−m)(a∗I\J(θ)− r)
)]
+(n−m)
[
θB(a∗I\J(θ)− r)− (a∗I\J(θ)− r)
· c
(
m(a∗J(θ)− r) + (n−m)(a∗I\J(θ)− r)
)]
+λ1r + λ2(a
∗
I\J(θ)− r)
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The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are:
∂L
∂r
=−m
[
B′(a∗J(θ)− r)
−
[
c
(
m(a∗J(θ)− r) + (n−m)(a∗I\J(θ)− r)
)
+n(a∗J(θ)− r)c′
(
m(a∗J(θ)− r) + (n−m)(a∗I\J(θ)− r)
)]]
−(n−m)
[
θB′(a∗I\J(θ)− r)
−
[
c
(
m(a∗J(θ)− r) + (n−m)(a∗I\J(θ)− r)
)
+n(a∗I\J(θ)− r)c′
(
m(a∗J(θ)− r) + (n−m)(a∗I\J(θ)− r)
)]]
+λ1 − λ2 = 0
λ1r =0, λ1 ≥ 0, r ≥ 0
λ2(a
∗
I\J(θ)− r) =0, λ2 ≥ 0, r ≤ a∗I\J(θ)
Kuhn-Tucker conditions for lump-sum reduction by J-coalition
max
rˆ∈[0,a∗J (θ)]
m
[
B(a∗J(θ)− rˆ)− (a∗J(θ)− rˆ)c
(
m(a∗J(θ)− rˆ) + (n−m)aJI\J(θ)
)]
The Lagrangian is:
L(r, λ1, λ2) = m
[
B(a∗J(θ)− rˆ)− (a∗J(θ)− rˆ)
· c
(
m(a∗J(θ)− rˆ) + (n−m)aJI\J(θ)
)]
+ λ1rˆ + λ2(a
∗
J(θ)− rˆ)
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The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are:
∂L
∂rˆ
=−m
[
B′(a∗J(θ)− rˆ)−
[
c
(
m(a∗J(θ)− rˆ) + (n−m)aJI\J(θ)
)
+m(a∗J(θ)− rˆ)c′
(
m(a∗J(θ)− rˆ) + (n−m)aJI\J(θ)
)]]
+λ1 − λ2 = 0
λ1rˆ =0, λ1 ≥ 0, rˆ ≥ 0
λ2(a
∗
J(θ)− rˆ) =0, λ2 ≥ 0, rˆ ≤ a∗J(θ)
Incentive for J-coalition to Reduce.
Let the utility of coalition J taking a lump-sum reduction of r be de-
noted as
uLSJ (r, θ) = m
[
B(a∗J(θ)− r)− (a∗J(θ)− r) c
(
m(a∗J(θ)− r) + (n−m)aJI\J(θ)
)]
.
Lemma A.3. When moving from zero, the players in J in the game in Section
1.4.2 have a strict incentive to increase r and reduce. Formally, this means
that
∂uLSJ (r,θ)
∂r
∣∣∣∣
r=0
, derived below, is positive:
∂uLSJ (r, θ)
∂r
∣∣∣∣
r=0
=−m
[
B′ (a∗J(θ))− c
(
ma∗J(θ) + (n−m)aJI\J(θ)
)
−ma∗J(θ)c′
(
ma∗J(θ) + (n−m)aJI\J(θ)
) ]
Proof. From the Nash ﬁrst order conditions, a∗J(θ) solves:
B′ (a∗J(θ))− c
(
(n−m)a∗I\J(θ) +ma∗J(θ)
)
− a∗J(θ)c′
(
(n−m)a∗I\J(θ) +ma∗J(θ)
)
= 0
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At r = 0, those in J are agreeing to play the no-coalition Nash equilib-
rium, meaning that the best responses of those not in J are also the coalition
actions, giving a∗I\J(θ) = a
J
I\J(θ). The ﬁrst order condition and the derivative
of uLSJ with respect to r evaluated at zero are then nearly identical, apart from
the extra weight on the cost derivative. Comparing the two, then it must be
that:
B′ (a∗J(θ))− c
(
(n−m)aJI\J(θ) +ma∗J(θ)
)
−ma∗J(θ)c′
(
(n−m)aJI\J(θ) +ma∗J(θ)
)
< 0
Combined with the negative sign on the outside of the parentheses,
∂uLSJ (r,θ)
∂r
∣∣∣∣
r=0
> 0.
Proof of Lemma 1.4.
Restatement of Lemma 1.4. There exists a threshold value θ¯ > 0 for
the group parameter such that for all values of the parameter higher than the
threshold, θ ∈ (0, θ¯), the equilibrium action of players not in J , a∗I\J(θ), is a
binding constraint on problem (1.14).
Proof. I show that there exists an open set around 1 in the parameter range Θ
for which r∗J(θ) is strictly positive and large compared to r
∗
I (θ), which is close
to zero.
1. Continuity: The ﬁrst step is to show that the Nash equilibrium a∗(θ)
is continuous. I use the result that if and only if some function Φ :
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X → K(Y ) has a closed graph and Y is compact, then Φ is upper hemi-
continuous (Corollary 6.1.33 in [26]).
Here, Φ is our equilibrium correspondence, deﬁned below as f . The X is
the game Γ, which is deﬁned below. The Y is the paramter θ ∈ Θ = [0, 1]
(which is immediately observed to be compact), and K(Y ) is the set of
strategy proﬁles σ ∈ ∆(A).
1.1 Establishing closed graph:
• Each player has a utility function, ui : A×Θ→ R.
• The game is deﬁned as follows: Γ(θ) ≡ {(ui(·; θ), Ai)i∈I : θ ∈
Θ}.
• A set of strategies, σ∗ is a Nash equilibrium of the game Γ
if σ∗i performs at least as well as any other strategy a
o
i for
player i given that the other agents are playing σ∗−i. Formally,
σ∗ ∈ Eq(Γ(θ)) if and only if for all agents i in all possible sets
of agents I and for all alternate strategies aoi ∈ Ai, then:
f(σ, θ; aoi ) ≡
∫
A
ui(a; θ)dσ
∗(a)−
∫
A
ui(a \ aoi )dσ∗(a) ≥ 0 (A.2)
Then the graph is deﬁned Gr(f) ≡ {(σ, θ) : f(σ, θ; aoi ) ≥ 0},
and it is closed.
Thus, the equilibrium correspondence of the game Γ(θ) is upper hemi-
continuous. Furthermore, a function that is upper hemi-continuous and
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single-valued at a point is continuous at that point. Since the equilibrium
correspondence is upper hemi-continuous, and the optimal actions a∗J(θ)
and a∗I\J(θ) of Equations (1.10) and (1.11) are single-valued for each θ,
then the equilibrium correspondence is single-valued for each θ. Thus,
the equilibrium correspondence of the game is continuous.
2. Close to zero: The next step is to assert that equilibria for values of
the parameter strictly inside the parameter space may be close to zero.
By continuity, since at the boundary parameter value of zero and the
equilibrium action a∗I\J(1) = 0, then a
∗
I\J(θ) for θ arbitarily close to zero
is also arbitrarily close to zero.
3. Binding: The third step is to show that when solving the coalition I
problem for θ close to zero, a∗I\J(θ) is a binding constraint on choosing
r∗I (θ). Looking at Equation 1.14, it balances the utility of both groups of
players. The players not in J can only decrease to zero, meaning that the
entire problem is constrained by the size of a∗I\J(θ). However, the players
in J have a strictly positive beneﬁt from group reduction, as shown in
Proposition A.3. Thus, the action of the players not in J is a binding
constraint on the coalition of the whole's reduction problem.
Since the reduction that can be implemented by the coalition of the
whole is constrained to be very small because the actions of the agents not in
J is very small, the players in J will prefer to form the J coalition (positive
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incentive to reduction, very low free-riding by non-members). This improves
the utility of those in J and those not in J , giving a Pareto improvement upon
the coalition of the whole for some values of the parameter.
A.3 Proportional Commitment Power
A.3.1 Proofs for Section 1.4.3
Proof of Theorem 1.2
Restatement of Theorem 1.2. For any J ( I, #J ≥ 2, there is a set of
u ∈ U having non-empty interior, for which the vector of actions aPr(u, J) is
conceivable, formally denoted as:
(∀j ∈ J)[uj(aPr(u, J)) > uj(a∗(u))].
Further, there is a subset of u ∈ U having non-empty interior which fulﬁll
the above and for which, under the proportional restriction, the coalition J
improves upon the outcome of the coalition of the whole, formally written as:
(∀i ∈ I)[ui(aPr(u, J)) > ui(aPr(u, I))].
Proof. For this proof, I use the same approach as for Theorem 1.1, as well as
the same function, Equation (A.1). A reminder:
ui(a) = θi (10 + ai)− a2i
(
n+
n∑
j=1
aj
)
.
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The properties of U have already been shown to be fulﬁlled, as has
their openness. The only thing to prove is that the exclusion result holds
for proportional reduction, which is shown through Lemma 1.6, which is itself
proven in Appendix A.3.2. The exclusion example in that lemma requires that
B′(0) > 0 and that the total cost of zero action is also zero. The function used
has B′(a) = θ for any action and has cost of zero when ai = 0.
A.3.2 Proofs for Section 1.4.4
Kuhn-Tucker conditions for proportional reduction by coalition of the whole
Using the cardinalities deﬁned earlier, the maximization problem can
be rewritten as:
max
s∈[0,1]
m
[
B(sa∗J(θ))− sa∗J(θ)c
(
msa∗J(θ) + (n−m)sa∗I\J(θ)
)]
+(n−m)
[
θB(sa∗I\J(θ))− sa∗I\J(θ)c
(
msa∗J(θ) + (n−m)sa∗I\J(θ)
)]
The Lagrangian is:
L(s, λ1, λ2) = m
[
B(sa∗J(θ))− sa∗J(θ)c
(
msa∗J(θ) + (n−m)sa∗I\J(θ)
)]
+(n−m)
[
θB(sa∗I\J(θ))− sa∗I\J(θ)2
· c
(
msa∗J(θ) + (n−m)sa∗I\J(θ)
)]
+λ1s+ λ2(1− s)
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The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are:
∂L
∂s
=m
[
B′(sa∗J(θ))a
∗
J(θ)−
[
a∗J(θ)c
(
msa∗J(θ) + (n−m)sa∗I\J(θ)
)
+ sa∗J(θ)c
′
(
msa∗J(θ) + (n−m)sa∗I\J(θ)
)
· (ma∗J(θ) + (n−m)a∗I\J(θ)) ]]+ (n−m)[θB′(sa∗I\J(θ))a∗I\J(θ)
−
[
a∗I\J(θ)c
(
msa∗J(θ) + (n−m)sa∗I\J(θ)
)
+ sa∗I\J(θ)c
′
(
msa∗J(θ) + (n−m)sa∗I\J(θ)
)
· (ma∗J(θ) + (n−m)a∗I\J(θ)) ]]+ λ1 − λ2 = 0
λ1s =0, λ1 ≥ 0, s ≥ 0
λ2(1− s) =0, λ2 ≥ 0, s ≤ 1
Kuhn-Tucker conditions for proportional reduction by J-coalition
max
sˆ∈[0,1]
m
[
B(sa∗J(θ))− sa∗J(θ)c
(
msa∗J(θ) + (n−m)aJI\J(θ)
)]
Maximize the Lagrangian
L(sˆ, λ1, λ2) = m
[
B(sˆa∗J(θ))− sˆa∗J(θ)c
(
msˆa∗J(θ) + (n−m)aJI\J(θ)
)]
+ λ1sˆ+ λ2(1− sˆ)
and solving the Kuhn-Tucker conditions:
∂L
∂sˆ
=m
[
B′(sˆa∗J(θ))a
∗
J(θ)−
[
a∗J(θ)c
(
msˆa∗J(θ) + (n−m)aJI\J(θ)
)
+sˆa∗J(θ)c
′
(
msˆa∗J(θ) + (n−m)aJI\J(θ)
)
(ma∗J(θ))
]]
λ1sˆ =0, λ1 ≥ 0, sˆ ≥ 0
λ2(1− sˆ) =0, λ2 ≥ 0, sˆ ≤ 1
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Proof of Lemma 1.5.
Restatement of Lemma 1.5. For any θ, the proportional reduction taken
by the grand coalition is never full-reduction, i.e. s∗I(θ) > 0.
Proof. Suppose not. Suppose that the coalition of the whole took action of
zero. This would mean that the corner solution Kuhn-Tucker condition would
have to hold. This would mean that the zero corner slackness multiplier λ1 ≥ 0,
while the one corner slackness multiplier λ2 = 0.
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are:
m
[
B′((0)a∗J(θ))a
∗
J(θ)−
[
a∗J(θ)
2c
(
m(0)a∗J(θ) + (n−m)(0)a∗I\J(θ)
)
+(0)a∗J(θ)
2c′
(
m(0)a∗J(θ) + (n−m)(0)a∗I\J(θ)
) (
ma∗J(θ) + (n−m)a∗I\J(θ)
) ]]
+(n−m)
[
θB′((0)a∗I\J(θ))a
∗
I\J(θ)−
[
a∗I\J(θ)
2c
(
m(0)a∗J(θ) + (n−m)(0)a∗I\J(θ)
)
+(0)a∗I\J(θ)
2c′
(
m(0)a∗J(θ) + (n−m)(0)a∗I\J(θ)
) (
ma∗J(θ) + (n−m)a∗I\J(θ)
) ]]
+ λ1 = 0
These can be simpliﬁed as:
m
[
B′(0)a∗J(θ)−
[
a∗J(θ)
2c (0) + 0
]]
+ (n−m)
[
θB′(0)a∗I\J(θ)−
[
a∗I\J(θ)
2c (0) + 0
]]
+ λ1 = 0
[
ma∗J(θ) + (n−m)θa∗I\J(θ)
]
B′(0)
− [ma∗J(θ)2 + (n−m)a∗I\J(θ)2] c (0) + λ1 = 0
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Since B′(0) > 0, c(0) = 0, and λ1 ≥ 0, this equation can only be equal
to zero if all the actions are zero. However, we showed that a∗J(θ) > a
∗
I\J(θ)
when θ < 1, so they cannot all be zero. Hence, the grand coalition will never
take full-reduction.
Incentive for J-coalition to Reduce.
Let the utility of coalition J taking a proportional reduction of s be
denoted as
uPrJ (s, θ) = m
[
B(sa∗J(θ))− sa∗J(θ)c
(
msa∗J(θ) + (n−m)aJI\J(θ)
)]
.
Lemma A.4. When moving from one, the players in J in the game in Section
1.4.4 have a strict incentive to decrease s from 1 and reduce. Formally, this
means that
∂uPrJ (s,θ)
∂s
∣∣∣∣
s=1
, derived below, is negative:
∂uPrJ (s, θ)
∂s
∣∣∣∣
s=1
=ma∗J(θ)
[
B′ (a∗J(θ))− c
(
ma∗J(θ) + (n−m)aJI\J(θ)
)
−mc′ (ma∗J(θ) + (n−m)aJI\J(θ)) ]
Proof. This proof is very similar to the proof of Lemma A.3. From the ﬁrst
order conditions, a∗J(θ) solves:
B′ (a∗J(θ))− c
(
(n−m)a∗I\J(θ) +ma∗J(θ)
)
− a∗J(θ)c′
(
(n−m)a∗I\J(θ) +ma∗J(θ)
)
= 0
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At s = 1, those in J are agreeing to play the no-coalition equilib-
rium, meaning that the best responses of those not in J are also Nash, giving
a∗I\J(θ) = a
J
I\J(θ). The ﬁrst order condition and the derivative of u
Pr
J with
respect to s evaluated at one are then nearly identical, apart from the extra
weight on the cost derivative. Comparing the two, then it must be that:
B′ (a∗J(θ))− c
(
(n−m)aJI\J(θ) +ma∗J(θ)
)
−mc′ ((n−m)aJI\J(θ) +ma∗J(θ)) < 0
Therefore, we have that ∂u
Pr
J (s,θ)
∂s
∣∣∣∣
s=1
< 0, which means that increasing
s will decrease utility  but that decreasing s, thereby increasing reduction,
will increase coalition utility.
Proof of Lemma 1.6.
Restatement of Lemma 1.6. There exists a threshold value θ < 1 for
the group parameter such that for all values of the parameter higher than the
threshold, θ ∈ (θ, 1), the reduction chosen by the coalition of the whole, s∗I(θ),
is equal to one.
Proof. Examine the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for sI .
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ma∗J(θ)
[
B′(sa∗J(θ))− c
(
msa∗J(θ) + (n−m)sa∗I\J(θ)
)
−sc′
(
msa∗J(θ) + (n−m)sa∗I\J(θ)
) (
ma∗J(θ) + (n−m)a∗I\J(θ)
) ]
+(n−m)a∗I\J(θ)
[
θB′(sa∗I\J(θ))− c
(
msa∗J(θ) + (n−m)sa∗I\J(θ)
)
−sc′
(
msa∗J(θ) + (n−m)sa∗I\J(θ)
) (
ma∗J(θ) + (n−m)a∗I\J(θ)
) ]
+ λ1 − λ2 = 0
According to Lemma 1.5, we know that s > 0, so we can ignore one
case (and consequently we know that λ1 = 0). Let's look at the remaining two
cases: interior and corner s = 1.
If s were interior, then we would have λ2 = 0 as well, and the following
would be the K-T condition:
ma∗J(θ)
[
B′(sa∗J(θ))− c
(
msa∗J(θ) + (n−m)sa∗I\J(θ)
)
−sc′
(
msa∗J(θ) + (n−m)sa∗I\J(θ)
) (
ma∗J(θ) + (n−m)a∗I\J(θ)
) ]
+(n−m)a∗I\J(θ)
[
θB′(sa∗I\J(θ))− c
(
msa∗J(θ) + (n−m)sa∗I\J(θ)
)
−sc′
(
msa∗J(θ) + (n−m)sa∗I\J(θ)
) (
ma∗J(θ) + (n−m)a∗I\J(θ)
) ]
= 0
Basically, this equation is balancing the marginal utility of reduction
of the two groups, somehow imagined as (−MU IJ ) + (−MU II\J) = 0. If both
groups were the same, then the optimal solution for the coalition would be the
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same as for each group. However, since the groups are diﬀerent, the marginal
utilities must take opposite signs to make the equation hold. Therefore, the
optimal reduction for the coalition of the whole will have negative marginal
utility for one group and positive marginal utility for the other. Moving the
terms belonging to I \ J , the equation becomes:
ma∗J(θ)
[
B′(sa∗J(θ))− c
(
msa∗J(θ) + (n−m)sa∗I\J(θ)
)
−sc′
(
msa∗J(θ) + (n−m)sa∗I\J(θ)
) (
ma∗J(θ) + (n−m)a∗I\J(θ)
) ]
=
−(n−m)a∗I\J(θ)
[
θB′(sa∗I\J(θ))− c
(
msa∗J(θ) + (n−m)sa∗I\J(θ)
)
−sc′
(
msa∗J(θ) + (n−m)sa∗I\J(θ)
) (
ma∗J(θ) + (n−m)a∗I\J(θ)
) ]
Since a∗I\J(θ) is continuous and increasing in θ ⇒ limθ→0 a∗I\J(θ) = 0.1
Consider an action close to zero, particularly a∗I\J(θ) =
ε
n−m > 0, but very
small. Then it looks like:
ma∗J(θ)
[
B′(sa∗J(θ))− c(msa∗J(θ) + sε)− sc′(msa∗J(θ) + sε) (ma∗J(θ) + ε)
]
=
−ε
[
θB′
(
s
ε
n−m
)
− c(msa∗J(θ) + sε)− sc′(msa∗J(θ) + sε) (ma∗J(θ) + ε)
]
1If the parameter set included θ = 0, then at the action a∗I\J(1) = 0 the equation would
look like:
ma∗J(θ)
[
B′(sa∗J(θ))− c(msa∗J(θ))− sc′(msa∗J(θ))ma∗J(θ)
]
= 0
This could actually have a positive solution for s, so literal zero producers are permitted
to hang on. However, the parameter set does not include zero.
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Because of Nash equilibrium, we know that:
B′(a∗J(θ))− c(ma∗J(θ) + ε)−mc′(ma∗J(θ) + ε) = 0
If s is interior, then sa∗J(θ) < a
∗
J(θ). This means that B
′(sa∗J(θ)) ≥
B′(a∗J(θ)), and c(msa
∗
J(θ) + sε) < c(ma
∗
J(θ) + ε). The remaining term appears
ambiguous at ﬁrst:
mc′(ma∗J(θ) + ε)
?
> s (ma∗J(θ) + ε) c
′(msa∗J(θ) + sε)
mc′(ma∗J(θ) + ε)
?
> msa∗J(θ)c
′(msa∗J(θ) + sε) + sεc
′(msa∗J(θ) + sε)
m [c′(ma∗J(θ) + ε)− sa∗J(θ)c′(msa∗J(θ) + sε)]
?
> sεc′(msa∗J(θ) + sε)
To make LHS > 0, choose
ε <
m [c′(ma∗J(θ) + ε)− sa∗J(θ)c′(msa∗J(θ) + sε)]
sc′(msa∗J(θ) + sε)
.
From the Nash equilibrium, we also know that:
θB′
(
ε
n−m
)
− c(ma∗J(θ) + ε)− (n−m)c′(ma∗J(θ) + ε) = 0
If the marginal beneﬁt of action for those not in J , i.e. θB′
(
s ε
n−m
)
, is
large enough (larger than the cost and marginal cost), then RHS is negative.
By similar logic as above, this should hold. Hence, the multiplier λ2 needs to
be included and greater than zero in order to balance out the FOC, meaning
that s = 1 is chosen when θ is small enough.
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Appendix B
Alternative Proofs for Chapter 1
B.1 Lump-Sum Reduction under Stronger Assumptions
If we consider a few stronger assumptions on the class of negative ex-
ternality games, then we can still demonstrate openness of unique Nash equi-
librium and, hence, the exclusion result. Consider U′ satisfying the following
conditions:
a. twice continuously diﬀerentiable, each ui is in C2(A),
b. negative externalities, (∀i ∈ I)(∀j 6= i)(∀a ∈ A)
[
∂ui(a)
∂aj
< 0
]
,
c. strict submodularity, (∀i ∈ I)(∀j 6= i)(∀a ∈ A)
[
∂2ui(a)
∂ai∂aj
< 0
]
,
d. strict own concavity, (∀i ∈ I)
[
∂2ui(a)
∂a2i
< 0
]
, and
e. strong dominant eﬀect, (∀i ∈ I)(∀a ∈ A)
[∣∣∣∂2ui(a)∂a2i ∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣∑j 6=i ∂2ui(a)∂ai∂aj ∣∣∣], and
f. unique interior Nash equilibrium, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for equi-
librium of u have a unique solution on the interior of A.
Observe here, that the stronger assumptions are unique interior Nash
equilibrium, as well as the added assumption of strong dominant eﬀect. The
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proofs in Appendix A did not require these two stronger assumptions. It is a
useful exercise to run through the details under these stronger assumptions.
Use the same utility function as before:
ui(a) = (1− θi) (10 + ai)− a2i
(
n+
n∑
j=1
aj
)
.
The function's fulﬁllment of twice continuous diﬀerentiability, negative
externalities, submodularity, and strict own concavity are shown in Appendix
A. Furthermore, while showing unique Nash, the only equilibrium was shown
to be interior as well. The only remaining property to check is strong dominant
eﬀect.
To conﬁrm strong dominant eﬀect, compare the second derivative of ui
with respect to i with the sum of the cross partials with respect to j 6= i.∣∣∣∂2ui(a)∂a2i ∣∣∣ ?> ∣∣∣∑j 6=i ∂2ui(a)∂ai∂aj ∣∣∣∣∣∣− [2(n+∑nj=1 aj)+ 4ai]∣∣∣ ?>
∣∣∣∣∣∑j 6=i−2ai
∣∣∣∣∣[
2
(
n+
∑n
j=1 aj
)
+ 4ai
]
?
> 2(n− 1)ai
2n+ 2
∑n
j=1 aj + 4ai
?
> 2(n− 1)ai
n > n− 1 and ai ≤ 1⇒ 2n > 2(n− 1)ai, and 2
∑n
j=1 aj + 4ai ≥ 0⇒
2n+ 2
n∑
j=1
aj + 4ai > 2(n− 1)ai
Hence, strong dominant eﬀect holds for all i and a.
Proof of Openness of U′.
151
Proof. Again, the C2-norm on the utility functions for i ∈ I is:
||ui||i ≡ max
a∈A
|ui(a)|+
∑
j
max
a∈A
∣∣∣∣∂ui(a)∂aj
∣∣∣∣+ ∑
k,j∈I,k≥j
max
a∈A
∣∣∣∣∂2ui(a)∂ak∂aj
∣∣∣∣
The openness of the conditions of negative externalities, submodularity,
and concavity under this norm was shown in Appendix A. The remaining two
conditions are conditionally open, i.e. open when the previous three conditions
hold. To show conditional openness for the two new conditions, I will show
that for a u ∈ U′ there exists ε > 0 such that ||u− v|| < ε implies that v ∈ U′
also.
• Strong dominant eﬀect: The previous three properties were uncondition-
ally open. For the uses of Theorem 1.1, it is suﬃcient for strong dominant
eﬀect to be open conditional upon the previous three properties.
Lemma B.1. Suppose u ∈ U and v is concave and submodular for all i,
j, a. Then ||u−v|| < ε⇒ v also has the strong dominant eﬀect property.
We know that u has ∀i, ∀j, ∀a
∣∣∣∂2ui(a)∂a2i ∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣∑j 6=i ∂2ui(a)∂ai∂aj ∣∣∣. The problem
maxi maxa
(
∂2ui(a)
∂a2i
−∑j 6=i ∂2ui(a)∂ai∂aj ) has a solution {i∗, a∗}. Since both
quantities are negative, and the own second derivative is larger in ab-
solute value (therefore more negative), this maximum value is negative.
Deﬁne
εc ≡ 1
2
(∣∣∣∣∂2ui∗(a∗)∂a2i∗
∣∣∣∣−
∣∣∣∣∣∑
j 6=i∗
∂2ui∗(a
∗)
∂ai∗∂aj
∣∣∣∣∣
)
.
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If ||u− v|| < εc, then ∀ i, ∀ j,∀ a:∣∣∣∣∂2ui(a)∂a2i − ∂
2vi(a)
∂a2i
∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣∑
j 6=i
∂2ui(a)
∂ai∂aj
−
∑
j 6=i
∂2vi(a)
∂ai∂aj
∣∣∣∣∣ < εc
By deﬁnition
∣∣∣∂2ui(a)∂a2i ∣∣∣− ∣∣∣∑j 6=i ∂2ui(a)∂ai∂aj ∣∣∣ ≥ 2εc. Add and subtract ∣∣∣∂2vi(a)∂a2i ∣∣∣:
∣∣∣∣∂2ui(a)∂a2i
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣∂2vi(a)∂a2i
∣∣∣∣− ∣∣∣∣∂2vi(a)∂a2i
∣∣∣∣−
∣∣∣∣∣∑
j 6=i
∂2ui(a)
∂ai∂aj
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ 2εc
Since these are all negative values, they can be combined within the
absolute value signs:∣∣∣∣∂2ui(a)∂a2i − ∂
2vi(a)
∂a2i
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣∂2vi(a)∂a2i
∣∣∣∣−
∣∣∣∣∣∑
j 6=i
∂2ui(a)
∂ai∂aj
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ 2εc
Now add and subtract
∑
j 6=i
∂2vi(a)
∂ai∂aj
:
∣∣∣∣∂2ui(a)∂a2i − ∂
2vi(a)
∂a2i
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣∂2vi(a)∂a2i
∣∣∣∣−
∣∣∣∣∣∑
j 6=i
∂2ui(a)
∂ai∂aj
∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣∑
j 6=i
∂2vi(a)
∂ai∂aj
∣∣∣∣∣−
∣∣∣∣∣∑
j 6=i
∂2vi(a)
∂ai∂aj
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ 2εc
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Again, these can be recombined within the absolute value signs:∣∣∣∣∂2ui(a)∂a2i − ∂
2vi(a)
∂a2i
∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣∂2vi(a)∂a2i −
∑
j 6=i
∂2vi(a)
∂ai∂aj
∣∣∣∣∣
−
∣∣∣∣∣∑
j 6=i
∂2ui(a)
∂ai∂aj
∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣∑
j 6=i
∂2vi(a)
∂ai∂aj
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ 2εc∣∣∣∣∂2ui(a)∂a2i − ∂
2vi(a)
∂a2i
∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣∂2vi(a)∂a2i −
∑
j 6=i
∂2vi(a)
∂ai∂aj
∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣∑
j 6=i
∂2vi(a)
∂ai∂aj
∣∣∣∣∣−
∣∣∣∣∣∑
j 6=i
∂2ui(a)
∂ai∂aj
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ 2εc∣∣∣∣∂2ui(a)∂a2i − ∂
2vi(a)
∂a2i
∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣∂2vi(a)∂a2i −
∑
j 6=i
∂2vi(a)
∂ai∂aj
∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣∑
j 6=i
∂2vi(a)
∂ai∂aj
−
∑
j 6=i
∂2ui(a)
∂ai∂aj
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ 2εc∣∣∣∣∂2ui(a)∂a2i − ∂
2vi(a)
∂a2i
∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣∂2vi(a)∂a2i −
∑
j 6=i
∂2vi(a)
∂ai∂aj
∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣∑
j 6=i
∂2ui(a)
∂ai∂aj
−
∑
j 6=i
∂2vi(a)
∂ai∂aj
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ 2εc
Using the earlier fact that∣∣∣∣∂2ui(a)∂a2i − ∂
2vi(a)
∂a2i
∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣∑
j 6=i
∂2ui(a)
∂ai∂aj
−
∑
j 6=i
∂2vi(a)
∂ai∂aj
∣∣∣∣∣ < εc,
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we can see that:∣∣∣∣∣∂2vi(a)∂a2i −
∑
j 6=i
∂2vi(a)
∂ai∂aj
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ 2εc −
∣∣∣∣∂2ui(a)∂a2i − ∂
2vi(a)
∂a2i
∣∣∣∣
−
∣∣∣∣∣∑
j 6=i
∂2ui(a)
∂ai∂aj
−
∑
j 6=i
∂2vi(a)
∂ai∂aj
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∂2vi(a)∂a2i −
∑
j 6=i
∂2vi(a)
∂ai∂aj
∣∣∣∣∣ > 2εc − εc∣∣∣∣∣∂2vi(a)∂a2i −
∑
j 6=i
∂2vi(a)
∂ai∂aj
∣∣∣∣∣ > εc
Therefore ∀ i,∀ j,∀ a
∣∣∣∂2vi(a)∂a2i ∣∣∣ − ∣∣∣∑j 6=i ∂2vi(a)∂ai∂aj ∣∣∣ > 0, and strong dominant
eﬀect holds for v.
• Unique interior Nash equilibrium: For the purposes of Theorem 1.1, it
is suﬃcient for the property of unique interior Nash equilibrium to be
open conditional upon the previous four properties.
Lemma B.2. Suppose u ∈ U and v is concave and submodular and has
negative externalities and strong dominant eﬀect for all i, j, a. Then
there exists ε such that ||u− v|| < ε⇒ v also has a unique Nash equilib-
rium.
Proceed with proof by contradiction. Let U′ be the set of C2 functions
that are concave, submodular, and have negative externalities and strong
dominant eﬀect, but may have multiple interior Nash equilibria. This
new set is a superset of U. Suppose that v ∈ U′ has more than one
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equilibrium. I will show that if it is close to u, then this means that u
should also have multiple equilibria.
I use the General Implicit Function Theorem (Theorem 3) from
Ward [22]: Let X, Y , and Z be normed linear spaces, Y being assumed
complete. Let Ω be an open set in X×Y . Let F : Ω→ Z. Let (x0, y0) ∈
Ω. Assume that F is continuous at (x0, y0), that F (x0, y0) = 0, that D2F
exists in Ω, that D2F is continuous at (x0, y0), and that D2F (x0, y0) is
invertible. Then there is a function f deﬁned on a neighborhood of x0
such that F (x, f(x)) = 0, f(x0) = y0, f is continuous at x0, and f is
unique in the sense that any other such functions must agree with f on
some neighborhood of x0.
Denote the following:
 X = U′
 Y = [0, 1]n
 Z = Rn
 Ω ⊆ (0, 1)n
 F =

∂v1(a)
∂a1
∂v2(a)
∂a2
...
∂vn(a)
∂an

 (x0, y0) are the interior Nash equilibria (v, a∗(v)) and (v, a∗∗(v))
Since F represents the interior Kuhn-Tucker conditions (or ﬁrst order
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conditions), we have that:
F (v, a∗(v)) =

∂v1(a∗(v))
∂a1
∂v2(a∗(v))
∂a2
...
∂vn(a∗(v))
∂an
 =

0
0
...
0

Each ﬁrst derivative is continuous, so F is continuous at all points. Since
U′ ∈ C2, D2F exists and can be written as:
D2F =

∂2v1(a)
∂a21
∂2v1(a)
∂a1∂a2
. . . ∂
2v1(a)
∂a1∂an
∂2v2(a)
∂a1∂a2
∂2v2(a)
∂a22
. . . ∂
2v2(a)
∂a2∂an
...
...
. . .
...
∂2vn(a)
∂a1∂an
∂2vn(a)
∂a2∂an
. . . ∂
2vn(a)
∂a2n

This matrix exists throughout [0, 1]n and is continuous at all points.
Finally, because of the property of strong dominant eﬀect, D2F is a
diagonally dominant matrix, ensuring that it is invertible throughout
the domain.
The conditions for the General Implicit Function Theorem are fulﬁlled.
Therefore, there is some function f which assigns Nash equilibria on a
neighborhood of v which are close to a∗(v), and some function f ′ which
assigns equilibra which are close to a∗∗(v). Thus, for u ∈ U which is also
within some εe-neighborhood of v, there must be a∗(u) and a∗∗(u) which
are respectively close to a∗(v) and a∗∗(v) which are also Nash equilibria,
i.e. satisfy F (u, a∗(u)) = F (u, a∗∗(u)) = 0. This is a contradiction that
u has a unique interior Nash equilibrium. Hence, v has only one interior
equilibrium.
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Each of the conditions has been shown to be open individually, either
unconditionally or conditionally upon the remaining conditions. Take ε∗ ≡
min{εa, εb, εc, εd}. Pick v such that ||u− v|| < ε∗. Then all the conditions are
satisﬁed by v. Hence, the set of utility functions in U is open. This means the
exclusion result holds on an open set.
B.2 Proportional Reduction under Stronger Assumptions
To establish the exclusion result under proportional commitment power,
I add two conditions on the utility functions in U′, creating a subset U′′. In
addition to the previous six conditions for U′, the utility functions belong to
the class U′′ must satisfy the following conditions:
g. inﬁnite marginal beneﬁt at zero, limai→0
∂ui(a)
∂ai
=∞, and
h. ﬁnite damages, lima→1
∣∣∣∂ui(a)∂a ∣∣∣ <∞.
These additional conditions strengthen the reasoning of disparate marginal
utilities and give suﬃciency for the exclusion result under proportional reduc-
tion. The conditions are possibly reasonable in the context of a negative ex-
ternality situation. The ﬁrst condition stipulates that the action which causes
the negative externality is necessary in some manner. It may be unthinkable
for a country to completely terminate an industry that releases pollutants or a
ﬁshery that provides much of a region's food. Unique interior Nash equilibrium
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was already one of the assumptions on U; now the reason for non-zero action
is the inﬁnite marginal beneﬁt at zero. Meanwhile, the second new condition
simply means that costs from action are not inﬁnite at the maximum possible
stock level, where every agent plays one. This emphasizes the power of the
negative externality as the reason the Nash equilibrium is interior from the
other side.
Alternative Proof of Existence of Exclusion under Proportional Reductions.
Theorem B.1. For any J ( I, #J ≥ 2, there is a set of u ∈ U′′ having
non-empty interior, for which the vector of actions aPr(u, J) is conceivable,
formally denoted as:
(∀j ∈ J)[uj(aPr(u, J)) > uj(a∗(u))].
Further, there is a subset of u ∈ U′′ having non-empty interior which fulﬁll
the above and for which, under the proportional restriction, the coalition J
improves upon the outcome of the coalition of the whole, formally written as:
(∀i ∈ I)[ui(aPr(u, J)) > ui(aPr(u, I))].
Proof. Again, we use the same approach as for the other proofs, this time
showing that the two additional conditions are fulﬁlled and open.
The new chosen utility function is:
ui(a) = (1− θi) (10 + ln ai)− a2i
(
n+
n∑
j=1
aj
)
. (B.1)
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Again, the parameter θ is as described in Section 1.4.2, where the group J
consists of agents who have θi = 0, while the remaining agents not in J have
θi = θ ∈ Θ = (0, 1).
Exclusion Result
The optimality of exclusion comes from Lemma B.4, which is itself
proven later in this section.
Fulﬁllment of Assumptions
• Twice continuous diﬀerentiability: This assumption clearly holds for this
utility function, as the ﬁrst and second total and partial derivatives can
be easily taken.
 First Derivatives
dui(a)
da
= ∂ui(a)
∂ai
+
∑
j 6=i
∂ui(a)
∂aj
∂ui(a)
∂ai
= (1−θi)
ai
−
[
2ai
(
n+
∑n
j=1 aj
)
+ a2i
]
∀ j 6= i ∂ui(a)
∂aj
= −a2i
 Second Derivatives
d2ui(a)
da2
= ∂
2ui(a)
∂a2i
+ 2
∑
j 6=i
∂2ui(a)
∂ai∂aj
+
∑
j 6=i
{
∂2ui(a)
∂a2j
+
∑
k 6=i or j
∂ui(a)
∂aj∂ak
}
∂2ui(a)
∂a2i
= −(1−θi)
a2i
−
[
2
(
n+
∑n
j=1 aj
)
+ 4ai
]
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∀ j 6= i ∂2ui(a)
∂ai∂aj
= −2ai
∀ j 6= i ∂ui(a)
∂a2j
= 0
∀ k 6= i or j ∂ui(a)
∂aj∂ak
= 0
• Negative externalities: The ﬁrst derivative of i's utility function with
respect to any j's action is the same as in the proof of Theorem 1.1:
∀ j 6= i ∂ui(a)
∂aj
= −a2i
Once again, for every action in the set Ai = [0, 1], this derivative is less
than or equal to zero. It is strictly negative for actions in (0, 1] and only
zero when no action is taken, i.e. ai = 0.
• Submodularity: The cross-partial of i's utility function with respect to
his own action and another agent j's action is the same as in the proof
of Theorem 1.1:
∀ j 6= i ∂
2ui(a)
∂ai∂aj
= −2ai
Again, for every action in the set Ai = [0, 1], this derivative is less than
or equal to zero. It is strictly negative for actions in (0, 1] and only zero
when no action is taken, i.e. ai = 0.
• Strict own concavity: The second derivative of i's utility function with
respect to his own action is:
∂2ui(a)
∂a2i
= −(1− θi)
a2i
−
[
2
(
n+
n∑
j=1
aj
)
+ 4ai
]
For any a ∈ A, this derivative is strictly negative.
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• Strong dominant eﬀect: To conﬁrm strong dominant eﬀect, compare the
second derivative of ui with respect to i with the sum of the cross partials
with respect to j 6= i. ∣∣∣∂2ui(a)∂a2i ∣∣∣ ?> ∣∣∣∑j 6=i ∂2ui(a)∂ai∂aj ∣∣∣∣∣∣− (1−θi)a2i − [2(n+∑nj=1 aj)+ 4ai]∣∣∣ ?>
∣∣∣∣∣∑j 6=i−2ai
∣∣∣∣∣
(1−θi)
a2i
+
[
2
(
n+
∑n
j=1 aj
)
+ 4ai
]
?
> 2(n− 1)ai
(1−θi)
a2i
+ 2n+ 2
∑n
j=1 aj + 4ai
?
> 2(n− 1)ai
As with Theorem 1.1, because n > n− 1 and ai ≤ 1⇒ 2n > 2(n− 1)ai,
and (1−θi)
a2i
+ 2
∑n
j=1 aj + 4ai ≥ 0⇒
(1− θi)
a2i
+ 2n+ 2
n∑
j=1
aj + 4ai > 2(n− 1)ai
Hence, strong dominant eﬀect holds for all i and a.
• Unique interior Nash equilibrium: The maximization problem for an
agent, given other's Nash actions a∗j , is the following:
max
ai∈[0,1]
(1− θi) (10 + ln ai)− a2i
(
n+
n∑
j=1
aj
)
s.t. ai ≥ 0
ai ≤ 1
The Lagrangian is:
L(ai, λ1i, λ2i) = (1− θi) (10 + ln ai)− a2i
(
n+
n∑
j=1
aj
)
+ λ1iai + λ2i(1− ai)
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The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are:
∂L
∂ai
=
(1− θi)
ai
−
[
2ai
(
n+
∑n
j=1 aj
)
+ a2i
]
+ λ1i − λ2i = 0
λ1iai = 0, λ1i ≥ 0, ai ≥ 0
λ2i(1− ai) = 0, λ2i ≥ 0, ai ≤ 1
There are three cases to examine: interior solution, corner solution of
zero, and corner solution of one.
Case i. Interior action: ai ∈ (0, 1)⇒ λ1i = λ2i = 0
The ﬁrst derivative of the Lagrangian becomes:[
2ai
(
n+
∑n
j=1 aj
)
+ a2i
]
=
(1− θi)
ai
ai
[
2ai
(
n+
∑
j 6=i a
∗
j
)
+ 3a2i
]
= (1− θi)
3a3i + 2a
2
i
(
n+
∑
j 6=i a
∗
j
)
− (1− θi) = 0
This cubic equation can be easily solved as a function of
∑
j 6=i a
∗
j
when n and θi are known, but without these two parameters, the
closed form is diﬃcult. However, the roots can be characterized
using the polynomial discriminant and Descartes' Rule of Signs.
 Polynomial discriminant: A trinomial represented by ax3 +
bx2 + cx+ d = 0 has the discriminant:
∆ = b2c2 − 4ac3 − 4b3d− 27a2d2 + 18abcd
Therefore, for the polynomial in question,
3a3i + 2a
2
i
(
n+
∑
j 6=i
a∗j
)
− (1− θi) = 0,
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the discriminant is:
∆ =
(
2
(
n+
∑
j 6=i a
∗
j
))2
(0)2 − 4(3)(0)3
−4
(
2
(
n+
∑
j 6=i a
∗
j
))3
(−(1− θi))− 27(3)2 (−(1− θi))2
+18(3)
(
2
(
n+
∑
j 6=i a
∗
j
))
(0) (−(1− θi))
=−4
(
2
(
n+
∑
j 6=i a
∗
j
))3
(−(1− θi))− 27(3)2 (−(1− θi))2
= 4(8)
(
n+
∑
j 6=i a
∗
j
)3
(1− θi)− 27(9)(1− θi)2
= 32
(
n+
∑
j 6=i a
∗
j
)3
(1− θi)− 243(1− θi)2
A trinomial has possibly three roots. Knowing the sign of the
discriminant can aid in determining the nature of those roots.
This discriminant will be positive when:
32
(
n+
∑
j 6=i a
∗
j
)3
(1− θi)− 243(1− θi)2 > 0
32
(
n+
∑
j 6=i a
∗
j
)3
(1− θi) > 243(1− θi)2
32
(
n+
∑
j 6=i a
∗
j
)3
> 243(1− θi)
The term (1− θi) is smaller than one, so the following is suﬃ-
cient:
32
(
n+
∑
j 6=i a
∗
j
)3
> 243(
n+
∑
j 6=i a
∗
j
)3
>
243
32
n3 + 3n2
∑
j 6=i a
∗
j + 3n
(∑
j 6=i a
∗
j
)2
+
(∑
j 6=i a
∗
j
)3
>
243
32
If a∗−i is the zero vector, then n
3 > 243
32
is suﬃcient for the
discriminant to be positive. Two facts guarantee that this is
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true: ﬁrst, n > 2, which means that n3 > 8, while 243
32
< 8.
If a∗−i is greater than the zero vector, then the condition on n
is even smaller. Hence, the discriminant for this polynomial
is always positive, meaning that there are three distinct real
roots.
 Descartes' Rule of Signs: Looking at the polynomial dis-
criminant gives three candidate solutions. Descartes' Rule of
Signs can characterize how many of of these are positive, nar-
rowing down the ﬁeld of maximizers.
The polynomial derived from the interior Kuhn-Tucker condi-
tion gives the function:
f(a) = 3a3i + 2a
2
i
(
n+
∑
j 6=i a
∗
j
)
− (1− θi)
According to Descartes' Rule of Signs, the number of sign switches
between non-zero coeﬃcients gives the maximum number of positive
roots. Here, we have one sign switch, since the ﬁrst and second
terms are positive but the third term is negative. Therefore, there
is at most one positive root out of the three real roots. We know
this root is greater than zero; we will check whether it is less than
one when checking the possibility of a corner solution at one. This
root will be the interior solution a∗i (θi, a
∗
−i).
Case ii. Corner solution of zero: a∗i = 0⇒ λ2i = 0
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The ﬁrst derivative of the Lagrangian becomes:
(1− θi)
ai
+ λ1i = 0
Since ai is in the denominator it cannot be zero. Therefore, this
case will never occur.
Case iii. Corner solution of one: a∗i = 1⇒ λ1i = 0
The ﬁrst derivative of the Lagrangian becomes:
(1−θi)
1
−
[
2
(
n+
∑
j 6=i aj
)
+ 3
]
− λ2i = 0
(1− θi) =
[
2
(
n+
∑
j 6=i aj
)
+ 3
]
+ λ2i
⇒ (1− θi) ≥ 2
(
n+
∑
j 6=i aj
)
+ 3
However, since 1− θi ≤ 1 and 2
(
1 +
∑
j 6=i a
∗
j
)
>> 1, this case can
never occur. Because of this, we know that the earlier interior case
is less than one.
Thus, the interior case is the only one which will be chosen. Now I show
that the equilibrium is unique through proof by contradiction. Suppose
there exists a∗ and a∗∗ s.t. that the interior Kuhn-Tucker conditions are
fulﬁlled, i.e. for all i both of the following hold:
2a∗i
(
n+
∑n
j=1 a
∗
j
)
+ a∗i
2 =
(1− θi)
a∗i
2a∗∗i
(
n+
∑n
j=1 a
∗∗
j
)
+ a∗∗i
2 =
(1− θi)
a∗∗i
These can be rewritten as:
2a∗i
2
(
n+
∑n
j=1 a
∗
j
)
+ a∗i
3 = (1− θi)
2a∗∗i
2
(
n+
∑n
j=1 a
∗∗
j
)
+ a∗∗i
3 = (1− θi)
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Summing these conditions over i, the following two conditions must hold:
2 (n+
∑n
i=1 a
∗
i )
∑n
i=1 a
∗
i
2 +
∑n
i=1 a
∗
i
3 =
∑n
i=1(1− θi)
2 (n+
∑n
i=1 a
∗∗
i )
∑n
i=1 a
∗∗
i
2 +
∑n
i=1 a
∗∗
i
3 =
∑n
i=1(1− θi)
Subtract the bottom condition from the top one:[
2 (n+
∑n
i=1 a
∗
i )
∑n
i=1 a
∗
i
2 +
∑n
i=1 a
∗
i
3
]
− [2 (n+∑ni=1 a∗∗i )∑ni=1 a∗∗i 2 +∑ni=1 a∗∗i 3] = 0
2
[
(n+
∑n
i=1 a
∗
i )
∑n
i=1 a
∗
i
2 − (n+∑ni=1 a∗∗i )∑ni=1 a∗∗i 2]
+
[∑n
i=1 a
∗
i
3 −∑ni=1 a∗∗i 3] = 0
2n
[∑n
i=1 a
∗
i
2 −∑ni=1 a∗∗i 2]+ 2 [(∑ni=1 a∗i )∑ni=1 a∗i 2 − (∑ni=1 a∗∗i )∑ni=1 a∗∗i 2]
+
[∑n
i=1 a
∗
i
3 −∑ni=1 a∗∗i 3] = 0
All three of these terms will have the same sign, since in between zero
and one
a∗i > a
∗
i
2 > a∗i
3.
Adding these up, we know that:
∑n
i=1 a
∗
i >
∑n
i=1 a
∗
i
2 >
∑n
i=1 a
∗
i
3.
Furthermore, since on (0, 1), f(x) = x2 is strictly increasing, we have
that:
a∗i > a
∗∗
i ⇒ a∗i 2 > a∗∗i 2.
Adding these up, we know that:
∑n
i=1 a
∗
i >
∑n
i=1 a
∗∗
i ⇒
∑n
i=1 a
∗
i
2 >
∑n
i=1 a
∗∗
i
2.
167
Suppose that
∑n
i=1 a
∗
i >
∑n
i=1 a
∗∗
i . This means that the ﬁrst and third
terms are positive. The middle term is x · y− x′ · y′ where we know that
x > x′ and y > y′, so we know that it is positive as well. Adding three
positive terms cannot give zero.
Now suppose that
∑n
i=1 a
∗
i <
∑n
i=1 a
∗∗
i . This means that all three terms
are negative. Adding three negative terms cannot give zero either.
Therefore, this equation can only be solved if each of the three terms
is zero, and we have that
∑n
i=1 a
∗
i =
∑n
i=1 a
∗∗
i , which also gives that∑n
i=1 a
∗
i
2 =
∑n
i=1 a
∗∗
i
2 and
∑n
i=1 a
∗
i
3 =
∑n
i=1 a
∗∗
i
3. However, this con-
dition does not yet imply that the two equilibria are equal, i.e. that
a∗i = a
∗∗
i for all i.
In order for a∗ and a∗∗ to not be the same, there must be at least one
person for whom the actions are diﬀerent. Without loss of generality,
suppose a∗i 6= a∗∗i . Check the conditions for i to see whether this is
possible.
2a∗i
2
(
n+
∑n
j=1 a
∗
j
)
+ a∗i
3 = (1− θi)
2a∗∗i
2
(
n+
∑n
j=1 a
∗∗
j
)
+ a∗∗i
3 = (1− θi)
Recall that the total agent sums must be the same, i.e.
∑n
i=1 a
∗
i =∑n
i=1 a
∗∗
i . Subtract the bottom condition from the top one:
2(a∗i
2 − a∗∗i 2)
(
n+
∑n
j=1 a
∗
j
)
+ (a∗i
3 − a∗∗i 3) = 0
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Substitute the factorizations for the diﬀerence of squares and diﬀerence
of cubes:
2(a∗i − a∗∗i )(a∗i + a∗∗i )
(
n+
∑n
j=1 a
∗
j
)
+ (a∗i − a∗∗i )(a∗i 2 + a∗i a∗∗i + a∗∗i 2) = 0
If a∗i 6= a∗∗i , this means we can divide through by (a∗i − a∗∗i ), since it is
not equal to zero. This gives:
2(a∗i + a
∗∗
i )
(
n+
∑n
j=1 a
∗
j
)
+ (a∗i
2 + a∗i a
∗∗
i + a
∗∗
i
2) = 0
2(a∗i + a
∗∗
i )
(
n+
∑n
j=1 a
∗
j
)
= −(a∗i 2 + a∗i a∗∗i + a∗∗i 2)
This leads to a contradiction: n > 0 and for all j, a∗j ≥ 0, meaning that
the left-hand side is strictly positive, while the right-hand side must be
weakly negative. Therefore it must be that a∗i = a
∗∗
i for all i, meaning
that a∗ and a∗∗ are the same and that the equilibrium is unique.
• Inﬁnite marginal beneﬁt at zero: The ﬁrst derivative of i's utility with
respect to ai is:
∂ui(a)
∂ai
= (1−θi)
ai
−
[
2ai
(
n+
∑n
j=1 aj
)
+ a2i
]
.
The limit as ai approaches zero is:
lim
ai→0
∂ui(a)
∂ai
= lim
ai→0
{
(1−θi)
ai
−
[
2ai
(
n+
∑n
j=1 aj
)
+ a2i
]}
= lim
ai→0
(1−θi)
ai
− lim
ai→0
[
2ai
(
n+
∑n
j=1 aj
)
+ a2i
]
=∞+ 0
=∞
Therefore, the utility function has inﬁnite marginal beneﬁt at zero.
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• Finite damages: The total derivative of i's utility with respect to the
vector a is:
dui(a)
da
= ∂ui(a)
∂ai
+
∑
j 6=i
∂ui(a)
∂aj
= (1−θi)
ai
−
[
2ai
(
n+
∑n
j=1 aj
)
+ a2i
]
−
∑
j 6=i
a2i
The limit of the absolute value as a approaches 1 (each element of the
vector a approaches 1) is:
lim
a→1
∣∣∣∣∂ui(a)∂a
∣∣∣∣ = lima→1
∣∣∣∣∣ (1−θi)ai − [2ai (n+∑nj=1 aj)+ a2i ]−∑
j 6=i
a2i
∣∣∣∣∣
= lim
a→1
∣∣∣ (1−θi)ai ∣∣∣+ lima→1 ∣∣∣[2ai (n+∑nj=1 aj)+ a2i ]∣∣∣
+ lim
a→1
∣∣∣∑j 6=i a2i ∣∣∣
= (1− θi) + [4n+ 1] + (n− 1)2
This limit is a ﬁnite number, therefore ﬁnite damages holds.
Openness of Conditions
In Appendix B.1, I have already shown that the properties of negative
externality, submodularity, and concavity are unconditionally open, that the
property of strong dominant eﬀect is open conditional upon the previous three,
and that the property of unique interior Nash equilibrium is open conditional
upon the presence of all four preceding properties. Now I will show openness
of the additional properties of U′′.
• Inﬁnite marginal beneﬁt at zero: Deﬁne εe = 12 . If ||u − v|| < εe, then
for any i, for any a,
∣∣∣∂ui(a)∂ai − ∂vi(a)∂ai ∣∣∣ < εe. At each a, even when ai is
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very small and getting, the distance between these derivatives is at most
εe. This means that limai→0
∣∣∣∂ui(a)∂ai − ∂vi(a)∂ai ∣∣∣ < εe. Since u ∈ U, we know
that limai→0
∂ui(a)
∂ai
= ∞, so it must be the case that limai→0 ∂vi(a)∂ai = ∞
as well. Hence, v has inﬁnite marginal beneﬁt at zero.
• Finite damages: The problem mini
∣∣∣∂ui(a)∂a ∣∣∣
a=1
has a solution {i∗}. Since
u ∈ U′, u fulﬁlls ﬁnite damages, so we know that
∣∣∣∂ui(a)∂a ∣∣∣ <∞. This value
is either the smallest positive total derivative or the largest negative total
derivative. Deﬁne
εf ≡ 1
2
∣∣∣∣∂ui∗(1)∂a
∣∣∣∣ .
If ||u − v|| < εf , then ∀ i ∂vi(1)∂a ∈
(
∂ui(1)
∂a
− εf , ∂ui(1)∂a + εf
)
. These are
two ﬁnite values, and since ∂vi(1)
∂a
is between them, it too is ﬁnite. Hence,
lima→1
∣∣∣∂vi(a)∂a ∣∣∣ <∞, and v has ﬁnite damages.
Each of the original and additional conditions has been shown to be
open. Take
ε∗ ≡ min{εa, εb, εc, εd, εe, εf}.
Pick v such that ||u − v|| < ε∗. Then all the conditions are satisﬁed by v.
Hence, the set of utility functions in U′ is open. This means the exclusion
result holds on an open set.
Proportional Reduction Lemmas in U′′.
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Lemma B.3. For any θ, the proportional reduction taken by the grand coali-
tion is never full-reduction, i.e. s∗I(θ) > 0.
Proof. Suppose not. Suppose that the coalition of the whole took action of
zero. This would mean that the corner solution Kuhn-Tucker condition would
have to hold. This would mean that the zero corner slackness multiplier λ1 ≥ 0,
while the one corner slackness multiplier λ2 = 0.
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are:
m
[
B′((0)a∗J(θ))a
∗
J(θ)−
[
a∗J(θ)
2c
(
m(0)a∗J(θ) + (n−m)(0)a∗I\J(θ)
)
+ (0)a∗J(θ)
2c′
(
m(0)a∗J(θ) + (n−m)(0)a∗I\J(θ)
)
· (ma∗J(θ) + (n−m)a∗I\J(θ)) ]]+ (n−m)[(1− θ)B′((0)a∗I\J(θ))a∗I\J(θ)
−
[
a∗I\J(θ)
2c
(
m(0)a∗J(θ) + (n−m)(0)a∗I\J(θ)
)
+ (0)a∗I\J(θ)
2c′
(
m(0)a∗J(θ) + (n−m)(0)a∗I\J(θ)
)
· (ma∗J(θ) + (n−m)a∗I\J(θ)) ]]+ λ1 = 0
However, since limai→0B
′(ai) =∞, this equation is adding two positive
inﬁnite terms, which cannot sum to zero. Therefore, because of the condition
of inﬁnite marginal beneﬁt at zero, the grand coalition will never take full-
reduction.
Lemma B.4. There exists a threshold value θ < 1 for the group parameter
such that for all values of the parameter higher than the threshold, θ ∈ (θ, 1),
the reduction chosen by the coalition of the whole, s∗I(θ), is equal to one.
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Proof. Examine the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for sI .
ma∗J(θ)
[
B′(sa∗J(θ))− c
(
msa∗J(θ) + (n−m)sa∗I\J(θ)
)
−sc′
(
msa∗J(θ) + (n−m)sa∗I\J(θ)
) (
ma∗J(θ) + (n−m)a∗I\J(θ)
) ]
+(n−m)a∗I\J(θ)
[
(1− θ)B′(sa∗I\J(θ))− c
(
msa∗J(θ) + (n−m)sa∗I\J(θ)
)
−sc′
(
msa∗J(θ) + (n−m)sa∗I\J(θ)
) (
ma∗J(θ) + (n−m)a∗I\J(θ)
) ]
+λ1 − λ2 = 0
According to Lemma B.3, we know that s > 0, so we can ignore one
case (and consequently we know that λ1 = 0). Let's look at the remaining two
cases: interior and corner s = 1.
If s were interior, then we would have λ2 = 0 as well, and the following
would be the K-T condition:
ma∗J(θ)
[
B′(sa∗J(θ))− c
(
msa∗J(θ) + (n−m)sa∗I\J(θ)
)
−sc′
(
msa∗J(θ) + (n−m)sa∗I\J(θ)
) (
ma∗J(θ) + (n−m)a∗I\J(θ)
) ]
+(n−m)a∗I\J(θ)
[
(1− θ)B′(sa∗I\J(θ))− c
(
msa∗J(θ) + (n−m)sa∗I\J(θ)
)
−sc′
(
msa∗J(θ) + (n−m)sa∗I\J(θ)
) (
ma∗J(θ) + (n−m)a∗I\J(θ)
) ]
= 0
Basically, this equation is balancing the marginal utility of reduction
of the two groups, somehow imagined as (−MU IJ ) + (−MU II\J) = 0. If both
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groups were the same, then the optimal solution for the coalition would be the
same as for each group. However, since the groups are diﬀerent, the marginal
utilities must take opposite signs to make the equation hold. Therefore, the
optimal reduction for the coalition of the whole will have negative marginal
utility for one group and positive marginal utility for the other. Moving the
terms belonging to I \ J , the equation becomes:
ma∗J(θ)
[
B′(sa∗J(θ))− c
(
msa∗J(θ) + (n−m)sa∗I\J(θ)
)
−sc′
(
msa∗J(θ) + (n−m)sa∗I\J(θ)
) (
ma∗J(θ) + (n−m)a∗I\J(θ)
) ]
=
−(n−m)a∗I\J(θ)
[
(1− θ)B′(sa∗I\J(θ))− c
(
msa∗J(θ) + (n−m)sa∗I\J(θ)
)
−sc′
(
msa∗J(θ) + (n−m)sa∗I\J(θ)
) (
ma∗J(θ) + (n−m)a∗I\J(θ)
) ]
Since a∗I\J(θ) is continuous and decreasing in θ ⇒ limθ→1 a∗I\J(θ) = 0.
Since u ∈ U′, it must be that limai→0 ∂ui(a)∂ai = ∞, so for this utility function
that means that limθ→1,ai→0(1− θ)B′(ai) =∞, i.e. B′(·) goes to inﬁnity faster
than θ goes to one. Therefore, as θ approaches one, RHS is going to negative
inﬁnity quickly. In fact, with a small, tiny s close to zero multiplying the
action, then RHS would go to inﬁnity even faster. In order for the equation to
hold, LHS must to go to negative inﬁnity as well. The beneﬁt function, B′(·),
is strictly increasing throughout the action space, so it cannot make RHS go
to negative inﬁnity. The cost function is subtracted and has the potential to
make RHS negative. However, by the assumption made that the cost function
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does not asymptote to inﬁnity within the action space of [0, 1], this means that
neither c(·) nor c′(·) goes to inﬁnity. Therefore, RHS cannot go to negative
inﬁnity, so the two cannot be equal and an interior s is not possible when θ is
really, really tiny.
Instead, look at the K-T condition for the corner of s = 1, where λ2 ≥ 0:
ma∗J(θ)
[
B′(sa∗J(θ))− c
(
msa∗J(θ) + (n−m)sa∗I\J(θ)
)
−sc′
(
msa∗J(θ) + (n−m)sa∗I\J(θ)
) (
ma∗J(θ) + (n−m)a∗I\J(θ)
) ]
+(n−m)a∗I\J(θ)
[
(1− θ)B′(sa∗I\J(θ))− c
(
msa∗J(θ) + (n−m)sa∗I\J(θ)
)
−sc′
(
msa∗J(θ) + (n−m)sa∗I\J(θ)
) (
ma∗J(θ) + (n−m)a∗I\J(θ)
) ]− λ2 = 0
This can be rewritten as:
ma∗J(θ)
[
B′(sa∗J(θ))− c
(
msa∗J(θ) + (n−m)sa∗I\J(θ)
)
−sc′
(
msa∗J(θ) + (n−m)sa∗I\J(θ)
) (
ma∗J(θ) + (n−m)a∗I\J(θ)
) ]− λ2 =
−(n−m)a∗I\J(θ)
[
(1− θ)B′(sa∗I\J(θ))− c
(
msa∗J(θ) + (n−m)sa∗I\J(θ)
)
−sc′
(
msa∗J(θ) + (n−m)sa∗I\J(θ)
) (
ma∗J(θ) + (n−m)a∗I\J(θ)
) ]
Since λ2 ≥ 0, subtracting it helps balance things, and it is permissible
that λ2 → ∞ as a∗I\J → 0. This means that s∗I(θ) = 1 will occur when θ is
large enough.
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Appendix C
Proofs and Derivations for Chapter 2
C.1 Alternative Parametrization with Centered Taylor
Expansions
In this paper, simple linear parameters are used. However, an alterna-
tive similar to Taylor expansions was suggested. Here are the respective set
ups for the three diﬀerent eﬀects.
1. Opponent eﬀect:
(a) Non-coordination:
wNi (θJ) = ui(ai, aj)− θJ(aj − aNj (0))
wNj (θJ) = uj(aj, ai)− θJ(ai − aNi (0))
(b) Coordination:
wP (θJ) = ui(ai, aj) + uj(aj, ai)− θJ
[
(ai − aPi (0)) + (aj − aPj (0))
]
2. Own eﬀect:
(a) Non-coordination:
wNi (θI) = ui(ai, aj) + θI(ai − aNi (0))
wNj (θI) = uj(aj, ai) + θI(aj − aNj (0))
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(b) Coordination:
wP (θI) = ui(ai, aj) + uj(aj, ai) + θI
[
(ai − aPi (0)) + (aj − aPj (0))
]
3. Submodular eﬀect:
(a) Non-coordination:
wNi (θIJ) = ui(ai, aj)− θIJ
(
ai − aNi (0)
) (
aj − aNj (0)
)
wNj (θIJ) = uj(aj, ai)− θIJ
(
ai − aNi (0)
) (
aj − aNj (0)
)
(b) Coordination:
wPi (θIJ) = ui(ai, aj) + uj(aj, ai)− 2θIJ
(
ai − aPi (0)
) (
aj − aPj (0)
)
C.2 Expanded Results from Section 2.3.1
Proof of Theorem 2.1
Restatement of Theorem 2.1 from Section 2.3.1. For a symmetric game
Γ, an increase in the parameter multiplying the added linearizations has the
following eﬀect for each:
1. Increasing the opponent eﬀect increases the distance in the actions under
non-coordination and coordination, that is, for all i:
d
dθJ
[aNi (θJ)− aPi (θJ)] > 0;
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2. Increasing the own eﬀect has ambiguous results on the distance in actions
under non-coordination and coordination; and
3. Increasing the submodular eﬀect also has ambiguous results on the dis-
tance in actions under non-coordination and coordination.
Proof. For each type of eﬀect, this proof examines the ﬁrst order conditions to
determine the directions of change in the action gaps. Each eﬀect has separate
analysis.
1. Opponent Eﬀect
The opponent eﬀect is set-up in the paper in Equations (2.4) and (2.5).
First, I examine the Nash ﬁrst order conditions, and then I examine the
social planner's ﬁrst order conditions.
(a) Non-coordination: The maximization problem for agent i, given the
Nash equilibrium action of agent j, is:
max
ai∈Ai
ui(ai, a
N
j (θJ))− θJaNj (θJ)
aN(0) solves the following:
∂wi
∂ai
=
∂ui(·, aNj (0))
∂ai
≡ 0
∂wj
∂aj
=
∂uj(·, aNi (0))
∂aj
≡ 0
aN(θJ) solves the following:
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∂wi
∂ai
=
∂ui(·, aNj (θJ))
∂ai
≡ 0
∂wj
∂aj
=
∂uj(·, aNi (θJ))
∂aj
≡ 0
Observe that aN(θJ) = aN(θ′J) = a
N(0) for all θJ and θ′J in θJ .
Hence,
∂aNi (·)
∂θJ
= 0.
(b) Coordination: The maximization problem for the social planner is:
max
(ai,aj)∈Ai×Aj
ui(ai, aj) + uj(aj, ai)− θJ (ai + aj)
For θJ = 0, aP (0) solves the following:
∂(wi + wj)
∂ai
=
∂ui(·, aPj (θJ))
∂ai
+
∂uj(a
P
j (θJ), ·)
∂ai
≡ 0
∂(wi + wj)
∂aj
=
∂uj(·, aPi (θJ))
∂aj
+
∂ui(a
P
i (θJ), ·)
∂aj
≡ 0
For θJ > 0, aP (θJ) solves the following:
∂(wi + wj)
∂ai
=
∂ui(·, aPj (θJ))
∂ai
+
∂uj(a
P
j (θJ), ·)
∂ai
− θJ ≡ 0
∂(wi + wj)
∂aj
=
∂uj(·, aPi (θJ))
∂aj
+
∂ui(a
P
i (θJ), ·)
∂aj
− θJ ≡ 0
Since the game is symmetric, if the Social Planner changes any
agent's action, he will change the other's action in the same manner
(i.e same direction and likely magnitude). The next lemma looks
at the comparative statics of the whole vector.
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Lemma C.1. aP (θJ) is decreasing in θJ .
Proof. Suppose not. Suppose that for θ′J > θJ , a
P (θ′J) 6< aP (θJ).
i. Case i. aP (θ′J) > a
P (θJ)
Look at the FOC for ∂(wi+wj)
∂ai
(the FOC for ∂(wi+wj)
∂aj
are sym-
metric):
∂ui(a
P
i (θJ), a
P
j (θJ))
∂ai
+
∂uj(a
P
j (θJ), a
P
i (θJ))
∂ai
= θJ
∂ui(a
P
i (θ
′
J), a
P
j (θ
′
J))
∂ai
+
∂uj(a
P
j (θ
′
J), a
P
i (θ
′
J))
∂ai
= θ′J
Subtract the ﬁrst from the second:
[
∂ui(a
P
i (θ
′
J), a
P
j (θ
′
J))
∂ai
− ∂ui(a
P
i (θJ), a
P
j (θJ))
∂ai
]
+
[
∂uj(a
P
j (θ
′
J), a
P
i (θ
′
J))
∂ai
− ∂uj(a
P
j (θJ), a
P
i (θJ))
∂ai
]
= θ′J − θJ
Because θ′J > θJ , RHS is greater than zero. Now look at LHS.
Take the ﬁrst bracketed term:
∂ui(a
P
i (θ
′
J), a
P
j (θ
′
J))
∂ai
− ∂ui(a
P
i (θJ), a
P
j (θJ))
∂ai(
∂ui(a
P
i (θ
′
J), a
P
j (θ
′
J))
∂ai
− ∂ui(a
P
i (θJ), a
P
j (θ
′
J))
∂ai
)
+
(
∂ui(a
P
i (θJ), a
P
j (θ
′
J))
∂ai
− ∂ui(a
P
i (θJ), a
P
j (θJ))
∂ai
)
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Since u is concave in own action, if aPi (θ
′
J) > a
P
i (θJ), then it
must be the case that for any aj:
∂ui(a
P
i (θ
′
J), ·)
∂ai
<
∂ui(a
P
i (θJ), ·)
∂ai
Furthermore, since u is submodular in opponent action, if
aPj (θ
′
J) > a
P
j (θJ),
then it must be the case that for any ai:
∂ui(·, aPj (θ′J))
∂ai
<
∂ui(·, aPj (θJ))
∂ai
This means that the LHS is negative, so it cannot equal the
positive RHS. This is a contradiction, so this case will not occur.
ii. Case ii. aP (θ′J) = a
P (θJ)
Look at the FOC for ∂(wi+wj)
∂ai
(the FOC for ∂(wi+wj)
∂aj
are sym-
metric):
∂ui(a
P
i (θJ), a
P
j (θJ))
∂ai
+
∂uj(a
P
j (θJ), a
P
i (θJ))
∂ai
= θJ
∂ui(a
P
i (θ
′
J), a
P
j (θ
′
J))
∂ai
+
∂uj(a
P
j (θ
′
J), a
P
i (θ
′
J))
∂ai
= θ′J
If aP (θ′J) = a
P (θJ), that means that the two LHS are equal
as well. This implies that the two RHS should be equal, so
θJ = θ
′
J . This is a contradiction of θJ < θ
′
J , so this case cannot
occur.
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Since both cases are contradictions, it must be that for θ′J > θJ , then
aPi (θ
′
J) < a
P
i (θJ), so the social planner's chosen action is decreasing
in θJ .
By Lemma C.1, it is seen that:
∂aPi (·)
∂θJ
< 0.
Combining this result with that of non-coordination, it has been obtained
that for all agents i:
d
dθJ
[
aNi (θJ)− aPi (θJ)
]
> 0.
2. Own Eﬀect
The own eﬀect is set-up in the paper in Equations (2.6) and (2.7). First,
I examine the Nash ﬁrst order conditions, and then I examine the social
planner's ﬁrst order conditions.
(a) Non-coordination: The maximization problem for agent i, given the
Nash equilibrium action of agent j, is:
max
ai∈Ai
ui(ai, a
N
j (θI)) + θIai
aN(θI) solves the following:
∂wi
∂ai
=
∂ui(·, aNj (θI))
∂ai
+ θI ≡ 0
∂wj
∂aj
=
∂uj(·, aNi (θI))
∂aj
+ θI ≡ 0
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The intuition is that this action is increasing, due to the increased
own beneﬁt.1
Lemma C.2. aNi (θI) is increasing in θI .
Proof. Suppose not. Suppose that for θ′I > θI , a
N
i (θ
′
I) 6> aNi (θI).
i. Case i. aNi (θ
′
I) < a
N
i (θI)
Look at the FOC for ∂wi
∂ai
:
∂ui(a
N
i (θI), a
N
j (θI))
∂ai
= −θI
∂ui(a
N
i (θ
′
I), a
N
j (θ
′
I))
∂ai
= −θ′I
Subtract the ﬁrst from the second:
∂ui(a
N
i (θ
′
I), a
N
j (θ
′
I))
∂ai
− ∂ui(a
N
i (θI), a
N
j (θI))
∂ai
= −θ′I + θI
The RHS is negative. Look at the LHS and add/subtract some
terms:
∂ui(a
N
i (θ
′
I), a
N
j (θ
′
I))
∂ai
− ∂ui(a
N
i (θI), a
N
j (θI))
∂ai
∂ui(a
N
i (θ
′
I), a
N
j (θ
′
I))
∂ai
− ∂ui(a
N
i (θI), a
N
j (θ
′
I))
∂ai
+
∂ui(a
N
i (θI), a
N
j (θ
′
I))
∂ai
− ∂ui(a
N
i (θI), a
N
j (θI))
∂ai
1In the non-symmetric game, there are cross-partials to check to determine the direction
of change, but the symmetric game imposes additional assumptions that assist in making
this straightforward.
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If aNi (θ
′
I) < a
N
i (θI), then because of concavity in own action,
the ﬁrst subtraction pair is positive. Since the agents are
symmetric, agent j's action must follow the same pattern. If
aNj (θ
′
I) < a
N
j (θI), then because of submodularity, the second
subtraction pair is also positive. Thus the LHS is positive,
which contradicts the RHS being negative. Thus, this case
cannot occur.
ii. Case ii. aNi (θ
′
I) = a
N
i (θI)
Look at the FOC for ∂wi
∂ai
:
∂ui(a
N
i (θI), a
N
j (θI))
∂ai
= −θI
∂ui(a
N
i (θ
′
I), a
N
j (θ
′
I))
∂ai
= −θ′I
If aNi (θ
′
I) = a
N
i (θI) and a
N
j (θ
′
I) = a
N
j (θI), then the LHS of
both of these are equal. This means the RHS should be equal
too. This is a contradiction of the assumption that θ′I > θI .
Therefore, this case cannot occur.
Since both cases cannot occur, it must be the case that aNi (θ) is
increasing in θ. This holds symmetrically for aNJ (θ).
By Lemma C.2, it is obtained that:
∂aNi (·)
∂θI
> 0.
(b) Coordination: The maximization problem for the social planner is:
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max
(ai,aj)∈Ai×Aj
ui(ai, aj) + uj(aj, ai) + θI (ai + aj)
For θI ≥ 0, aP (θI) solves the following:
∂(wi + wj)
∂ai
=
∂ui(·, aPj (θI))
∂ai
+
∂uj(a
P
j (θI), ·)
∂ai
+ θI ≡ 0
∂(wi + wj)
∂aj
=
∂uj(·, aPi (θI))
∂aj
+
∂ui(a
P
i (θI), ·)
∂aj
+ θI ≡ 0
The Social Planner may also want to increase actions, because of
the increased beneﬁt, but will be wary of the submodularity's eﬀect
as well. Recall here, because this is a symmetric game, the action
changes will go in the same direction for both agents. The next
lemma posits that the SP's actions are also increasing.
Lemma C.3. aP (θI) is increasing in θI .
Proof. Suppose not. Suppose that for θ′I > θI , a
P (θ′I) 6> aP (θI).
i. Case i. aP (θ′I) < a
P (θI)
Look at the FOC for ∂(wi+wj)
∂ai
(the FOC for ∂(wi+wj)
∂aj
are sym-
metric):
∂ui(a
P
i (θI), a
P
j (θI))
∂ai
+
∂uj(a
P
j (θI), a
P
i (θI))
∂ai
= −θI
∂ui(a
P
i (θ
′
I), a
P
j (θ
′
I))
∂ai
+
∂uj(a
P
j (θ
′
I), a
P
i (θ
′
I))
∂ai
= −θ′I
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Subtract the second from the ﬁrst:
∂ui(a
P
i (θ
′
I), a
P
j (θ
′
I))
∂ai
− ∂ui(a
P
i (θI), a
P
j (θI))
∂ai
+
∂uj(a
P
j (θ
′
I), a
P
i (θ
′
I))
∂ai
− ∂uj(a
P
j (θI), a
P
i (θI))
∂ai
= −θ′I + θI
The RHS is negative. Examine the ﬁrst subtraction pair of the
LHS:
∂ui(a
P
i (θ
′
I), a
P
j (θ
′
I))
∂ai
− ∂ui(a
P
i (θI), a
P
j (θI))
∂ai(
∂ui(a
P
i (θ
′
I), a
P
j (θ
′
I))
∂ai
− ∂ui(a
P
i (θI), a
P
j (θ
′
I))
∂ai
)
+
(
∂ui(a
P
i (θI), a
P
j (θ
′
I))
∂ai
− ∂ui(a
P
i (θI), a
P
j (θI))
∂ai
)
If aP (θ′I) < a
P (θI), then by concavity wrt own action, the ﬁrst
subtraction pair is positive, and by submodularity, the second
pair is positive. This holds for agent j's ﬁrst derivatives as
well, so the LHS of the previous statement is positive. This
contradicts the negative LHS, so this case cannot occur.
ii. Case ii. aP (θ′I) = a
P (θI)
Look at the FOC for ∂(wi+wj)
∂ai
(the FOC for ∂(wi+wj)
∂aj
are sym-
metric):
∂ui(a
P
i (θI), a
P
j (θI))
∂ai
+
∂uj(a
P
j (θI), a
P
i (θI))
∂ai
= −θI
∂ui(a
P
i (θ
′
I), a
P
j (θ
′
I))
∂ai
+
∂uj(a
P
j (θ
′
I), a
P
i (θ
′
I))
∂ai
= −θ′I
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If aP (θ′I) = a
P (θI), then the LHS of both functions must be the
same. This means the RHS must be the same, i.e. θ′I = θI , but
this is a contradiction. Therefore, this case cannot occur.
Since both of these cases cannot occur, it must be that aPi is in-
creasing in θI .
By Lemma C.3, it is obtained that:
∂aPi (·)
∂θI
> 0.
Both the Nash actions and the eﬃcient actions are increasing in θI .
At each θI , it should be that the eﬃcient actions are smaller than the
Nash actions because of the negative externality. Intuition says that the
Nash increases are larger, because the agents ignore the externality, but
this really depends on the curvature of the utility function. Therefore,
though the directions actions take are known, as is the increase in utility
for social planner problem, the ambiguity in utility for the Nash problem
makes it diﬃcult to say whether the Nash increases are larger or smaller
than the eﬃcient increases, rendering the comparison ambiguous.
Thus, the own eﬀect is the confusing type of externality. One the one
hand, the direct beneﬁt increases utility, but on the other hand, the
agents then exert more of the externality on each other.
3. Submodular Eﬀect
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The submodular eﬀect is set-up in the paper in Equations (2.8) and (2.9).
First, I examine the Nash ﬁrst order conditions, and then I examine the
social planner's ﬁrst order conditions.
(a) Non-coordination: The maximization problem for agent i, given the
Nash equilibrium action of agent j, is:
max
ai∈Ai
ui(ai, a
N
j (θIJ)) + θIJaia
N
j (θIJ)
aN(0) solves:
∂wi
∂ai
=
∂ui
(·, aNj (0))
∂ai
≡ 0
∂wj
∂aj
=
∂uj
(·, aNi (0))
∂aj
≡ 0
aN(θIJ) solves:
∂wi
∂ai
=
∂ui
(·, aNj (θIJ))
∂ai
− θIJaNj (θIJ) ≡ 0
∂wj
∂aj
=
∂uj
(·, aNi (θIJ))
∂aj
− θIJaNi (θIJ) ≡ 0
Going oﬀ of the structure above, the next lemma posits that the
submodular eﬀect is rendered Null for the Nash equilibrium.
Lemma C.4. For θ′IJ > θIJ , a
N
i (θ
′
IJ) < a
N
i (θIJ).
Proof. Suppose not. Suppose that for θ′IJ > θIJ , a
N
i (θIJ) ≥ aNi (θ′IJ).
Because of symmetric utility functions, agents actions go in the
same direction.
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i. Case i. aNi (θ
′
IJ) > a
N
i (θIJ)∀i. Look at the FOC for ∂wi∂ai :
∂ui
(
aNi (θIJ), a
N
j (θIJ)
)
∂ai
= θIJa
N
j (θIJ)
∂ui
(
aNi (θ
′
IJ), a
N
j (θ
′
IJ)
)
∂ai
= θ′IJa
N
j (θ
′
IJ)
Subtract the second from the ﬁrst:
∂ui
(
aNi (θ
′
IJ), a
N
j (θ
′
IJ)
)
∂ai
− ∂ui
(
aNi (θIJ), a
N
j (θIJ)
)
∂ai
= θ′IJa
N
j (θ
′
IJ)− θIJaNj (θIJ)
RHS is positive. If both Nash actions are larger, then by con-
cavity and submodularity, LHS is negative. This case cannot
occur.
ii. Case ii. aNi (θ
′
IJ) = a
N
i (θIJ)∀i.
∂ui
(
aNi (θ
′
IJ), a
N
j (θ
′
IJ)
)
∂ai
− ∂ui
(
aNi (θIJ), a
N
j (θIJ)
)
∂ai
= θ′IJa
N
j (θ
′
IJ)− θIJaNj (θIJ)
If actions are equal, then LHS is equal to zero. The statement
can be rewritten as:
0 = (θ′IJ − θIJ) aNj (θIJ)
In order for RHS to be zero, need θ′IJ = θIJ . This is a contra-
diction.
Therefore the only possibility is that aNi (θIJ) to be decreasing in
θIJ .
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By Lemma C.4, it is obtained that:
∂aNi (·)
∂θIJ
< 0.
(b) Coordination: The maximization problem for the social planner is:
max
(ai,aj)∈Ai×Aj
ui(ai, aj) + uj(aj, ai) + 2θIJaiaj
For θIJ ≥ 0, aP (θJ) solves the following:
∂(wi + wj)
∂ai
=
∂ui(·, aPj (θIJ))
∂ai
+
∂uj(a
P
j (θIJ), ·)
∂ai
− 2θIJaPj (θIJ) ≡ 0
∂(wi + wj)
∂aj
=
∂uj(·, aPi (θIJ))
∂aj
+
∂ui(a
P
i (θIJ), ·)
∂aj
− 2θIJaPi (θIJ) ≡ 0
Lemma C.5. For θ′IJ > θIJ , a
P
i (θ
′
IJ) < a
P
i (θIJ).
Proof. Suppose not. Suppose aP (θ′IJ) ≥ aP (θIJ).
i. Case i. aPi (θ
′
IJ) > a
P
i (θIJ)∀i. Look at the FOC for ∂wi∂ai :
∂ui
(
aPi (θIJ), a
P
j (θIJ)
)
∂ai
+
∂uj
(
aPj (θIJ), a
P
i (θIJ)
)
∂ai
= 2θIJa
P
j (θIJ)
∂ui
(
aPi (θ
′
IJ), a
P
j (θ
′
IJ)
)
∂ai
+
∂uj
(
aPj (θ
′
IJ), a
P
i (θ
′
IJ)
)
∂ai
= 2θ′IJa
P
j (θ
′
IJ)
Subtract the second from the ﬁrst:
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∂ui
(
aPi (θ
′
IJ), a
P
j (θ
′
IJ)
)
∂ai
+
∂uj
(
aPj (θ
′
IJ), a
P
i (θ
′
IJ)
)
∂ai
−∂ui
(
aPi (θIJ), a
P
j (θIJ)
)
∂ai
− ∂uj
(
aPj (θIJ), a
P
i (θIJ)
)
∂ai
=2θ′IJa
P
j (θ
′
IJ)− 2θIJaPj (θIJ)
If aPi (θIJ) > a
P
i (θ
′
IJ), then RHS is positive.
Because of concavity and submodularity, when both aPi (θ
′
IJ) >
aPi (θIJ) and a
P
j (θ
′
IJ) > a
P
j (θIJ), we have that:
∂ui(a
P
i (θ
′
IJ), a
P
j (θ
′
IJ))
∂ai
<
∂ui(a
P
j (θIJ), a
P
j (θIJ))
∂ai
and that:
∂uj(a
P
i (θ
′
IJ), a
P
j (θ
′
IJ))
∂ai
<
∂uj(a
P
j (θIJ), a
P
j (θIJ))
∂ai
This means that LHS is negative, which is a contradiction. This
case cannot occur.
ii. Case ii. aPi (θ
′
IJ) = a
P
i (θIJ)
If the actions are equal for both agents, then LHS is zero, and
the subtracted FOC can be written as:
0 = 2 (θ′IJ − θIJ) aPj (θIJ)
The only way for RHS to equal LHS is for θ′IJ = θIJ . This is a
contradiction, so this case cannot occur.
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By Lemma C.5, it is obtained that:
∂aPi (·)
∂θIJ
< 0.
Both the Nash actions and the eﬃcient actions are decreasing in
θIJ . Similar as with the own eﬀect, the eﬃcient actions should
be smaller. From the extra two in the social planner's ﬁrst order
conditions, it is suspected that the eﬃcient actions are decreasing
more quickly than the non-coordination actions, but this depends
on the curvature of the utility function. Thus, the submodular
eﬀect is ambiguous as well.2
Combined, these three results give Theorem 2.1.
C.3 Expanded Results from Section 2.3.2
Derivation of Second-Order Expansions
1. Non-coordination ﬁrst order conditions:
Recall the FOC are:
∂ui(ai, aj)
∂ai
+ θii ≡ 0
∂uj(aj, ai)
∂aj
+ θjj ≡ 0
2For a centered Taylor expansion version of this problem, the submodular eﬀect would
be null, as opposed to ambiguous.
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The derivatives of these with respect to agent i's own eﬀect, θii, are:
∂2ui(ai, aj)
∂a2i
· ∂a
N
i (θ)
∂θii
+
∂2ui(ai, aj)
∂ai∂aj
· ∂a
N
j (θ)
∂θii
+ 1 = 0
∂2uj(aj, ai)
∂aj∂ai
· ∂a
N
i (θ)
∂θii
+
∂2uj(aj, ai)
∂a2j
· ∂a
N
j (θ)
∂θii
= 0
and with respect to agent i's opponent eﬀect, θij, are:
∂2ui(ai, aj)
∂a2i
· ∂a
N
i (θ)
∂θij
+
∂2ui(ai, aj)
∂ai∂aj
· ∂a
N
j (θ)
∂θij
= 0
∂2uj(aj, ai)
∂aj∂ai
· ∂a
N
i (θ)
∂θij
+
∂2uj(aj, ai)
∂a2j
· ∂a
N
j (θ)
∂θij
= 0
In the second set of expansions, those with respect to θij, since the
function is concave and submodular, then in both top and bottom two
negative numbers multiplied by the derivatives. In order for any set of
numbers other than zero to solve this set of equations, this would require
the own second derivatives to equal the cross-partials, which is possible,
but a small set of functions. Furthermore, since the parameter θij does
not appear in the ﬁrst order conditions, this proof will proceed with the
case of:
∂aNi (θ)
∂θij
=
∂aNj (θ)
∂θij
= 0.
The derivatives of the FOC with respect to agent j's opponent eﬀect on
i, θji, are:
∂2ui(ai, aj)
∂a2i
· ∂a
N
i (θ)
∂θji
+
∂2ui(ai, aj)
∂ai∂aj
· ∂a
N
j (θ)
∂θji
= 0
∂2uj(aj, ai)
∂aj∂ai
· ∂a
N
i (θ)
∂θji
+
∂2uj(aj, ai)
∂a2j
· ∂a
N
j (θ)
∂θji
= 0
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and with respect to agent j's own eﬀect , θjj, are:
∂2ui(ai, aj)
∂a2i
· ∂a
N
i (θ)
∂θjj
+
∂2ui(ai, aj)
∂ai∂aj
· ∂a
N
j (θ)
∂θjj
= 0
∂2uj(aj, ai)
∂aj∂ai
· ∂a
N
i (θ)
∂θjj
+
∂2uj(aj, ai)
∂a2j
· ∂a
N
j (θ)
∂θjj
+ 1 = 0
The parameter θji displays a similar pattern as did θij, and so the proof
will proceed under the following:
∂aNi (θ)
∂θji
=
∂aNj (θ)
∂θji
= 0.
The results with respect to θii and θjj can be condensed into matrix
form:  ∂2ui(ai,aj)∂a2i ∂2ui(ai,aj)∂ai∂aj
∂2uj(ai,aj)
∂ai∂aj
∂2uj(ai,aj)
∂a2j
 ·
∂aNi∂θii ∂aNi∂θjj
∂aNj
∂θii
∂aNj
∂θjj
 = [−1 0
0 −1
]
2. Coordination ﬁrst order conditions:
Recall the FOC are:
∂ui(ai, aj)
∂ai
+
∂ui(ai, aj)
∂aj
+
∂uj(aj, ai)
∂ai
+
∂uj(aj, ai)
∂aj
+ γi + γj ≡ 0
The derivatives of these with respect to agent i's total eﬀect, γi, are:
∂2ui(ai, aj)
∂a2i
· ∂a
P
i
∂γi
+
∂2ui(ai, aj)
∂ai∂aj
· ∂a
P
j
∂γi
+
∂2uj(aj, ai)
∂a2i
· ∂a
P
i
∂γi
+
∂2uj(aj, ai)
∂ai∂aj
· ∂a
P
j
∂γi
+ 1 = 0
∂2ui(ai, aj)
∂aj∂ai
· ∂a
P
i
∂γi
+
∂2ui(ai, aj)
∂a2j
· ∂a
P
j
∂γi
+
∂2uj(aj, ai)
∂aj∂ai
· ∂a
P
i
∂γi
+
∂2uj(aj, ai)
∂a2j
· ∂a
P
j
∂γi
= 0
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and the derivatives with respect to agent j's total eﬀect, γj, are:
∂2ui(ai, aj)
∂a2i
· ∂a
P
i
∂γj
+
∂2ui(ai, aj)
∂ai∂aj
· ∂a
P
j
∂γj
+
∂2uj(aj, ai)
∂a2i
· ∂a
P
i
∂γj
+
∂2uj(aj, ai)
∂ai∂aj
· ∂a
P
j
∂γj
= 0
∂2ui(ai, aj)
∂aj∂ai
· ∂a
P
i
∂γj
+
∂2ui(ai, aj)
∂a2j
· ∂a
P
j
∂γj
+
∂2uj(aj, ai)
∂aj∂aj
· ∂a
P
i
∂γj
+
∂2uj(aj, ai)
∂a2j
· ∂a
P
j
∂γj
+ 1 = 0
The results with respect to γi and γj can be condensed into matrix form:∂2ui(ai,aj)∂a2i + ∂2uj(ai,aj)∂a2i ∂2ui(ai,aj)∂ai∂aj + ∂2uj(ai,aj)∂ai∂aj
∂2uj(ai,aj)
∂ai∂aj
+
∂2ui(ai,aj)
∂ai∂aj
∂2uj(ai,aj)
∂a2j
+
∂2ui(ai,aj)
∂a2j
 ·
∂aPi∂γi ∂aPi∂γj
∂aPj
∂γi
∂aPj
∂γj
 = [−1 0
0 −1
]
Proof of Lemma 2.2
Restatement of Lemma 2.2. For DaN to be positive and for the Nash ac-
tions to be increasing in response to an increase in θ, it is suﬃcient for the own
second derivatives to be the same direction in comparison to the cross-partials
for both agents. That is, the own second derivative can be more negative than
the cross partial for both agents:
∂2ui(ai, aj)
∂a2i
<
∂2ui(ai, aj)
∂ai∂aj
and
∂2uj(ai, aj)
∂a2j
<
∂2uj(ai, aj)
∂ai∂aj
or, the own second derivative can be less negative than the cross partial for
both agents:
∂2ui(ai, aj)
∂a2i
>
∂2ui(ai, aj)
∂ai∂aj
and
∂2uj(ai, aj)
∂a2j
>
∂2uj(ai, aj)
∂ai∂aj
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Proof. Recall the set-up of the linearization:
[
a b
c d
]
=
 ∂2ui(ai,aj)∂a2i ∂2ui(ai,aj)∂ai∂aj
∂2uj(ai,aj)
∂ai∂aj
∂2uj(ai,aj)
∂a2j

ad− bc = ∂
2ui(ai, aj)
∂a2i
· ∂
2uj(ai, aj)
∂a2j
− ∂
2ui(ai, aj)
∂ai∂aj
· ∂
2uj(ai, aj)
∂ai∂aj[
d− c a− b] = [∂2uj(ai,aj)∂a2j − ∂2uj(ai,aj)∂ai∂aj ∂2ui(ai,aj)∂a2i − ∂2ui(ai,aj)∂ai∂aj ]
There are two cases to consider:
1. ad− bc > 0 while d− c < 0, a− b < 0
ad− bc = ∂
2ui(ai, aj)
∂a2i
· ∂
2uj(ai, aj)
∂a2j
− ∂
2ui(ai, aj)
∂ai∂aj
· ∂
2uj(ai, aj)
∂ai∂aj
ad− bc > 0⇒
∂2ui(ai, aj)
∂a2i
· ∂
2uj(ai, aj)
∂a2j
>
∂2ui(ai, aj)
∂ai∂aj
· ∂
2uj(ai, aj)
∂ai∂aj
By concavity and submodularity, these are individually negative. So,
the above statement could hold under some sort of dominant eﬀect idea,
where the own second derivative is more negative (larger) than the
cross partial. Then d − c and a − b would be negative, because both d
and a would be smaller (more negative) than c and b.
2. ad− bc < 0 and d− c > 0, a− b > 0
On the other hand, with the opposite of dominant eﬀect, or some second
order opponent eﬀect, then ad would be smaller than bc, but c would
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be smaller from d (as well as b from a, which would be positive). This
would give the same required sign.
Proof of Lemma 2.3
Restatement of Lemma 2.3. For UP to have only positive eigenvalues, it
is suﬃcient that:
∂2ui
∂a2j
> 0
∂2uj
∂a2j
> 0
(
∂2ui
∂a2i
+
∂2uj
∂a2i
)(
∂2ui
∂a2j
+
∂2uj
∂a2j
)
>
(
∂2ui
∂ai∂aj
+
∂2uj
∂ai∂aj
)2
Proof. Recall the method for calculating eigenvalues:
∂2ui∂a2i + ∂2uj∂a2i − λ ∂2ui∂ai∂aj + ∂2uj∂ai∂aj
∂2ui
∂ai∂aj
+
∂2uj
∂ai∂aj
∂2ui
∂a2j
+
∂2uj
∂a2j
− λ

The characteristic function is:(
∂2ui
∂a2i
+
∂2uj
∂a2i
− λ
)(
∂2ui
∂a2j
+
∂2uj
∂a2j
− λ
)
−
(
∂2ui
∂ai∂aj
+
∂2uj
∂ai∂aj
)2
= 0
Expanding:
197
λ2 − λ
(
∂2ui
∂a2i
+
∂2uj
∂a2i
+
∂2ui
∂a2j
+
∂2uj
∂a2j
)
+
(
∂2ui
∂a2i
+
∂2uj
∂a2i
)(
∂2ui
∂a2j
+
∂2uj
∂a2j
)
−
(
∂2ui
∂ai∂aj
+
∂2uj
∂ai∂aj
)2
= 0
Using quadratic function, we know that the values for λ are as follows:
λ =
1
2
[(
∂2ui
∂a2i
+
∂2uj
∂a2i
+
∂2ui
∂a2j
+
∂2uj
∂a2j
)
±
√√√√(∂2ui
∂a2i
+
∂2uj
∂a2i
+
∂2ui
∂a2j
+
∂2uj
∂a2j
)2
−4
[(
∂2ui
∂a2i
+
∂2uj
∂a2i
)(
∂2ui
∂a2j
+
∂2uj
∂a2j
)
−
(
∂2ui
∂ai∂aj
+
∂2uj
∂ai∂aj
)2]]
When are both λ positive? First, check under the square root.
(
∂2ui
∂a2i
+
∂2uj
∂a2i
+
∂2ui
∂a2j
+
∂2uj
∂a2j
)2
?
>
4
[(
∂2ui
∂a2i
+
∂2uj
∂a2i
)(
∂2ui
∂a2j
+
∂2uj
∂a2j
)
−
(
∂2ui
∂ai∂aj
+
∂2uj
∂ai∂aj
)2]
It is known that the eigenvectors of symmetric matrices are real, so the
above equation must hold. Therefore, what is under the square root must be
positive. Hence, the following condition that must be also true:
(
∂2ui
∂a2i
+
∂2uj
∂a2i
)2
+
(
∂2ui
∂a2j
+
∂2uj
∂a2j
)2
+
(
∂2ui
∂ai∂aj
+
∂2uj
∂ai∂aj
)2
> 2
(
∂2ui
∂a2i
+
∂2uj
∂a2i
)(
∂2ui
∂a2j
+
∂2uj
∂a2j
)
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The two eigenvalues can be denoted as:
λ1 =
1
2
[(
∂2ui
∂a2i
+
∂2uj
∂a2i
+
∂2ui
∂a2j
+
∂2uj
∂a2j
)
+
√√√√(∂2ui
∂a2i
+
∂2uj
∂a2i
+
∂2ui
∂a2j
+
∂2uj
∂a2j
)2
−4
[(
∂2ui
∂a2i
+
∂2uj
∂a2i
)(
∂2ui
∂a2j
+
∂2uj
∂a2j
)
−
(
∂2ui
∂ai∂aj
+
∂2uj
∂ai∂aj
)2]]
λ2 =
1
2
[(
∂2ui
∂a2i
+
∂2uj
∂a2i
+
∂2ui
∂a2j
+
∂2uj
∂a2j
)
−
√√√√(∂2ui
∂a2i
+
∂2uj
∂a2i
+
∂2ui
∂a2j
+
∂2uj
∂a2j
)2
−4
[(
∂2ui
∂a2i
+
∂2uj
∂a2i
)(
∂2ui
∂a2j
+
∂2uj
∂a2j
)
−
(
∂2ui
∂ai∂aj
+
∂2uj
∂ai∂aj
)2]]
From this, it is is clear that if λ2 > 0 ⇒ λ1 > 0 (adding a positive
amount vs. subtracting it). Hence, for both to be positive, the minimum is to
check when λ2 is positive.
0 <
1
2
[(
∂2ui
∂a2i
+
∂2uj
∂a2i
+
∂2ui
∂a2j
+
∂2uj
∂a2j
)
−
√√√√(∂2ui
∂a2i
+
∂2uj
∂a2i
+
∂2ui
∂a2j
+
∂2uj
∂a2j
)2
−4
[(
∂2ui
∂a2i
+
∂2uj
∂a2i
)(
∂2ui
∂a2j
+
∂2uj
∂a2j
)
−
(
∂2ui
∂ai∂aj
+
∂2uj
∂ai∂aj
)2]]
0 <
(
∂2ui
∂a2i
+
∂2uj
∂a2i
+
∂2ui
∂a2j
+
∂2uj
∂a2j
)
−
√√√√(∂2ui
∂a2i
+
∂2uj
∂a2i
+
∂2ui
∂a2j
+
∂2uj
∂a2j
)2
−4
[(
∂2ui
∂a2i
+
∂2uj
∂a2i
)(
∂2ui
∂a2j
+
∂2uj
∂a2j
)
−
(
∂2ui
∂ai∂aj
+
∂2uj
∂ai∂aj
)2]
(
∂2ui
∂a2i
+
∂2uj
∂a2i
+
∂2ui
∂a2j
+
∂2uj
∂a2j
)
>
√√√√(∂2ui
∂a2i
+
∂2uj
∂a2i
+
∂2ui
∂a2j
+
∂2uj
∂a2j
)2
−4
[(
∂2ui
∂a2i
+
∂2uj
∂a2i
)(
∂2ui
∂a2j
+
∂2uj
∂a2j
)
−
(
∂2ui
∂ai∂aj
+
∂2uj
∂ai∂aj
)2]
The square root must be positive, so that means(
∂2ui
∂a2i
+
∂2uj
∂a2i
+
∂2ui
∂a2j
+
∂2uj
∂a2j
)
> 0
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as well, and since the utility function is concave, need ∂
2ui
∂a2j
> 0 and ∂
2uj
∂a2j
> 0.
With those added assumptions, square both sides:(
∂2ui
∂a2i
+
∂2uj
∂a2i
+
∂2ui
∂a2j
+
∂2uj
∂a2j
)2
>
(
∂2ui
∂a2i
+
∂2uj
∂a2i
+
∂2ui
∂a2j
+
∂2uj
∂a2j
)2
−4
[(
∂2ui
∂a2i
+
∂2uj
∂a2i
)(
∂2ui
∂a2j
+
∂2uj
∂a2j
)
−
(
∂2ui
∂ai∂aj
+
∂2uj
∂ai∂aj
)2]
This then becomes:
0 > −4
[(
∂2ui
∂a2i
+
∂2uj
∂a2i
)(
∂2ui
∂a2j
+
∂2uj
∂a2j
)
−
(
∂2ui
∂ai∂aj
+
∂2uj
∂ai∂aj
)2]
0 <
[(
∂2ui
∂a2i
+
∂2uj
∂a2i
)(
∂2ui
∂a2j
+
∂2uj
∂a2j
)
−
(
∂2ui
∂ai∂aj
+
∂2uj
∂ai∂aj
)2]
Hence, convex opponent derivative and the above condition are suﬃ-
cient for positive eigenvalues.
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Appendix D
Proofs and Derivations for Chapter 3
D.1 Proofs for Fallow Fisheries from Section 3.3
D.1.1 Derivations and Proofs under Non-coordination
Finding Πig(pi, p
M
j )
Πig(pi, p
M
j ) = u1 + β
[
(1− r)Πig(pi, pMj ) + rΠib(pi, pMj )
]
(1− β(1− r)) Πig(pi, pMj ) = u1 + βrΠib(pi, pMj )
Πig(pi, p
M
j ) =
u1 + βrΠ
i
b(pi, p
M
j )
(1− β(1− r))
Finding Πib(pi, p
M
j )
Πib(pi, p
M
j ) = u0(pi) + β
[
(pi + p
M
j )
(
u1 + βrΠ
i
b(pi, p
M
j )
(1− β(1− r))
)
+ (1− pi − pMj )Πib(pi, pMj )
]
(
1− β(1− pi − pMj )
)
Πib(pi, p
M
j ) = u0(pi) + β(pi + p
M
j )
(
u1 + βrΠ
i
b(pi, p
M
j )
(1− β(1− r))
)
Multiply through by (1− β(1− r)):(
1− β(1− pi − pMj )
)
(1− β(1− r)) Πib(pi, pMj )
= (1− β(1− r))u0(pi) + β(pi + pMj )
(
u1 + βrΠ
i
b(pi, p
M
j )
)[ (
1− β(1− pi − pMj )
)
(1− β(1− r))− β2r (pi + pMj ) ]Πib(pi, pMj )
= (1− β(1− r))u0(pi) + β(pi + pMj )u1
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Simplifying the coeﬃcient on Πib on the LHS:(
1− β(1− pi − pMj )
)
(1− β(1− r))− β2r (pi + pMj )
= 1− β(1− r)− β(1− pi − pMj ) + β2(1− r)(1− pi − pMj )− β2r
(
pi + p
M
j
)
= 1− β(1− r)− β(1− pi − pMj ) + β2(1− r)(1−
(
pi + p
M
j )
)− β2r (pi + pMj )
= 1− β(1− r)− β(1− pi − pMj ) + β2(1−
(
pi + p
M
j
)− r + r (pi + pMj ))
− β2r (pi + pMj )
= 1− β(1− r)− β(1− pi − pMj ) + β2 − β2
(
pi + p
M
j
)− β2r
= 1− β(1− r)− β(1− pi − pMj ) + β2
(
1− r − pi − pMj
)
Continuing to simplify:
1− β(1− r)− β(1− pi − pMj ) + β2
(
1− r − pi − pMj
)
= 1− 2β + β2 + (β − β2)r + (β − β2) (pi + pMj )
= (1− β)2 + β(1− β)r + β(1− β) (pi + pMj )
= (1− β) [1− β + βr + β (pi + pMj )]
(1− β) [1− β + βr + β (pi + pMj )]Πib(pi, pMj ) = (1− β(1− r))u0(pi) + β(pi + pMj )u1
Πib(pi, p
M
j ) =
(1− β(1− r))u0(pi) + β(pi + pMj )u1
(1− β)
[
1− β + βr + β
(
pi + pMj
)]
Proof of Lemma 3.1
Restatement of Lemma 3.1. There exists a unique interior Markov perfect
equilibrium described by:
βu0(p
M
i )−
[
1− β + βr + β (pMi + pMj )]u′0(pMi )− βu1 = 0
βu0(p
M
j )−
[
1− β + βr + β (pMi + pMj )]u′0(pMj )− βu1 = 0
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Proof. Uniqueness is given by Kuhn-Tucker suﬃciency. The function to be
maximized is concave in p, and the constraints are linear, so they are convex.
Recall, the maximization problem is:
max
pi
(1− β(1− r))u0(pi) + β(pi + pMj )u1
(1− β) [1− β + βr + β (pi + pMj )]
s.t. pi ≥
¯
p
pi ≤ p¯
Assign +λ1i to the inequality pi −
¯
p ≥ 0 and +λ2i to the inequality
p¯− pi ≥ 0. Then the Lagrangian is:
L (p, λ1i, λ2i) =
(1− β(1− r))u0(pi) + β(pi + pMj )u1
(1− β) [1− β + βr + β (pi + pMj )] +λ1i (pi − ¯p)+λ2i (p¯− pi)
FOC:
∂L
∂pi
=
1
(1− β)2
[
1− β + βr + β
(
pi + pMj
)]2 · { [(1− β(1− r))u′0(pi) + βu1]
· (1− β) [1− β + βr + β (pi + pMj )]− β(1− β)[ (1− β(1− r))u0(pi)
+ β(pi + p
M
j )u1
]}
+ λ1i − λ2i = 0
λ1i
(
pi −
¯
p
)
=0, λ1i ≥ 0
(
pi −
¯
p
) ≥ 0
λ2i (p¯− pi) =0, λ2i ≥ 0 (p¯− pi) ≥ 0
The function ∂L
∂pi
can be simpliﬁed a little bit, since the denominator
can cancel with some parts of the numerator. Rewritten as:
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∂L
∂pi
=
[(1− β(1− r))u′0(pi) + βu1]
(1− β) [1− β + βr + β (pi + pMj )]
− β
[
(1− β(1− r))u0(pi) + β(pi + pMj )u1
]
(1− β) [1− β + βr + β (pi + pMj )]2 + λ1i − λ2i = 0
The conditions all together are:
∂L
∂pi
=
[(1− β(1− r))u′0(pi) + βu1]
(1− β) [1− β + βr + β (pi + pMj )]
− β
[
(1− β(1− r))u0(pi) + β(pi + pMj )u1
]
(1− β) [1− β + βr + β (pi + pMj )]2
+ λ1i − λ2i = 0
λ1i
(
pi −
¯
p
)
= 0, λ1i ≥ 0
(
pi −
¯
p
) ≥ 0
λ2i (p¯− pi) = 0, λ2i ≥ 0 (p¯− pi) ≥ 0
Solving, there are three cases to consider:
Case i. pi =
¯
p⇒ λ2i = 0, λ1i ≥ 0
[
(1− β(1− r))u′0(
¯
p) + βu1
]
(1− β)
[
1− β + βr + β
(
¯
p+ pMj
)] + λ1i
=
β
[
(1− β(1− r))u0(
¯
p) + β(
¯
p+ pMj )u1
]
(1− β)
[
1− β + βr + β
(
¯
p+ pMj
)]2
[
(1− β(1− r))u′0(
¯
p) + βu1
]
(1− β)
[
1− β + βr + β
(
¯
p+ pMj
)] ≤ β
[
(1− β(1− r))u0(
¯
p) + β(
¯
p+ pMj )u1
]
(1− β)
[
1− β + βr + β
(
¯
p+ pMj
)]2
Case ii. pi = p¯⇒ λ1i = 0, λ2i ≥ 0
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[(1− β(1− r))u′0(p¯) + βu1]
(1− β)
[
1− β + βr + β
(
p¯+ pMj
)] = β
[
(1− β(1− r))u0(p¯) + β(p¯+ pMj )u1
]
(1− β)
[
1− β + βr + β
(
p¯+ pMj
)]2
+ λ2i
[(1− β(1− r))u′0(p¯) + βu1]
(1− β)
[
1− β + βr + β
(
p¯+ pMj
)] ≥ β
[
(1− β(1− r))u0(p¯) + β(p¯+ pMj )u1
]
(1− β)
[
1− β + βr + β
(
p¯+ pMj
)]2
Case iii.
¯
p < pi < p¯⇒ λ1i = 0, λ2i = 0
[(1− β(1− r))u′0(pi) + βu1]
(1− β)
[
1− β + βr + β
(
pi + pMj
)] = β
[
(1− β(1− r))u0(pi) + β(pi + pMj )u1
]
(1− β)
[
1− β + βr + β
(
pi + pMj
)]2
[
(1− β(1− r))u′0(pi) + βu1
]
=
β
[
(1− β(1− r))u0(pi) + β(pi + pMj )u1
]
[
1− β + βr + β
(
pi + pMj
)]
[
1− β + βr + β (pi + pMj )] [(1− β(1− r))u′0(pi) + βu1]
= β
[
(1− β(1− r))u0(pi) + β(pi + pMj )u1
]
[
1− β + βr + β (pi + pMj )](1− β(1− r))u′0(pi)
+ β
[
1− β + βr + β (pi + pMj )]u1
= β (1− β(1− r))u0(pi) + β2(pi + pMj )u1
(1− β(1− r)) [βu0(pi)− [1− β + βr + β (pi + pMj )]u′0(pi)]
=
[
β
[
1− β + βr + β (pi + pMj )]− β2(pi + pMj )]u1
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Simplifying the coeﬃcient on u1:
β
[
1− β + βr + β (pi + pMj )]− β2(pi + pMj )
=β − β2 + β2r + β2 (pi + pMj )− β2(pi + pMj )
=β − β2 + β2r
=β(1− β(1− r))
(1− β(1− r)) [βu0(pi)− [1− β + βr + β (pi + pMj )]u′0(pi)]
= β(1− β(1− r))u1
(1− β(1− r)) [βu0(pi)− [1− β + βr + β (pi + pMj )]u′0(pi)]
− β(1− β(1− r))u1 = 0
Divide through by (1− β(1− r)) 6= 0:
βu0(pi)−
[
1− β + βr + β (pi + pMj )]u′0(pi)− βu1 = 0
D.1.2 Derivations and Proofs under Coordination
Finding ΠPg (pi, pj)
ΠPg (pi, pj) = 2u1 + β
[
(1− r)ΠPg (pi, pj) + rΠPb (pi, pj)
]
(1− β(1− r)) ΠPg (pi, pj) = 2u1 + βrΠPb (pi, pj)
ΠPg (pi, pj) =
2u1 + βrΠ
P
b (pi, pj)
(1− β(1− r))
Finding ΠPb (pi, pj)
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ΠPb (pi, pj) =u0(pi) + u0(pj)
+ β
[
(pi + pj)
(
2u1 + βrΠ
P
b (pi, pj)
(1− β(1− r))
)
+ (1− pi − pj)ΠPb (pi, pj)
]
[1− β(1− pi − pj)] ΠPb (pi, pj) = u0(pi) + u0(pj) + β(pi + pj)
(
2u1 + βrΠ
P
b (pi, pj)
(1− β(1− r))
)
Multiply through by (1− β(1− r)):
(1− β(1− r)) [1− β(1− pi − pj)] ΠPb (pi, pj)
= (1− β(1− r)) (u0(pi) + u0(pj)) + β(pi + pj)
· (2u1 + βrΠPb (pi, pj))[
(1− β(1− r)) [1− β(1− pi − pj)]− β2r(pi + pj)
]
ΠPb (pi, pj)
= (1− β(1− r)) (u0(pi) + u0(pj)) + 2β(pi + pj)u1
Using the coeﬃcient simpliﬁcations derived for the non-coordination
case, this can be rewritten as:
(1− β) [1− β + βr + β (pi + pj)] ΠPb (pi, pj) = (1− β(1− r)) (u0(pi) + u0(pj))
+ 2β(pi + pj)u1
ΠPb (pi, pj) =
(1− β(1− r)) (u0(pi) + u0(pj)) + 2β(pi + pj)u1
(1− β) [1− β + βr + β (pi + pj)]
Proof of Lemma 3.2
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Restatement of Lemma 3.2. There exists a unique interior Markov perfect
cooperative equilibrium given by:
β [u0(pi) + u0(pj)]− [1− β + βr + β (pi + pj)]u′0(pi)− 2βu1 = 0
β [u0(pi) + u0(pj)]− [1− β + βr + β (pi + pj)]u′0(pj)− 2βu1 = 0
Proof. Uniqueness is the same as for Lemma 3.1. The ﬁrst order conditions
are:
max
pi,pj
(1− β(1− r)) (u0(pi) + u0(pj)) + 2β(pi + pj)u1
(1− β) [1− β + βr + β (pi + pj)]
s.t. pi ≥
¯
p
pi ≤ p¯
pj ≥
¯
p
pj ≤ p¯
Assign +µ1i to the inequality pi −
¯
p ≥ 0 and +µ2i to the inequality
p¯− pi ≥ 0. Then the Lagrangian is:
L (p, µ1i, µ2i, µ1j , µ2j) =
(1− β(1− r)) (u0(pi) + u0(pj)) + 2β(pi + pj)u1
(1− β) [1− β + βr + β (pi + pj)]
+ µ1i
(
pi −
¯
p
)
+ µ2i (p¯− pi) + µ1j
(
pj −
¯
p
)
+ µ2j (p¯− pj)
FOC:
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∂L
∂pi
=
[(1− β(1− r))u′0(pi) + 2βu1]
(1− β) [1− β + βr + β (pi + pj)]
− β [(1− β(1− r)) (u0(pi) + u0(pj)) + 2β(pi + pj)u1]
(1− β) [1− β + βr + β (pi + pj)]2
+ µ1i − µ2i = 0
∂L
∂pj
=
[(1− β(1− r))u′0(pj) + 2βu1]
(1− β) [1− β + βr + β (pi + pj)]
− β [(1− β(1− r)) (u0(pi) + u0(pj)) + 2β(pi + pj)u1]
(1− β) [1− β + βr + β (pi + pj)]2
+ µ1j − µ2j = 0
µ1i
(
pi −
¯
p
)
= 0, µ1i ≥ 0
(
pi −
¯
p
) ≥ 0
µ2i (p¯− pi) = 0, µ2i ≥ 0 (p¯− pi) ≥ 0
µ1j
(
pj −
¯
p
)
= 0, µ1j ≥ 0
(
pj −
¯
p
) ≥ 0
µ2j (p¯− pj) = 0, µ2j ≥ 0 (p¯− pj) ≥ 0
There are multiple cases to consider, basically every possible combina-
tion of how the multipliers could be.1 I will list them, but I will only investigate
the fully interior one for now:
Case i. pi =
¯
p⇒ µ2i = 0, µ1i ≥ 0
Case i.a. pj =
¯
p⇒ µ2j = 0, µ1j ≥ 0
Case i.b. pj = p¯⇒ µ1j = 0, µ2j ≥ 0
Case i.c.
¯
p < pj < p¯⇒ µ1j = µ2j = 0
1Only if the agents are somehow non-symmetric, of course.
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Case ii. pi = p¯⇒ µ1i = 0, µ2i ≥ 0
Case ii.a. pj =
¯
p⇒ µ2j = 0, µ1j ≥ 0
Case ii.b. pj = p¯⇒ µ1j = 0, µ2j ≥ 0
Case ii.c.
¯
p < pj < p¯⇒ µ1j = µ2j = 0
Case iii.
¯
p < pi < p¯⇒ µ1i = µ2i = 0
Case iii.a. pj =
¯
p⇒ µ2j = 0, µ1j ≥ 0
Case iii.b. pj = p¯⇒ µ1j = 0, µ2j ≥ 0
Case iii.c.
¯
p < pj < p¯⇒ µ1j = µ2j = 0
This is the purely interior case, and it is the one under consideration.
Observe that once the multipliers are gone, it is very clear that these
agents are symmetric, so their FOC are quite similar:
[(1− β(1− r))u′0(pi) + 2βu1]
(1− β) [1− β + βr + β (pi + pj)] =
β [(1− β(1− r)) (u0(pi) + u0(pj)) + 2β(pi + pj)u1]
(1− β) [1− β + βr + β (pi + pj)]2
[(1− β(1− r))u′0(pj) + 2βu1]
(1− β) [1− β + βr + β (pi + pj)] =
β [(1− β(1− r)) (u0(pi) + u0(pj)) + 2β(pi + pj)u1]
(1− β) [1− β + βr + β (pi + pj)]2
Multiplying both sides by the LHS denominator:
[
(1− β(1− r))u′0(pi) + 2βu1
]
=
β [(1− β(1− r)) (u0(pi) + u0(pj)) + 2β(pi + pj)u1]
[1− β + βr + β (pi + pj)][
(1− β(1− r))u′0(pj) + 2βu1
]
=
β [(1− β(1− r)) (u0(pi) + u0(pj)) + 2β(pi + pj)u1]
[1− β + βr + β (pi + pj)]
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β [u0(pi) + u0(pj)]− [1− β + βr + β (pi + pj)]u′0(pi)− 2βu1 = 0
β [u0(pi) + u0(pj)]− [1− β + βr + β (pi + pj)]u′0(pj)− 2βu1 = 0
D.1.3 Comparative Statics
Proof of Lemma 3.3
Restatement of Lemma 3.3. Under the assumptions listed, the social plan-
ner's symmetric action pP is larger than the non-cooperative action pM .
Proof. Recall the new assumptions:
u1 > 2u0(
¯
p)
0 ≥ u′′0(p)
[1− β + βr + 2βpP ] > 0
Recall the symmetric conditions for non-coordination and coordination:
β
(
u0(p
M)− u1
)
=
[
1− β + βr + 2βpM]u′0(pM)
2β
(
u0(p
P )− u1
)
=
[
1− β + βr + 2βpP ]u′0(pP )
Subtracting from each other:
β
[(
u0(p
M)− u1
)− 2 (u0(pP )− u1)] = [1− β + βr + 2βpM]u′0(pM)
− [1− β + βr + 2βpP ]u′0(pP )
β
[
u0(p
M)− 2u0(pP ) + u1
]
=
[
1− β + βr + 2βpM]u′0(pM)
− [1− β + βr + 2βpP ]u′0(pP )
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Suppose not. Suppose pP ≤ pM .
i. Case i. pP = pM
Let the value be p.
β [u0(p)− 2u0(p) + u1] = [1− β + βr + 2βp]u′0(p)
− [1− β + βr + 2βp]u′0(p)
β [−u0(p) + u1] = 0
−u0(p) + u1 = 0
u1 = u0(p)
This is a contradiction of the set-up, because u1 > u0(p), for all values
of p in the choice set.
ii. Case ii. pP < pM
β
[
u0(p
M)− 2u0(pP ) + u1
]
=
[
1− β + βr + 2βpM]u′0(pM)
− [1− β + βr + 2βpP ]u′0(pP )
β
[
u0(p
M)− 2u0(pP ) + u1
]
= (1− β + βr) [u′0(pM)− u′0(pP )]
+ 2β
(
pM − pP )] [u′0(pM)− u′0(pP )](
u0(p
M)− u1
) ?≤ 2 (u0(pP )− u1)
u0(p
M) + u1
?≤ 2u0(pP )
If pP < pM ⇒ u0(pP ) > u0(pM). Furthermore, u1 > u0(pP ), so it's a bit
diﬃcult to say what's going on with that sign yet (opposing eﬀects).
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On the other side,
pP < pM ⇒ [1− β + βr + 2βpM] > [1− β + βr + 2βpP ] .
So the coeﬃcient on u′0(p
M) is larger than the coeﬃcient on u′0(p
P ).
a.) No acceleration: [u′′ = 0]
Suppose u′′ = 0⇒ 0 > u′0(pM) = u′0(pP )⇒
β
[
u0(p
M)− 2u0(pP ) + u1
]
= (1− β + βr) · 0
+ 2β
(
pMu′0(p
M)− pPu′0(pP )
)
[
u0(p
M)− 2u0(pP ) + u1
]
= 2
(
pM − pP )u′0(p)
pM > pP and u′0 < 0⇒ RHS < 0.
This means RHS < 0, so LHS should be negative as well:
β
[
u0(p
M)− 2u0(pP ) + u1
]
< 0
u0(p
M)− 2u0(pP ) + u1 < 0
u0(p
M) + u1 < 2u0(p
P )
Contradiction of assumptions.
b.) Deceleration: [u′′ < 0]
Suppose u′′ < 0 (i.e. concave, the function is slowing down). If u′′ <
0, then pP < pM ⇒ 0 > u′0(pP ) > u′0(pM) ⇒ u′0(pM) − u′0(pP ) < 0.
This also means that pMu′0(p
M)− pPu′0(pP ) < 0.
RHS is two negative terms added together so, RHS < 0. This means
that LHS should also be < 0. Contradiction of assumptions.
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c.) Acceleration: [u′′ > 0]
This is a contradiction of weak concavity.
Proof of Lemma 3.4
Restatement of Lemma 3.4. Under the assumptions listed, the following
are the comparative statics of the problem:
• With respect to the discount factor, β, the non-cooperative action is in-
creasing:
∂pM
∂β
> 0,
as is the cooperative action:
∂pP
∂β
> 0.
• With respect to the static good-state reward, u1, the non-cooperative ac-
tion is increasing:
∂pM
∂u1
> 0,
as is the cooperative action:
∂pP
∂u1
> 0.
• With respect to the transition from the good state to the bad state, r, the
non-cooperative action is decreasing:
∂pM
∂r
< 0,
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while the cooperative action is constant:
∂pP
∂r
= 0.
Proof. This proof examines the comparative statics of the respective ﬁrst or-
der conditions using implicit function diﬀerentiation. First, I examine the
comparative statics of the discount factor, β.
F (pM) ≡ β (u0(pM)− u1)− [1− β + βr + 2βpM]u′0(pM) = 0
G(pP ) ≡ 2β (u0(pP )− u1)− [1− β + βr + 2βpP ]u′0(pP ) = 0
For the non-coordination problem:
∂F (pM)
∂β
=
(
u0(p
M)− u1
)
+ βu′0(p
M)
∂pM
∂β
−
[
−1 + r + 2pm + 2β∂p
M
∂β
]
u′0(p
M)
− [1− β + βr + 2βpM]u′′0(pM)∂pM∂β = 0
(
u0(p
M )− u1
)
+
(
1− r − 2pM)u′0(pM )
=
[
1− β + βr + 2βpM]u′′0(pM )∂pM∂β + 2β∂pM∂β u′0(pM )− βu′0(pM )∂pM∂β(
u0(p
M )− u1
)
+
(
1− r − 2pM)u′0(pM )
=
[(
1− β + βr + 2βpM)u′′0(pM ) + 2βu′0(pM )− βu′0(pM )] ∂pM∂β(
u0(p
M )− u1
)
+
(
1− r − 2pM)u′0(pM )
=
[(
1− β + βr + 2βpM)u′′0(pM ) + βu′0(pM )] ∂pM∂β
∂pM
∂β
=
(
u0(p
M )− u1
)
+
(
1− r − 2pM)u′0(pM )
[(1− β + βr + 2βpM )u′′0(pM ) + βu′0(pM )]
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From the earlier assumptions, the denominator is not equal to zero.
Furthermore it is negative.
∂pM
∂β
?
< 0(
u0(p
M)− u1
)
+
(
1− r − 2pM)u′0(pM)
[(1− β + βr + 2βpM)u′′0(pM) + βu′0(pM)]
?
< 0
To ﬁnd the sign of this expression, need to know when the numerator
is negative: (
u0(p
M)− u1
)
+
(
1− r − 2pM)u′0(pM) ?< 0
− (u1 − u0(pM))+ (1− r − 2pM)u′0(pM) ?< 0(
1− r − 2pM)u′0(pM) ?< (u1 − u0(pM))
The numerator is negative when 1−r−2pM is positive or if the following
holds:
0 >
(
1− r − 2pM) > (u1 − u0(pM))
u′0(pM)
(D.1)
For the coordination problem:
∂G(pP )
∂β
=2
(
u0(p
P )− u1
)
+ 2βu′0(p
P )
∂pP
∂β
−
[
−1 + r + 2pP + 2β∂p
P
∂β
]
u′0(p
P )
− [1− β + βr + 2βpP ]u′′0(pP )∂pP∂β = 0
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2
(
u0(p
P )− u1
)
+
(
1− r − 2pP )u′0(pP )
=
[
1− β + βr + 2βpP ]u′′0(pP )∂pP∂β − 2βu′0(pP )∂pP∂β + 2β∂pP∂β u′0(pP )
2
(
u0(p
P )− u1
)
+
(
1− r − 2pP )u′0(pP ) = [1− β + βr + 2βpP ]u′′0(pP )∂pP∂β
∂pP
∂β
=
2
(
u0(p
P )− u1
)
+
(
1− r − 2pP )u′0(pP )
[1− β + βr + 2βpP ]u′′0(pP )
The denominator is negative. Checking when the numerator is negative:
2
(
u0(p
P )− u1
)
+
(
1− r − 2pP )u′0(pP ) ?< 0
−2 (u1 − u0(pP ))+ (1− r − 2pP )u′0(pP ) ?< 0(
1− r − 2pP )u′0(pP ) ?< 2 (u1 − u0(pP ))
If Equation (D.1) holds, then this holds more easily, since pP > pM .
Now I examine the comparative statics of the good-state reward, u1.
F (pM) ≡ β (u0(pM)− u1)− [1− β + βr + 2βpM]u′0(pM) = 0
G(pP ) ≡ 2β (u0(pP )− u1)− [1− β + βr + 2βpP ]u′0(pP ) = 0
For the non-coordination problem:
∂F (pM)
∂u1
=β
(
u′0(p
M)
∂pM
∂u1
− 1
)
− 2β∂p
M
∂u1
u′0(p
M)
− [1− β + βr + 2βpM]u′′0(pM)∂pM∂u1 = 0
[
βu′0(p
M)− 2βu′0(pM)−
(
1− β + βr + 2βpM)u′′0(pM)] ∂pM∂u1 = β[−βu′0(pM)− (1− β + βr + 2βpM)u′′0(pM)] ∂pM∂u1 = β
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∂pM
∂u1
=
−β
[βu′0(pM) + (1− β + βr + 2βpM)u′′0(pM)]
Given the previous assumptions, the denominator is negative, rendering
the whole thing positive.
For the coordination problem:
∂G(pP )
∂u1
= 2β
(
u′0(p
P )
∂pP
∂u1
− 1
)
− 2β∂p
P
∂u1
u′0(p
P )
− [1− β + βr + 2βpP ]u′′0(pP )∂pP∂u1 = 0
2βu′0(p
P )
∂pP
∂u1
− 2β∂p
P
∂u1
u′0(p
P )− [1− β + βr + 2βpP ]u′′0(pP )∂pP∂u1 = 2β
− [1− β + βr + 2βpP ]u′′0(pP )∂pP∂u1 = 2β
∂pP
∂u1
=
−2β
[1− β + βr + 2βpP ]u′′0(pP )
This is positive. In comparing the two:
∂pM
∂u1
=
−β
[βu′0(pM) + (1− β + βr + 2βpM)u′′0(pM)]
∂pP
∂u1
=
−2β
[1− β + βr + 2βpP ]u′′0(pP )
The denominator is smaller, the numerator is larger, so the aﬀect of u1
on pP is much greater than that on pM .
Finally, I examine the comparative statics of the transition probability
from the good state to the bad state, r.
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F (pM) ≡ β (u0(pM)− u1)− [1− β + βr + 2βpM]u′0(pM) = 0
G(pP ) ≡ 2β (u0(pP )− u1)− [1− β + βr + 2βpP ]u′0(pP ) = 0
For the non-coordination problem:
∂F (pM)
∂r
=βu′0(p
M)
∂pM
∂r
− βu′0(pM)
− [1− β + βr + 2βpM]u′′0(pM)∂pM∂r = 0
∂pM
∂r
=
βu′0(p
M)
[βu′0(pM)− (1− β + βr + 2βpM)u′′0(pM)]
The numerator is negative; the denominator is positive if:[
βu′0(p
M)− (1− β + βr + 2βpM)u′′0(pM)] ?> 0
0 > βu′0(p
M)
?
>
(
1− β + βr + 2βpM)u′′0(pM)
For the coordination problem:
∂G(pP )
∂r
=2βu′0(p
P )
∂pP
∂r
− 2β∂p
P
∂r
u′0(p
P )
− [1− β + βr + 2βpP ]u′′0(pP )∂pP∂r = 0
− [1− β + βr + 2βpP ]u′′0(pP )∂pP∂r = 0
∂pP
∂r
= 0
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